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This issue of the Forum looks at 
economic diversification in Middle 
Eastern and North African (MENA) 
countries generally, and in the oil-
producing states in the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) 
specifically. Since the oil price 
collapse in 2014, the diversification of 
oil-producing economies has become 
a hot topic again—‘again’, because 
diversification has been discussed for 
decades and has featured in many 
previous development visions. In 
recent years, in part due to the price 
collapse and a changing international 
energy landscape, it has become a 
more pronounced objective. 
However, it appears that the debate 
on diversification suffers from path 
dependency, lacks specificity, and 
still insufficiently takes into account 
the particular political-economic 
constraints of GCC countries. The 
first challenge lies in its definition: 
diversification of what? Of value 
added? Exports? Revenue? Clearly, 
revenue is the focus of the post-2014 
obsession with diversification, but a 
sole focus on revenue would 
unnecessarily limit discussion of 
policy options in the medium term.  
Diversification efforts in MENA 
(particularly GCC) countries obviously 
correlate with international oil prices. It 
would be naïve to believe a rapid 
decoupling is either feasible or 
necessary in the short term. Economic 
logic favours specialization over 
diversification—individuals and 
enterprises should concentrate on what 
they can do best and where they have 
a comparative advantage. The 
increasing importance of global value 
chains for development emphasizes 
this economic logic, by moving 
competition from entire sectors to 
single stages of production and even 
individual jobs. GCC states hold a 
comparative advantage in oil and gas 
production, so why should they not 
tailor their economies to this sector and 
approach their own diversification in 
the context of the value chain of 
petroleum products? One might argue 
that countries with large resource 
reserves and small populations could 
then simply accept, for the time being, 
that price shocks will happen 
periodically. Of course, GCC countries 
are heterogeneous, with several states 
now having declining reserves and 
sizeable populations. In this context, 
with additional drivers of technological 
advancement and environmental 
unsustainability, diversification is more 
urgent.  
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This issue opens with an article by 
Giacomo Luciani exploring the concept 
of ‘unsustainability’ of oil-exporting Gulf 
economies, which is often asserted as 
evident truth. Sustainability can be 
defined in multiple ways, not all of 
which naturally converge into an 
overarching, organic concept. The 
author shows, for instance, that GDP 
and export diversification are not good 
measures to conclude that these 
economies are unsustainable, arguing 
instead that the Gulf economies are 
diversifying and are much more 
adaptable and competitive than they 
were three or four decades ago. There 
are other potential reasons for 
unsustainability, however, which may 
be politically more relevant in the 
coming years. The main challenge 
might not be in the dimension of 
environmental sustainability, as Gulf 
countries have significant leeway to 
decarbonize oil and gas production with 
carbon capture and storage, reduce 
final consumption with improved 
efficiency and energy pricing reforms, 
and develop clean alternative sources. 
More serious are two other dimensions 
of sustainability: the fiscal dimension 
(excessive reliance on oil revenue for 
funding government operations) and 
the labour dimension (excessive 
reliance on expatriate labour in parallel 
with, and causing, unemployment 
among nationals, especially the youth). 
Manal Shehabi also challenges the 
dominant discourse that economic 
diversification in the GCC countries is 
almost nonexistent. The author argues 
that they indeed have a diversified 
economic base. Nevertheless, this has 
failed to contribute to export revenue or 
to fiscal diversification due to structural 
constraints and economic distortions. 
On the one hand, diversification has 
succeeded, thanks to an open 
exchange trade system and openness 
to expatriate labour with its elastic 
supply. On the other hand, multiple 
factors have constrained the ability of 
GCC governments to reduce their 
overdependence on hydrocarbon 
revenues—including the lack of 
taxation, the concentration of capital in 
the energy industries and abroad in 
sovereign wealth funds, the widespread 
oligopolistic structures, the dominance 
of the public sector, and the 
concentration of the local labour force 
in the public sector. The article 
illustrates these arguments in the 
Kuwaiti context, using a database 
constructed to calibrate an economy-
wide model. The author concludes that 
what the GCC economies need is not 
just economic diversification but better, 
more meaningful, and broader 
diversification that removes many of the 
structural barriers facing the economy.  
Joerg Beutel analyses economic 
diversification in the GCC using data 
from extended input-output tables to 
compare the performance of these 
economies with that of a reference 
case, Norway, which is considered to 
have successfully diversified its 
economy despite having a large oil 
resource base. The article also 
assesses GCC countries’ relative 
progress on sustainable development 
using a new measure, adjusted net 
savings, which measures the ‘true’ rate 
of savings in an economy after 
accounting for investments in physical 
and human capital, depletion of natural 
resources, and damage from 
environmental pollution. This view of 
sustainable development requires that 
the nation passes on an aggregate 
stock of physical, human, and natural 
capital to the next generation that is not 
smaller than the one that currently 
exists. This requires that the loss of 
depleting resources be offset by 
increasing the stock of physical and 
human capital. The article concludes 
that GCC countries have, contrary to 
expectation, collectively performed 
relatively well on diversification, but 
their performance on sustainable 
development varies. 
The next article focuses on the complex 
political contexts within which economic 
diversification needs to take place in 
the MENA countries. Adeel Malik 
argues that economic diversification in 
the Middle East—far from being purely 
a technocratic affair—carries deep 
power implications for three interlocking 
spheres: domestic, regional, and 
geopolitical. By producing a greater 
number and variety of products, 
diversification not only increases the 
complexity of economic exchange but 
also risks generating independent 
constituencies whose political-
economic effects are not neutral for 
either the domestic power structure or 
the prevailing geopolitical order. The 
author calls for a more holistic 
understanding of the challenge of 
diversification. First, successful 
diversification requires a new political 
settlement that allows elites to concede 
greater space to the private sector; 
second, diversification is unlikely to 
succeed without a regional vision that 
fosters complementarities among Arab 
economies and creates a shared 
economic space to deal with emergent 
economic challenges; and third, 
sustained economic change in the 
Middle East requires a wider set of 
concessions that go beyond domestic 
and regional political elites.    
The next three articles focus on the big-
picture economic contexts within which 
MENA oil-exporting countries face 
economic diversification, highlighting 
the process of transition and economic 
transformation. Bassam Fattouh and 
Anupama Sen consider the renewed 
sense of urgency around economic 
diversification in the MENA countries in 
the context of ‘peak demand’ and the 
energy transition. The authors make 
three main arguments. First, the speed 
of the energy transition is highly 
uncertain. Also, since the current 
transition is heavily driven by 
government policies, its speed will not 
be uniform across regions, making it 
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difficult to draw firm conclusions on a 
global scale. Second, the diversification 
strategy adopted by oil-exporting 
countries will be conditioned by the 
speed of the energy transition, during 
which the oil sector will continue to play 
a key role in these economies, 
including in their diversification efforts. 
Thus, oil producers will need to be far 
more strategic in developing their 
energy sector, including the renewables 
sector, strengthening forward and 
backward linkages to help diversify 
their economies. Finally, there is 
interdependence between the success 
of diversification efforts by oil exporters 
and the global energy transition. 
Rabah Arezki provides an overview of 
arguments for economic diversification 
in economies of the Middle East and 
Africa. He argues that if countries were 
to shift their focus from the end goal, 
diversification, to how to get there—that 
is, to the transformation process—they 
might find it easier to diversify. The 
effort involves steps to shift away from 
the dominant oil and gas sector. A 
focus on transformation involves an 
approach to that dominant sector that 
can spill over to, and even help foster, 
other sectors. That is, by embracing 
transformation, countries will focus on 
getting incentives right for managers 
and other economic agents and turn 
technology and innovation, which 
energy markets now see as disruptive 
enemies, into friends. Countries that 
take this approach are less likely to 
stumble or resist change. 
Ali Al-Saffar argues that demographic 
pressures and uncertainties on both the 
supply and demand sides mean that for 
countries that rely on oil and gas 
revenues, the imperative to reorient 
their economies is growing. For a group 
of countries with young, fast-growing 
populations, like Nigeria, Iraq, and 
Saudi Arabia, the current economic 
model, which channels oil and gas 
revenues to public-sector jobs and 
government-led consumption, will be 
increasingly difficult to maintain, even in 
a scenario where oil prices trend 
higher. Across the Middle East, per 
capita income would be 50 per cent 
lower by 2040 in a scenario of 
decreasing prices and decreased 
demand than in a scenario where 
demand keeps growing and prices 
remain robust. At the same time, it 
should not be taken for granted that the 
comparative advantage in energy of 
major producers will diminish in the 
energy transition. The author proposes 
five ways the energy sector in MENA 
countries can adapt and ensure that it 
acts as a platform for development and 
transformation, rather than a crutch for 
an unbalanced economy.  
This is followed by two articles that 
focus on fiscal sustainability— one 
important element of economic 
diversification that tends to receive an 
overwhelming amount of attention. 
Monica Malik and Thirumalai Nagesh 
argue that GCC countries that are most 
resilient, fiscally, in coping with a lower 
oil price environment are those with 
large hydrocarbon reserves relative to 
their populations (hydrocarbon rich per 
capita). These are underpinned by low 
debt and high foreign exchange 
reserves, supporting economic 
sustainability despite high exposure to 
the hydrocarbon sector. These 
economies still need to diversify, but 
because of their fiscal strength, they 
experience less economic pressure 
during times of low prices and reform. 
Although hydrocarbon endowment 
plays a strong role, varying progress in 
the pace of reform since 2014 indicates 
that other economic, social, and 
political factors are also important. The 
United Arab Emirates (hydrocarbon 
richer per capita) and to a lesser 
degree Saudi Arabia (hydrocarbon 
poorer per capita) have been the most 
proactive in fiscal reforms. Looking 
ahead, the author argues that 
deepening the tax base and lowering 
the wage component of government 
spending will be central to boosting 
fiscal sustainability.  
Tom Moerenhout reviews recent pricing 
reform strategies in the GCC countries, 
arguing that while it is widely believed 
that GCC countries still have a long 
way to go in terms of fuel pricing 
reform, progress thus far has been 
remarkable, and has yielded results, 
particularly in terms of lowering 
demand. There appears to be 
consensus among policymakers on the 
criticality of pricing reform. While 
Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab 
Emirates have been able to implement 
formula-based fuel price adjustments 
and have persisted in upwards 
revisions of fuel prices, Saudi Arabia 
and Bahrain have proven that one-off 
reforms can be followed up with further 
rounds when accompanied by 
measures to mitigate adverse impacts 
on consumers. The author concludes 
that while fuel pricing reform may not 
yet be a norm in the GCC economies, it 
is certainly a trend, as reform has 
continued despite the recent recovery 
in oil prices. 
We then move to another important 
element of diversification: the labour 
markets in the MENA countries, 
identified in earlier articles as a key 
enabler of diversification. Martin Hvidt 
discusses  economic diversification in 
the Arab Gulf countries with special 
emphasis on job creation. Over the 
next 15 years, the author estimates, 
more than 500,000 increasingly well-
educated nationals will enter working 
age in the six Gulf countries, and 
increasing numbers will actively seek 
employment. The author uses the 
concept of value chains to address two 
interlinked questions: What kind of jobs 
should these societies aim to create in 
order to secure long-term economic 
growth and social development? And 
how could these states succeed in 
attracting national populations to jobs in 
the private sector?  
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The next four articles contain country 
case studies highlighting different 
aspects of economic diversification. 
Ishac Diwan investigates Saudi 
Arabia’s rentier model of development 
and what could replace it. There is a 
debate between those who believe that 
the collapse of this model will lead to 
instability, and those advocating the 
move from the current mono-sector to a 
modern, diversified, knowledge-based 
economy. This divergence originates in 
the unusual structure of the kingdom’s  
labour market, in which nationals are 
simply not employable in large numbers 
in the private sector. The author shows 
that huge gains could be made if this 
situation changed, as the national 
labour force is grossly underemployed 
as well as increasingly well-educated, 
increasing the opportunity cost of low 
participation. To employ its youth 
gainfully, the author argues, Saudi 
Arabia needs to become a ‘normal oil 
economy’ that exports mostly if not only 
oil but derives national income from the 
work of its own population, largely in 
the service sector. The transition could 
result in a smaller economy but a larger 
national income, with the oil sector 
generating a much larger multiplier 
effect in terms of domestic employment 
of nationals.  
Steffen Hertog discusses Saudi 
Aramco’s political history and position 
in the Saudi system and its growing 
role outside of the upstream sector, 
including in industrialization. Political 
changes under the new Saudi 
leadership have, among other things, 
led to plans for an initial public offering 
of Aramco stock and a large industrial 
restructuring plan under which Aramco 
is planning the debt-financed 
acquisition of a majority stake in 
national petrochemicals giant SABIC 
(Saudi Basic Industries Corporation). 
Aramco’s prominent national role 
reflects its capabilities and has 
garnered considerable political capital 
but also comes with significant 
noncommercial obligations, which often 
are not of its own making. It is too 
important an asset not to be used for 
diversification, but will come under 
closer local and international scrutiny 
as a result. While the kingdom’s 
ambitious industrial diversification 
agenda provides Aramco an 
opportunity to shine, it also pushes the 
firm into a more complex political 
environment and requires it to operate 
in theatres that it is less familiar with.  
Jim Krane discusses strategies 
undertaken by producer countries to 
protect the flow of oil and gas rents 
from climate action, by seeking ways to 
preserve market share for oil in 
general, and by differentiating national 
supplies of crude oil from grades 
produced by other countries. He 
focuses on Saudi Arabia, which has 
developed a sophisticated climate 
strategy in this regard that builds on its 
significant advantages as a low-cost oil 
producer with substantial market and 
investment power. It has staked out an 
early advantage in noncombustion uses 
for oil and gas, and has made 
investments that should place it in a 
strong future position as a relevant 
supplier. As international resolve has 
coalesced around the desirability of 
greenhouse gas mitigation, the author 
argues, the Paris Agreement also 
provides useful political cover for 
unpopular—albeit environmentally 
beneficial—actions like Saudi Arabia’s 
reforms of energy subsidies. 
Petter Nore discusses how Norway’s 
Oil Fund has been a key instrument of 
economic diversification, serving to 
transfer as much capital as possible 
from oil and gas in the ground to other 
forms of capital (e.g. financial assets). 
The 3 per cent annual cap on the 
spending of Oil Fund revenues has led 
to greater macroeconomic stability and 
the ability to live with increased market 
risk. As short-term government 
spending is dependent on the return on 
past savings placed in the Fund, 
government finances enjoy a large 
degree of independence from the oil 
price level. However, a combination of 
exogenous and endogenous factors 
could change this—such as 
simultaneous erosion of the value of 
the Fund’s capital, a faster-than-
expected increase in state expenses, 
and falling returns on investments. 
While Norway can influence some of 
these factors, it has little influence on 
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It is commonly maintained that the 
economies of the oil-exporting 
countries in the Gulf are unsustainable. 
This pessimistic assessment is shared 
by the citizens and political authorities 
of these countries themselves, the 
latter periodically proposing strategies 
or ‘visions’ to overcome perceived 
excessive dependency on the 
petroleum sector. 
In most cases, unsustainability is 
asserted as evident truth, which does 
not need to be substantiated or 
discussed in detail. But exactly why 
should we say that the Gulf oil 
exporters’ economies are 
unsustainable? Precisely defining the 
problem is important if a strategy to 
achieve sustainability is to be worked 
out. 
Sustainability can be defined in multiple 
ways, not all of which naturally 
converge into an overarching, organic 
concept. The most immediate, and 
frequently referred to, concept of 
sustainability is tied to the finite nature 
of all mineral resources: What will 
happen when oil runs out? This 
question has been asked from early in 
the history of the region’s oil production 
and exports, and is quite primordial. It 
indicates a need to find alternative 
sources of value added to substitute for 
that generated by oil production; in 
other words, to diversify economic 
activity as a necessary antidote to the 
intrinsically unsustainable nature of any 
extractive industry. Diversification, or 
lack thereof, is then measured based 
on the share of total value added (i.e. 
GDP) generated by the oil sector. 
However, this is a very crude indicator, 
heavily influenced by volatility in oil 
prices, so that when oil prices are high, 
diversification appears to decline 
drastically, while significant progress 
appears to be made when oil prices 
decline—which of course is nonsense. 
Joerg Beutel’s article in this issue of the 
Oxford Energy Forum deals extensively 
with dilemmas of measuring 
diversification of GDP, and I will not 
repeat his analysis here; suffice it to 
say that things look quite different when 
we adopt more sophisticated indicators 
based on input–output tables. These 
show that diversification, at least in 
some of the Gulf oil-exporting 
countries, has significantly improved 
since the start of the development effort 
in the 1970s. 
Another approach focuses on 
diversification of exports. The rationale 
here may be that, even if oil remains 
available and does not run out in the 
foreseeable future, global demand for it 
may collapse, for whatever reason. The 
trade balances of the major oil 
exporters are in most cases largely 
positive, but non-oil exports are not 
sufficient to balance imports, and a 
complete collapse of oil exports (which 
is certainly an extreme hypothesis) 
would expose these countries to 
massive trade deficits. But even 
accepting this extreme assumption, the 
shift of the trade balance from surplus 
to massive deficit would be 
accompanied by compensatory swings 
in other items of the balance of 
payments. Even limiting the analysis to 
the current account, a total collapse of 
world oil demand would surely be 
followed by a massive decrease in the 
number of expatriate workers, which in 
turn would drastically cut the large 
payments for remittances, and a good 
chunk of merchandise imports. The 
point is: to any shock the market 
provides a counter force, so that the net 
result is never as bad as it may look at 
first sight. 
The table on page 6 ranks key Gulf 
exporters’ Economic Complexity Index 
(ECI) scores for 1996 and 2016. The 
ECI, published by Harvard’s Center for 
International Development, measures 
export diversification and 
competitiveness for 127 countries 
worldwide. The table includes several 
comparator countries, to highlight the 
extent to which superficial impressions 
may be misguided.  
There are several interesting points to 
be noted in this table. To begin with, all 
oil or commodity exporters have low 
economic complexity because of their 
relative specialization. Thus, the US 
ranks lower than one may expect of the 
leading techno-economy in the world, 
and will probably show a further decline 
in the coming years, thanks to Donald 
Trump’s push for ‘energy dominance’ 
(DOI, 2017). It is striking that Mexico is 
ranked as more complex than Canada, 
and both are more complex than 
Norway, which is normally viewed as 
the success case par excellence 
among oil exporters. Russia and India 
are rated barely more complex than 
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates. The latter two are doing 
better than New Zealand, and all Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries 
are doing better than Australia, while 
Iran does just a bit worse. We normally 
do not worry about the sustainability of 
any of the comparator countries (except 
maybe Russia)—so the Gulf economies 
may be unsustainable, but lack of 
economic complexity does not appear 
to be the reason for it. 
Between 1996 and 2016, all Gulf 
countries, including Iran, significantly 
improved their ECI position, while all 
comparator countries except Mexico 
lost ground. So diversification is indeed 
happening, and economic complexity is 
increasing.  
A limitation of the ECI is that it is 
vulnerable to changes in oil prices and 
quite unstable for major oil exporters—
for example, Saudi Arabia ranked 36th 
in 2004, a year of low oil prices, and 
104th in 2008, a year of peak oil prices. 
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However, oil prices were relatively low 
in both years compared here (1996 and 
2006), so the improvement is clearly 
not just due to changes in oil prices. 
Furthermore, oil prices affect all oil 
exporters, so that GCC improvement 
relative to other oil exporters must be 
real. It remains true, however, that low 
oil prices help diversification and high 
oil prices hinder it. At times of growing 
oil prices, diversification may well be 
taking place but be obscured by the 
inflation of value added in the oil sector. 
When prices decline again, 
diversification becomes visible. 
Some further comments are in order. 
First, the structural transformation of an 
economy takes time. Global oil demand 
may peak in 20 years (at a level above 
today’s), but there is no credible 
prospect of oil losing economic 
significance for at least the next 50 
years (more on this in Fattouh and 
Sen’s article in this issue). 
Diversification may become more 
challenging after the early successes (it 
is difficult to diversify when you are 
already diversified to begin with) but we 
should certainly expect further 
improvement in the ranking of the Gulf 
oil exporters. Some massive 
investment projects that have been 
undertaken in the past 10 years have 
yet to fully impact export statistics, 
because of their long gestation and the 
progressive ramp-up of production. 
Second, there are major differences 
between Gulf oil exporters. The gap in 
2016 between Saudi Arabia (ranked 
50) and Iran (ranked 87) is greater than 
the gap between Norway (ranked 39) 
and Saudi Arabia. We do not have an 
ECI for Iraq, but it would surely be 
much worse than Iran’s. And the gap 
between the Gulf economies and oil 
exporters elsewhere in the world is 
huge: Nigeria ranked 125 (out of 127 
countries), Azerbaijan 120, and Angola 
116. Not all countries are doing equally 
well, and relatively few can be said to 
have made real progress in 
diversification. 
My conclusion is that GDP and export 
diversification are not good reasons to 
conclude that the Gulf oil export 
economies are unsustainable. Of 
course, the global economy is 
constantly evolving. Demand, supply, 
and terms of trade of individual 
products change constantly, and 
adaptation is a never-ending task; but 
the Gulf economies are diversifying and 
are today much more adaptable and 
competitive than they were three or four 
decades ago. Diversification is 
happening and is likely to continue, 
progressively though slowly reducing 
dependence on the oil sector—even if 
oil remains a valuable and important 
internationally traded commodity. 
But there are other potential reasons 
for unsustainability, which may be 
politically more relevant in the coming 
years. Notwithstanding the very 
unsatisfactory record so far, I do not 
believe that the main challenge is likely 
to be environmental sustainability, 
because the Gulf countries have 
significant leeway to decarbonize oil 
and gas production with carbon capture 
and sequestration, reduce final 
consumption with improved efficiency, 
and develop clean alternative energy 
sources, whether renewables or 
nuclear (more on this in Krane’s and Al- 
Saffar’s articles in this issue). More 
serious are two further dimensions of 
sustainability: one fiscal (the excessive 
reliance on oil revenue to cover 
ongoing government expenditure) and 
the other labour-related (excessive 
reliance on expatriate labour—
Ranking of Gulf countries and selected comparator countries by 
Economic Complexity Index  
 2016 1996 
Country Rank ECI value Rank ECI value 
United States 10 1.55 7 1.868 
Mexico  21 1.11 25 0.817 
Canada 35 0.696 23 0.898 
Norway 39 0.638 32 0.592 
Russian Federation 48 0.235 38 0.420 
India 49 0.191 56 0.007 
Saudi Arabia 50 0.171 65 −0.153 
United Arab Emirates 51 0.162 80 −0.476 
New Zealand 54 0.124 42 0.313 
Oman 71 0.292 82 −0.510 
Kuwait 73 0.314 89 −0.666 
Qatar 76 −0.396 109 −0.955 
Australia 86 −0.592 60 −0.026 
Iran 87 −0.611 106 −0.915 
Source: Center for International Development, Harvard University, Atlas of Economic 
Complexity.  
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concurrent with, and causing, 
unemployment among nationals, 
especially the youth). 
Excessive dependence on oil revenue 
is evident in all countries except 
perhaps those (Abu Dhabi, Kuwait, and 
possibly Qatar) that can accumulate 
sufficiently large sovereign funds, 
generating revenue which might 
substitute for hydrocarbon rent if and 
when the latter dwindles away. Claims 
about developing non-oil revenue 
sources have been made from time to 
time, but little or no action has ensued. 
Some fees for government services 
have been increased, mostly affecting 
foreign visitors or resident expatriates, 
but they do not amount to much as a 
share of total revenue. Taxes on 
international trade are not especially 
high and conflict with the globalization 
drive under the World Trade 
Organization. Corporate income taxes 
exist but are not seriously enforced. 
Personal income taxes limited to 
expatriates have been proposed, with 
the obvious consequence of 
precipitating a wave of resignation 
threats unless net pay was preserved. 
The only form of taxation that has been 
introduced in some of the Gulf 
countries is VAT at a very low rate; 
VAT, as a consumption tax, weighs 
most heavily on people whose income 
is mostly directed to consumption, 
those with lower incomes. 
Resistance to taxation is quite natural, 
but it takes on increased importance in 
the context of the Gulf rentier states. 
The essence of being a rentier state is 
that revenue is derived from the rest of 
the world and redistributed to the 
national population through government 
expenditure. The redistribution takes 
place very unequally, but almost all 
earners directly or indirectly benefit 
from it and do not contribute to 
government revenue. The difficulty of 
introducing modern forms of taxation is 
increased by the fact that oil revenue, 
albeit with ups and downs, is available, 
so why should the government set it 
aside, like Norway does, and tax its 
own citizens? Developing modern 
taxation requires a sustained effort over 
many years; if a justification may be 
found at times when oil prices are low, 
it evaporates as soon as they increase. 
Most importantly, the creation of a 
modern taxation system is hindered by 
the lack of democratic legitimation. 
Even in countries where parliaments 
are appointed  and purely consultative, 
such as Saudi Arabia, the executive 
refuses to seek approval for the budget, 
and expenditure details remain 
undisclosed. In Kuwait, where the 
National Assembly is elected but the 
government does not need to obtain a 
vote of confidence, parliamentarians 
have consistently shown no appetite for 
raising revenue and a strong inclination 
to defend all existing handouts or even 
propose new ones. 
To the extent that fiscal capability 
cannot be established overnight, delay 
in developing this instrument may 
indeed be unsustainable. This is an 
issue of political more than economic 
sustainability, in the sense that the 
obstacle is in the rentier nature of the 
state and the unwillingness of the 
power structure to evolve towards 
democratic legitimation. But it is also 
compounded by the lack of a taxable 
base, because most nationals are 
employed by the government, and the 
private sector is overly dependent on 
cheap expatriate labour. Ishac Diwan’s 
article in this issue discusses this 
aspect of unsustainability with 
reference to Saudi Arabia, but his 
analysis is valid for all GCC countries. 
Long-term dependence on a constantly 
rotating army of expatriate workers 
translates into declining productivity 
and marginalization of nationals from 
productive employment. 
Thus, sustainability demands that the 
objective of reducing reliance on 
expatriates, which has been official 
government policy as expressed (e.g. 
in successive Five Year Development 
Plans) since at least the early 1980s, 
finally be pursued with determination. 
Resistance from the private sector is to 
be expected and must be overcome.  
Increasing productivity, reducing 
reliance on cheap expatriate labour, 
and offering opportunities for well-paid 
jobs to nationals are the key 
developmental tasks that the private 
sector needs deliver. Diversification is 
not a plus if it means that more 
industries are developed that can only 
survive if continued access to low-cost 
expatriate labour is guaranteed. Only 
projects that can potentially offer 
employment to nationals are truly 
sustainable, and existing industries 
should be pushed to restructure or 
perish by progressively increasing 
wages for expatriates until they reach a 
level that a national would find 
acceptable. 
Eventually, this is also necessary to 
tackle the issue of growing income and 
wealth disparities. Gulf societies have a 
recent past of relative egalitarianism (in 
international comparison). The oil rent 
changed that by creating opportunities 
for vast enrichment which only 
relatively few were able to grasp. After 
a phase of significant social mobility, 
during which rags-to-riches stories did 
materialize, society appears to have 
prematurely sclerotized, consolidating 
the cleavage between the descendants 
of the original founders of fortunes, to 
whom all opportunities are open, and 
the vast majority of the younger 
generation, whose prospects at best 
consist of lower middle class status 
thanks to a government job. 
Growing income and wealth disparities 
may or may not be sustainable. In 
recent decades numerous countries 
governed by democratic institutions 
have become tolerant of greater 
inequality; growth in emerging 
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economies (such as China and India) 
has also been characterized by rapidly 
increasing inequality. But it might be 
dangerous to presume that growing 
inequality will remain politically 
sustainable forever. Hirschman’s tunnel 
effect (Hirshman and Rothschild, 1973) 
may have been at work so far: people 
left behind still viewing the success of a 
few as promise that their turn will come. 
But their turn is not coming, and 
disillusionment may easily turn to rage. 
 
SLOWING THE PUMP? 
WHY GCC ECONOMIES 
HAVE A DIVERSIFIED 
BASE BUT REMAIN 
OVERLY HYDROCARBON-
DEPENDENT 
Manal Shehabi  
According to the dominant discourse, 
economic diversification in most Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries is 
almost nonexistent. The economic 
contraction following the collapse of the 
oil price in mid-2014 amplified concerns 
over the unsustainability of the status 
quo, resulting in renewed calls for 
economic diversification. These 
concerns are valid, given the expected 
decline in hydrocarbon export revenue 
due to growing domestic energy 
consumption, slowing global demand 
for hydrocarbons, high government 
spending commitments, a lower oil 
price environment, and the 
exhaustibility of the resource base. This 
has given rise to multi-decade ‘visions’, 
grandiose economic blueprints and 
wish lists—such as Vision 2040 in 
Oman, Vision 2035 in Kuwait, and 
Vision 2030 in Saudi Arabia. Although 
differing in substance, they all 
emphasize new economic activities and 
the private sector as engines of 
sustainable growth and development in 
the future of these economies, and call 
for the GCC states to become centres 
of excellence in tourism, finance, or 
other services.  
Emphasis on economic diversification 
is not new; historically it was at the 
centre of multi-year development plans. 
Nonetheless, economic 
overdependence on hydrocarbons 
persisted. Most economists believe the 
dominant view in economic literature on 
the Gulf which advance that the primary 
reason for the GCC diversification state 
is the so-called Dutch disease.  This 
phenomenon refer to a boom in natural 
resource exports leading to significant 
appreciation of nominal (and real) 
exchange rates (or inflation in countries 
with fixed exchange rates), adversely 
affecting other tradables.  
Notwithstanding widespread views that 
they are undiversified, GCC economies 
do in fact have a diversified economic 
base, through their sovereign wealth 
funds (SWFs) as well as their non-oil 
sectors. But this base has failed to 
contribute to export revenue or fiscal 
diversification, due to structural 
constraints and economic distortions. 
On the one hand, diversification has 
succeeded thanks to an open 
exchange trade system and openness 
to expatriate labour with elastic supply. 
On the other hand, multiple factors 
have constrained the ability of GCC 
governments to reduce 
overdependence on hydrocarbons 
revenues—including lack of taxation, 
concentration of capital in the energy 
industries and abroad in SWFs, 
widespread oligopolistic structures, 
dominance of the public sector, and 
concentration of the local labour force 
in the public sector. This article 
illustrates these points in the Kuwaiti 
context.  
Show me the diversification 
To varying degrees, the GCC 
economies’ overdependence on 
hydrocarbons is evidenced by the fact 
that their economic indicators, such as 
gross domestic product (GDP) and net 
foreign reserves, have tended to 
closely follow hydrocarbons production 
and prices.  
But this overdependence is not due to 
lack of economic diversification. In fact, 
the size of the non-energy base has 
increased over time in all hydrocarbon-
exporting Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) economies except Libya. 
Given limited data availability, Figure 1 
uses the share of mining, 
manufacturing, and utilities in GDP as a 
proxy for the share of the energy 
sectors (which include crude oil/gas, 
refining, electricity, and water 
desalination). The lower this share, the 
more diversified the economy.  
There are two caveats to consider 
when examining the data in this figure. 
First, they overestimate the share of the 
energy sectors because, while refining 
makes up the bulk of manufacturing in 
these countries, there is also some 
limited non-energy-related 
manufacturing. Second, the data are 
only indicative. The 2013 figures are a 
more accurate representation of the 
state of diversification than those of 
2015 because the share of the energy 
sectors is positively correlated with the 
oil price. Between 2013 (when the oil 
price was high) and 2015 (when it had 
collapsed), there were almost no 
significant structural changes in any 
GCC economy, but the share of non-
energy increased substantially—from 
7 per cent in Bahrain to 18 per cent in 
Kuwait and Qatar—due to the decline 
of the value of energy exports coupled 
with reverse ‘Dutch disease’ dynamics 
that led to increases in non-energy 
exports aided by the depreciating 
exchange rate (a consequence of the 
collapse of the oil price). Thus, 2015 
data overestimate the state of 
diversification in MENA economies.  
Notwithstanding these caveats, in 
2013, even the least diversified GCC 
economies, Kuwait and Qatar, still had 
non-energy sectors exceeding 
35 per cent of GDP. By contrast, in  
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Norway, often considered the 
exemplary oil-dependent economy, the 
share of mining, manufacturing, and 
utilities in GDP was 45 per cent in 1975 
and 34 per cent in 2013. This 
diversified base in the GCC has been 
aided by an open exchange trade 
system, savings in the SWFs, and 
openness to expatriate labour. The 
flexibility of expatriate labour enables 
the relatively low-cost free entry and 
exit of labour into the market, which 
helps to cushion the economic effect of 
oil shocks. The ability to withdraw from 
the SWFs to cover deficits offer another 
safety valve.  
A closer look at the GCC 2015 national 
accounts confirms the size of the non-
energy sectors as well as their inability 
to contribute to export or earnings 
diversification. National accounts 
typically include non-mining sectors 
(which they consider as a measure of 
diversification) and mining sectors.  
Within these sectors, they place 
refining, utilities, and services in the 
non-mining category, and crude sales 
and upstream activities in the mining 
category. Such accounting is 
misleading because energy-related 
activities are included in both 
categories. As such, I recategorized the 
national accounts data into energy 
sectors (include crude, mining, refining, 
electricity, and water desalination) and 





















Source: UN Input Output Tables (2018). 
 
Table 1. GCC non-energy sectors, 2014 
Country  
Share of non-energy sectors (%) 





Bahraina  60 31 17 
Kuwait b  39 9 9 
Oman c  46 16 21 
Qatar d  68 15 10 
Saudi Arabia e  50 20 12 
UAE f  55 22 40 
Notes: The share of the non-energy sectors in value added was calculated as 100 per cent minus the share of the energy sectors. Unless 
otherwise stated, the share in government revenue was based on data reported by the government and may include income from oil and 
gas investments; thus, it may be overstated. For United Nations value added data (2018), sectoral data on the share of non-energy in value 
added were not available in the national accounts, so UN data for mining, manufacturing (including refining), and utilities were used as 
proxies; therefore, these figures may be underestimated. For Qatar, government revenue excludes income from oil and gas investments. 
Sources are listed below.  For UAE, the share of non-energy exports is for 2016. 
Data Sources: a: For Bahrain: National accounts and budget from Bahrain Open Portal Data (2018); government budget from Bahrain 
Ministry of Finance (2018); United Nations value added data (2018). 
b: For Kuwait: National accounts from Kuwaiti Central Statistical Bureau (2018); government budget form Kuwait Ministry of Finance (2018). 
c: For Oman: National accounts from Oman National Centre for Statistics and Information (2018); government budget from Oman Ministry of 
Finance (2015); United Nations value added data (2018). 
d: For Qatar: National accounts from Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics (2018), Staff Concluding Statement for the 2018 Article 
IV Mission (2018); IMF Qatar Country Report (2013).  
e: For Saudi Arabia: National accounts from Saudi General Authority for Statistics (2018); government budget from Saudi Arabia Ministry of 
Finance (2018). 
f: For UAE: United Nations value added data (2018); UAE Annual Economic Report (2016, 2017).  
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non-energy sectors (everything else). 
Table 1 details the share of the non-
energy sectors in value added, exports, 
and government budgets in the GCC.  
These data reveal the following 
insights: 
 The non-energy sectors contribute a 
significant part of value added—
more than one-third in 2014 in 
Kuwait and Qatar, and more than 
one-half in the remaining GCC 
states. Other oil-dependent 
economies in the MENA region 
have similar trends. In 2014, the 
share of sectors other than energy, 
manufacturing, and utilities was 
52 per cent of gross valued added 
(at current prices) in Iraq, 
68 per cent in Iran, 66 per cent in 
Algeria, and 34 per cent in Libya 
(UN, 2018).  
 GCC non-energy-sector outputs are 
mostly non-traded, with limited 
contribution to exports. Their export 
also include re-exports, which are 
not produced locally, and are 
affected by real exchange rate 
dynamics and the adjustment 
valves of an economy. This 
suggests that the various reforms 
and development plans have not 
met their targets of significantly 
increasing non-energy exports. 
 The non-energy sectors make an 
even smaller contribution to state 
budgets, partly because they are 
largely state-owned and/or have 
negligible tax obligations, while 
receiving subsidies.   
Thus, diversification has progressed in 
the GCC, but it has contributed little to 
increasing productive capacity, 
diversifying government earnings, or 
increasing export revenue. The 
following section explains the reasons 
for these failures using illustrations from 
Kuwait, which has a similar economic 
structure to the other GCC states.  
The case of Kuwait  
Table  shows the key structural 
elements and sectors of the Kuwaiti 
economy, as well as their contributions 
to value added and exports.  Kuwait’s 
non-energy sectors contributed 
38.2 per cent of Kuwait’s GDP at factor 
cost (the same as the share in value 
added) in 2013. Data from 2013 are 
used because examining the economy 
during high oil prices offers a more 
accurate assessment, and 2013 data 
are the most recently available prior to 
2015. 
 
Table 2. Kuwait’s economic structural elements, 2013 
Sector  % of GDPFC 
% of total 
exports 




Energy sectors     
Mining 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Crude oil 48.9 42.1 50.5 50.3 
Gas and petro-services 0.9 1.3 50.5 50.3 
Oil refining 5.4 38.6 72.6 72.2 
Electricity 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other network services 4.6 4.6 32.3 31.4 
Non-energy sectors     
Agriculture 0.3 0.0 1.3 −63.3 
Chemicals 1.1 3.4 37.4 −1.7 
Light manufacturing 0.8 0.4 4.1 −56.0 
Heavy manufacturing 0.8 1.9 8.1 −72.0 
Construction 2.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Transport 3.4 5.7 38.9 14.1 
Financial services 7.8 0.7 4.1 −1.3 
Other services 21.7 1.2 1.8 −15.6 
Note: GDPFC is GDP at factor cost, which is the sum of value added in each industry. 
Source: Shehabi (2017) model database (social accounting matrix (SAM)) constructed by the author for 2013.  
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Despite their substantial contribution to 
value added, the non-energy sectors 
have failed to reduce Kuwait’s heavy 
dependence on oil. Their historic 
inability to create productive capacity or 
diversified earnings is due to structural 
constraints and economic distortions 
such as those outlined below. 
 Targeting nontradables: Non-
energy output consists mostly of 
nontradables, with only 9 per cent 
of it exported, a meagre 13 per 
cent of total exports (Figure 2). 
The energy sectors export only 55 
per cent of their output but 
contribute 87 per cent of total 
exports, which generate 
approximately 91 per cent of the 
government’s revenue. In sum, 
despite their sizable share of the 
economy, the non-energy sectors 
contribute little to earning 
diversification.  
 Fiscal structure: The non-energy 
sectors’ contribution to 
government revenue is negligible, 
because they pay almost no taxes 
but receive subsidies. Therefore, 
they have no effect on fiscal 
diversification. 
 Captive capital: Most of the 
economy’s capital is locked, 
largely in capital-intensive public-
owned energy industries. As 
shown in Shehabi (2019a), labour 
contributes only 8 per cent of the 
energy sectors’ value added.  
Non-energy sectors, by contrast, 
are more labour intensive, with 
labour contributing 55 per cent of 
their value added. Further, 
government capital surplus (owing 
to oil exports) is funnelled mostly 
to investments abroad in the 
SWFs (and some foreign aid). 
These factors limit capital mobility 
and the investment needed to 
expand the non-energy sectors.  
Figure  illustrates the contribution of 
non-energy sectors to the economy and 
the structural constraints and economic 
distortions.  
In addition to its dependence on 
hydrocarbons, Kuwait’s economy is 
constrained by other structural 
rigidities, as described below.  
 Public-sector dominance: In 
2014, the public sector 
generated over 65 per cent of 
GDP, compared with a private 
sector share that has ranged 
between 21 per cent (1989) and 
41 per cent (2010). The public 
sector contributes to two-thirds 
of total capital formation. It is 
also the employer of choice for 
Figure 2. Economic and structural constraints on the contribution of the non-energy sectors in Kuwait 
 
Notes: * The blue-green blocks represent the energy sectors, and the yellow blocks the non-energy sectors.  
* In the second row, for energy sectors in blue-green, the dark shaded blocks on the left represent portion of sectoral output used for 
domestic consumption, and the light shaded blocks on the right represent exported share of output. The same applies for the yellow blocks 
representing the non-energy sectors. 
* In the third row, the light shaded blue-green block correspond to the exported energy output in the second row. 
* The red and blue arrows represent direction of flow of funds of investments, subsidies, and taxes.  
Source: Author’s representation. 
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Kuwaiti workers; it employs the 
majority of them, and they make 
up the majority of public-sector 
employees. Despite privatization 
efforts, Kuwait’s private sector 
remains small, and the public 
sector continues to dominate the 
economy in various industries, 
including petroleum. This 
dominance of the public sector 
crowds out the private sector 
and minimizes innovation.  
 Public-sector employment 
policies: Two factors contribute 
to the fiscal rigidity that limits the 
scope and flexibility of public 
expenditures. First is the size of 
current expenditure, which 
constitutes 80 per cent of 
government expenditure; half of 
it funds the public-sector wage 
bill. Second is the size of 
transfers and subsidies to 
households and firms. In 2014, 
these represented more than 
half of the government’s total 
spending and included 
pervasive and conspicuously 
high energy subsidies estimated 
by the EIA at a 70 per cent 
subsidization rate in 2015 (the 
fifth highest globally and 
contributing to Kuwait’s rank as 
the world’s sixth highest energy 
consumer per capita). Despite 
reforming gasoline prices and 
electricity prices for expatriates 
and for commercial use, these 
rigidities persist and any attempt 
to reduce them faces severe 
political opposition. These 
transfers have serious negative 
implications for diversification 
because they are distortionary, 
enabling the public sector to 
affect supply and prices and 




 The labour market: The non-
energy sectors include some 
public firms and all private firms, 
which hire predominantly 
expatriate labour. There are 
effectively two separate labour 
markets. Expatriates comprise 
83 per cent of Kuwait’s labour 
force; most are employed in the 
private sector at lower wages 
and on flexible labour contracts 
linked to employers, through a 
strict employer-sponsorship 
system called kafāla. Access to 
expatriate labour offers large 
efficiency gains and an 
economic cushion against oil 
price shocks (Shehabi, 2017), 
so there is little incentive to 
employ local labour. Kuwaiti 
labour is largely concentrated in 
the public sector and enjoys 
guaranteed jobs with secured, 
long-term (inflexible) contracts. 
Further, the bloated public 
sector (which employs 
77 per cent of Kuwaitis) 
prioritizes indigenous 
employment and offers salaries 
exceeding those in the private 
sector for similar levels of 
education and technical training. 
This offers limited incentives for 
locals to move to the private 
sector, even with the wage 
equalization mechanisms 
provided by Kuwaitization 
polices (Shehabi, 2018). 
Therefore, the non-energy 
sectors offer little contribution to 
local employment growth. 
 The SWFs: Kuwait has two 
SWFs managed by the Kuwait 
Investment Authority (KIA), one 
fund for macro-stabilization and 
fiscal rebalancing, and a long-
term intergenerational fund 
established as an alternative 
source of government revenue 
to oil. The KIA is an important 
institutional and financial feature 
of the Kuwaiti economy, acting 
as a financing alternative during 
oil revenue shortages and a 
means to smooth out short-run 
governmental expenditures.  
The non-energy sectors do not 
contribute to SWF investments. 
Large investments in the SWFs, 
estimated at $524 billion (SWF 
Institute, n.d.), locks a large part 
of the budget surplus abroad. 
This funds’ value estimate are 
more than three times Kuwait’s 
record-high GDP in 2013 and 
more than five times that year’s 
export revenues. Investing in the 
KIA is a deliberate policy choice 
to offer a diversified alternative 
revenue source to sectoral 
diversification in the economy.  
The success of the SWFs in 
offering a fiscal cushion diverts 
resources away from private-
sector growth and 
diversification. 
 Dominance of oligopolistic 
firms: Oligopolies are pervasive 
in Kuwait, as evidenced by the 
high concentration of capital and 
revenue within a few companies 
across all industries (Shehabi, 
2017). It is not surprising that 
the high levels of minimum 
efficient scale delivered by 
modern technology and the 
smallness of Kuwait (and similar 
GCC economies) should lead to 
the emergence of oligopolies or 
monopolies, particularly in 
protected services. While it is 
natural for all economies to have 
oligopolies, short-run oligopoly 
rent is destroyed in the long run 
by competition-induced 
innovation and limit “creative 
destruction” (the process by 
which new innovation destroys 
rents of existing monopolies, 
revolutionizing the economic 
structure from within). This is 
problematic to the extent that 
   
13 
JUNE 2019: ISSUE 118 – ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION IN THE MENA 
OXFORD ENERGY FORUM 
oligopolies distort markets and 
prices and their sustained rents 
engender strategic behaviours 
that detract from growth-
enhancing innovation. 
Importantly to Kuwait and other 
small economies with similarly 
high specialization, oligopolies 
exhibit distortionary behaviour 
that is exacerbated by high 
subsidies, because subsidizing 
the negatively impacted 
industries enables them to be 
profitable at their existing levels 
of investment and innovation, 
thus reducing their economic 
incentives to innovate and 
expand. Government-dominated 
industries are, by definition, 
monopolies and oligopolies. 
Government reform plans to 
increase industrial 
competitiveness and expand the 
private sector have had limited 
success, largely due to strong 
public and parliamentary 
opposition. 
These constraints and distortions, 
rather than the often-cited ‘Dutch 
disease’, are the primary causes of the 
weak role of the non-energy sectors in 
the Kuwaiti economy.  
These arguments have been supported 
by simulations (Shehabi, 2017; Shehabi 
2019a) using a general equilibrium 
model of the Kuwaiti economy that 
embodies the country’s unique features 
and represents oligopoly and its 
regulation. In an analysis that is the first 
to feature diversification as a central 
theme of energy subsidy reform in the 
MENA context, Shehabi (2019a) has 
shown that energy subsidy reform 
minimally improves Kuwait’s non-oil 
export base due to real exchange rate 
dynamics and the adjustment valves 
(namely expatriate labour exit and the 
SWFs’ funds which offer a cushion to 
the economy following economic 
shocks, like low oil prices). Reforming 
energy subsidies in an environment of 
low oil prices has a limited effect on 
diversification to the extent that energy 
subsidy reform is contractionary for the 
overall economy. Yet this contraction 
reduces some oligopoly markups 
(profits earned above producer average 
cost), which translates to overall 
improvement in the economy. This, 
coupled with the depreciating real 
exchange rate, drives expansion in the 
non-energy exporting sectors, but to a 
fairly limited extent. Reverse Dutch 
disease dynamics are thus very limited 
due to the idiosyncrasies and 
constraints of the Kuwaiti economy. 
The large share of oligopolies in the 
domestic market, low elasticity of 
substitution between imports and 
locally produced goods, and share of 
imports in intermediate inputs of non-
energy tradables limit expansion in 
non-oil sectors required to achieve 
meaningful non-energy diversification.  
What the economy thus needs is not 
more diversification, but better 
diversification that can help diversify 
earnings and reduce the economy’s 
exposure to oil price and demand 
shocks. This requires relaxing some of 
the constraints and distortions 
described above and increasing 
economic incentives for innovation, 
labour mobility, exporting non-energy 
output, and sectoral growth. Shehabi 
(2019a; 2019b) examines some 
hypothetical yet potentially politically 
viable policy options (because they are 
already called for in existing policies) 
that would relax some economic 
constraints.  These studies find that 
competition and productivity shocks 
would achieve diversification effects, 
which would be further extended by the 
movement of Kuwaiti labour from the 
public to the private sector. These 
results confirm the argument put forth 
in this article that the state of 
diversification in Kuwait is due largely 
to economic and structural constraints 
and distortions, and that relaxing them 
is necessary to achieving better 
diversification that will be meaningful to 
the long-term economic sustainability of 
the country.  
Policy implications 
GCC economies have a diversified 
economic base, but this base has made 
only minimal contributions to earnings, 
exports, fiscal diversification, and 
therefore sustainability, due to the 
structural factors described in this 
article. What the GCC economies need, 
thus, is better economic diversification 
that is more meaningful and can reduce 
overdependence on hydrocarbons.  
Trade-offs arise from those constraints 
and distortions—most notably between 
fiscal stabilization on the one hand and 
diversification, industrial expansion, 
welfare, cost of living, and labour 
market stability on the other. A distinct 
trade-off exists between efficiency 
gains from expatriate labour and the 
expansion of the local labour force in 
the private sector.  
These factors have serious implications 
for energy and economic policy in the 
GCC, which since mid-2014 has 
focused predominantly on achieving 
fiscal sustainability and economic 
diversification away from hydrocarbons 
(as well as energy mix diversification, 
which is not addressed in this article). 
Achieving both fiscal reform and 
diversification is an ambitious goal and 
is hindered by these countries’ 
economic and political constraints and 
distortions. Yet with appropriate 
incentives, the ‘reverse Dutch disease’ 
effect could be considerably stronger, 
without becoming a panacea. For 
instance, an increase in overall 
productivity levels would translate to 
increased diversification and non-
energy exports, as would the increased 
mobility of capital and labour. 
Diversification can be further enhanced 
through efficiency-enhancing structural 
changes.  
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In developing petro-economies with 
pervasive oligopolies, like those of the 
GCC, microeconomic reform (such as 
competition reform) can be another 
channel through which to achieve 
efficiency and drive the diversification 
effects of energy and fiscal subsidy 
reforms. 
Finally, while achieving better economic 
diversification requires reducing 
distortions and relaxing some of the 
constraints described in this article, this 
would be a politically complex process, 
as some of these distortions (such as 
high subsidies) have historically 
contributed to political stability. 
Therefore, to achieve meaningful 
diversification, economic reform ought 
to be implemented as part of a larger 
reform package that also includes 
social, energy, environmental, cultural, 





DEVELOPMENT OF GULF 
COOPERATION COUNCIL 
COUNTRIES 
Joerg Beutel  
For decades, most countries’ exports 
and imports have grown more rapidly 
than domestic production. This is a 
strong indication that, besides foreign 
trade in final products, trade in 
intermediates is also becoming 
increasingly important. Globalization in 
production is changing the way in which 
nations interact, and any analysis of 
diversification should therefore also 
encompass the worldwide exchange of 
intermediates in production. For this 
reason, an input-output approach, 
which accounts for the role of 
intermediates, is more appropriate for 
any analysis of diversification than a 
traditional approach based purely on 
macroeconomic data.  
This article analyses economic 
diversification in Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) countries using data 
from extended input-output tables to 
compare the performance of these 
economies with that of a reference 
case, Norway, which is considered to 
have successfully diversified its 
economy despite having a large oil 
resource base. It also assesses these 
countries’ relative progress on 
sustainable development using a new 
measure, adjusted net savings, which 
measures the true rate of savings in an 
economy after accounting for 
investments in physical and human 
capital, depletion of natural resources, 
and damage from environmental 
pollution. This view of sustainable 
development requires that the country 
pass on an aggregate stock of physical, 
human, and natural capital to the next 
generation that is not smaller than the 
one that currently exists. This requires 
that the loss of depleting resources be 
offset by increasing the stock of 
physical and human capital. The article 
concludes that GCC countries have, 
contrary to expectation, collectively 
performed relatively well on 
diversification, but their performance on 
sustainable development varies. 
Trends in production, foreign trade, 
and GDP 
If exports and imports are growing 
faster than GDP, the shares of exports 
and imports in GDP are also 
increasing. Furthermore, if net exports 
grow faster than GDP, the purchasing 
power of the nation is increasing, and 
imports also tend to grow faster than 
GDP. Among the 10 largest economies 
of the world (G10) the most striking 
examples of an increase of the share of 
exports in GDP between 1995 and 
2016 are Germany (24.1 per cent), 
India (7.9 per cent), Japan (7.2 per 
cent), France (6.9 per cent), Italy (5.1 
per cent), and Brazil (5.1 per cent). 
Substantial increases in the share of 
imports in GDP occurred for Germany 
(16.6 per cent), France (10.3 per cent), 
India (8.2 per cent), Japan (7.5 per 
cent), and Italy (5.4 per cent). For the 
G10, the increase of the export share in 
GDP during 1995–2016 was 4.7 per 
cent; for the import share in GDP it was 
5.2 per cent.  
In the GCC countries during 1995–
2016, the share of exports in GDP 
increased by 12.9 per cent, while the 
share of imports in GDP increased by 
14.0 per cent. The most rapid increase 
of the export share was experienced by 
the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (57.9 
per cent) and Oman (14.0 per cent). 
Similar results were observed for the 
import share in GDP for UAE (41.3 per 
cent) and Oman (17.0 per cent). 
Intermediate consumption, value 
added, and output 
The numbers above suggest that 
during the last 20 years, economic 
globalization has increased worldwide 
interdependencies in production, 
leading to the intermediate 
consumption of goods and services 
becoming a key element in the 
intensification of economic 
diversification. If the consumption of 
intermediate products is growing above 
its GDP growth rate, an economy is 
moving towards more complex 
participation in interindustrial 
production. At present, the challenge 
for many countries is to participate 
successfully in the international value-
added chain of production. In 1995–
2011, the share of intermediates in total 
output for the G10 countries increased 
by 5.9 per cent—in other words, their 
production processes became more 
complex and more interdependent. 
During the same period, the share of 
intermediates in total output increased 
in China by 6.7 per cent and declined 
by 0.4 per cent in the United States.  
For the GCC countries combined, the 
share of intermediates and gross value 
added in total output was more or less 
constant during the last 20 years. 
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in Saudi Arabia by 
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dependence on a single dominant 
industry or a few natural-resource-
based products, as well as a change 
toward increased complexity and 
quality of output (Beutel, 2012).  
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, the 
most widely used measure of market 
concentration and diversification, is the 
sum of squared shares of the various 
industries in gross value added. In the 
normalized form, the index ranges from 
0 to 1; lower scores indicate greater 
diversification (more different industries 
with shares in value added). The figure 
above plots the index for recent 
decades for the GCC countries.  
Starting from the first oil boom in 1974 
and the second oil boom in 1978, the 
index fell steadily until 1998, indicating 
successful diversification. However, at 
the end of the last century, the recovery 
of oil prices after a long period of 
relatively low prices brought new 
turbulence in the trend of diversification 
in most GCC countries. 
New assessment of GCC countries 
with input-output data 
The best way to measure the 
relationship between intermediate 
consumption, gross value added, and 
final demand is through the use of 
input-output tables, which are derived 
from supply and use tables that are an 
integral part of the System of National 
accounts (Beutel, 2017). 
An input-output table is a matrix with 
detailed information on the production 
of goods and services in an economy. It 
details the intermediate and final uses 
of domestic and imported goods and 
services, as well as net taxes on 
products and industries’ gross value 
added. Table columns show required 
inputs and corresponding cost 
structures of industries and final 
demand categories (consumption, 
investment, exports), while rows show 
the sales or output structure for goods 
and services and components of value 
added (compensation of employees, 
net taxes on production, consumption 
of fixed capital, net operating surplus). 
Extended input-output tables can 
provide additional information on 
investment, capital, and labour, as well 
as energy, emissions, natural 
resources, waste, sewage, and water.  
An example of an extended input-
output table is shown in Table 1. Rows 
1–16 represent a traditional input-
output table and rows 17–50 represent 
an extension. 
Extended input-output tables provide 
rich data for studying sustainable 
development and the impact of 
environmental policies.  
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of industry diversification for GCC countries, 1970–2016 
 
Source: Data from National Accounts Estimates of Main Aggregates—United Nations Statistics Division. 
Note: Index values were calculated based on data from the following seven industries:  agriculture, hunting, 
forestry and fishing; mining and utilities; manufacturing; construction; wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and 
hotels; transport, storage, and communication; and other activities. 
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Traditional input-output indicators 
for GCC countries 
Only a few GCC countries compile and 
publish national supply, use, and input-
output tables for their national 
accounts. This article focuses on input-
output tables for Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait, with Norway serving as the 
reference country. The input-output 
data were extracted from the input-
output tables of the OECD (OECD, 
2018). The new Handbook of Supply- 
Use and Input-Output Tables with 
Extensions and Applications of the 
United Nations (United Nations, 2018) 
gives guidance on the compilation and 
main applications.  
The data in Table 2 reveal that the 
shares of intermediate consumption of 
products and gross value added in total 
output did not change much in Saudi 
Arabia and Norway during 2005–2011. 
The shares of intermediates in total 
output were significantly lower in Saudi 
Arabia than in Norway (31 vs. 46 per 
cent of output), as were the shares of 
imported intermediates (5 vs. 10 per 
cent). 
Direct input coefficients reflect the 
direct input requirements of products 
for a specific industry, while cumulative 
input coefficients represent both direct 
and indirect input requirements of 
products at all stages of production. 
Cumulative input coefficients are often 
used to identify an industry’s backward 
linkages. The column totals of the direct 
input coefficients and the Leontief 
Inverse input coefficients reflect the 
intensity of backward linkages. The row 
totals of the direct output coefficients 
and the Ghosh Inverse output 
coefficients show the intensity of 
forward linkages. 
On average Saudi Arabia reached 95 
per cent of the Leontief Inverse for 
domestic products of the reference 
country, Norway. In other words, by 
2011 Saudi Arabia had reached an 
international level of industrial 
diversification.  If imported intermediate 
inputs are included, the level of 
diversification appears to have reached 
86 per cent of Norway’s.  
A similar comparison can be made for 
the input-output data of Kuwait and 
Norway – shown in Table 3. 
Data for 2005–2013 show a clear trend 
in the use of domestic intermediates in 
Kuwait. In 2013 Kuwait (with 31.4 per 
cent of output) had almost reached the 
level of Norway (with 32.8 per cent of 
output). However, the share of imported 
intermediate inputs in Kuwait (5.5 per 
cent) was much lower than the share in 
Norway (11.1 per cent). The share of 
gross value added in output for Kuwait 
(64.8 per cent) was about 10 per cent 
higher than for Norway (54.6 per cent), 
indicating the potential for more 
diversification.   
The backward linkages for domestic 
inputs in Kuwait reached 95.8 per cent 
of Norway’s. They even exceeded 
Norway’s (108.8 per cent) if imported 
inputs are included. Thus, in Kuwait, 
the potential to induce more 
diversification should not be based on a 
general policy of promoting more import 
substitution but rather on a specific 
policy of encouraging more imports of 
intermediates.   
Primary Diversity Index 
Economic diversity has often been 
promoted as a means to achieve 
economic stability and growth. Some 
empirical studies have related higher 
levels of diversity to both economic 
stability and overall levels of economic 
activity. Diversity measures used in 
these studies have tended to be 
narrow, usually emphasizing the 
distribution of employment across 
industries. Such measures are 
unsatisfactory because they do not 
capture inter-industrial linkages.  
An alternative approach to measuring 
diversity, based on the technical 
coefficients matrix of an input-output 
model, was developed by Wagner and 
Deller (Wagner, 1998), who showed 
that higher levels of diversification 
within the theoretical construct of input-
output are associated with higher levels 
of stability. Their Primary Diversity 
Measure (PDM) emphasizes inter-
industry relations and provides the best 
way to evaluate economic 
diversification. It is derived by 
multiplying values assigned to three 
variables:  
 Relative size of the economy—
number of indigenous industries 
 Density of the economy—
number of non-zero elements in 
the Leontief matrix, indicating 
the diversity of transactions 
 Condition number of the 
Leontief matrix—indicator of 
inter-industry linkages. 
The Primary Diversity Measure (PDM) 
was applied by Al-Kawaz (2008) for 
Kuwait in 2000 and by Beutel (2018) for 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia during 1995-
2011. 
This is illustrated in Table 4.  
Saudi Arabia’s PDI is consistently lower 
than Norway’s, but the magnitude of 
difference has decreased. In 1995, 
Saudi Arabia’s PDI was 91.1 per cent 
of Norway’s, but by 2011 it had 
increased to 96.2 per cent. Thus, by 
2011 Saudi Arabia almost reached 
Norway’s diversity level—a 
considerable achievement of the Saudi 
development policy. 
Sustainable development: Adjusted 
net national income and savings 
Since a long time, the World Bank is 
engaged in measuring sustainable 
development of nations (World Bank, 
2001). The long-term strategy for oil-
producing countries should be to 
increase the gross national income per 
capita and transform the non-
renewable natural capital into other 
forms of capital like machinery, 
buildings, and human capital (Beutel, 
2013). 
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In the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (World Bank, 
2018) we find two prominent indicators 
for sustainable economic development: 
‘Adjusted net national income’ and 
‘Adjusted net savings’. 
 ‘Adjusted net national income’ is 
estimated by subtracting from gross 
national income the consumption of 
fixed capital and depletion of natural 
resources. The consumption of fixed 
capital reflects the decline in man-made 
physical capital through retirement of 
buildings, machinery, transport 
equipment, and the like; while the 
depletion of natural resources 
measures the decline in non-renewable 
natural resources through extraction.  
Gross domestic product (GDP) 
+  Net income from abroad 
=  Gross national income (GNI) 
 Consumption of fixed capital 
=  Net national income  
-  Natural resources depletion 
=  Adjusted net national income 
The consumption of fixed capital is 
estimated as part of the national 
accounts.  On the depletion of natural 
resources, the World Bank provides 
valuable information for 10 minerals, 4 
energy sources, and net forest 
depletion.   
‘Adjusted net savings’ is a national 
accounting aggregate designed to 
measure changes in assets including 
natural and human capital. The gross 
stock of natural capital (natural 
resources), physical capital (buildings, 
machinery, transport equipment), and 
human capital (education, skills, 
knowledge) is growing if a nation’s 
adjusted net savings are positive. 
There is an intrinsic link between 
change in the wealth of a nation and 
the sustainability of its development 
path. If genuine (adjusted) savings are 
negative at a given point in time, then 
welfare in the future will be less than 
current welfare. Therefore, adjusted net 
savings can be regarded as a 
sustainability indicator. 
The World Bank calculates adjusted net 
national savings as follows: 
Gross national savings 
−  Consumption of fixed capital 
= Net savings 
+ Education expenditure 
−  Energy depletion 
− Mineral depletion 
−  Net forest depletion 
−  Carbon dioxide emissions damage 
−  Particulate emissions damage 
= Adjusted net savings (genuine 
savings) 
The calculation of adjusted net national 
savings begins with gross national 
savings, calculated as gross national 
income minus total consumption plus 
net transfers from abroad. Deducting 
consumption of fixed capital from gross 
national savings, we arrive at net 
national savings. Finally, education 
expenditure (considered as investment 
into human capital) is added, and 
depletion of natural resources and 
damage from pollution are deducted. 
The World Bank adds all current 
operating expenditures for education to 
net savings as a gross investment in 
human capital. I believe that it would 
also be appropriate to deduct the 
consumption of human capital, as is 
done for the consumption of physical 
capital. Consumption of fixed capital 
reflects the value of the retired physical 
capital. The pensions of persons who 
worked in the education system could 
be regarded as consumption of human 
capital. In this case, consumption of 
human capital corresponds to the costs 
for the retirement of personnel in 
education. 
 
An economy is sustainable if it saves 
more than the depreciation on its man-
made and natural capital—in other 
words, if its net national savings 
measurement is positive. Table 5 
shows an assessment of all GCC 
countries and the reference country, 
Norway.  
In the comparison of Norway with GCC 
countries, Norway had the highest 
adjusted national income per capita 
($78,515) and adjusted net national 
savings per capita ($22,363). Among 
GCC countries, Qatar had the highest 
adjusted national income per capita 
($67,443), followed by UAE ($38,670) 
and Kuwait ($37,781). Qatar also had 
the highest adjusted net national 
savings per capita ($34,570), followed 
by Kuwait ($13,421). 
Among the GCC countries only Oman 
($−1,052) recorded in 2014 negative 
adjusted savings, and its combined 
stock of man-made capital and natural 
capital declined. This is consistent with 
the lowest level of adjusted net national 
income per capita ($10,556).  
Table 6 and Table 7 look in detail at the 
performance of Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia from 1995 to 2015. Despite 
substantial depletion of natural 
resources, Kuwait’s adjusted net 
national savings as a percentage of 
gross national income, were very high 
during 2000–2014. This is supported by 
relatively low recent rates of both 
private and government consumption. 
Due to substantial net income from 
abroad, gross national income was 
larger than GDP throughout this period. 
Saudi Arabia has significant net income 
from abroad, low consumption of fixed 
capital, moderate natural resource 
depletion, and the highest expenditures 
for education of any GCC country. 
Since 2005, adjusted net savings have 
been in the range of 20–30 per cent of 
gross national income—exceeding that 
of the reference country, Norway.  
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After a recent change in methodology, 
the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators estimated energy depletion 
as the ratio of the value of the stock of 
energy resources to the remaining 
reserve lifetime (capped at 25 years), 
covering coal, crude oil, and natural 
gas. The results for 2005 are quite 
different from the previous ones in the 
Little Green Data Book (World Bank, 
2006) for the GCC countries. This 
significant revision brought about a 
sudden, and debatable, improvement in 
the estimate of adjusted savings for the 
GCC.   
Conclusion  
Perhaps contrary to widely held 
opinions, the economic diversification 
of GCC countries is well underway. In 
many ways, these countries are 
approaching the diversification levels of 
the reference country, Norway. The test 
for sustainable development of GCC 
countries for 1995–2015 showed 
positive results for most. In 2014, Qatar 
and Kuwait achieved high rates of 
adjusted net national savings per 
person; Qatar even surpassed Norway. 
Bahrain and Saudi Arabia realized 
small positive rates. Oman was the only 
GCC country for which the test yielded 
a negative result. Throughout 1995–
2015, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and 
Saudi Arabia had positive rates of 
adjusted net savings, whereas for 
Oman the rate was only positive in 
2012. 
A full implementation of the input-output 
approach will only be possible if supply 
and use tables become available for all 
GCC countries that are comparable, 
have the same number of products and 
industries, and use the same 
classification of the System of National 
Accounts 2008 (United Nations, 2009). 
At the moment, such tables are only 
available for Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. 
The national statistical offices of the 
GCC countries should be encouraged 
to compile such tables annually.  
 
THE POLITICS OF 
DIVERSIFICATION IN THE 
MIDDLE EAST 
Adeel Malik 
The failure of Arab development is 
multifaceted and manifests across the 
economic, political, and geopolitical 
arenas. Over the last three decades, 
three profound shifts have marked the 
global political economy. The first, often 
dubbed the third wave of 
democratization, is a gradual opening 
of the political system to more 
representative forms of government. 
The second is successful economic 
diversification in several emerging 
economies in Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America. The third is the growing 
prominence of intra-regional trade by 
developing countries through their 
active participation in regional trade 
initiatives. All of these shifts have 
bypassed the Middle East.  
Judged by any of the above metrics, 
the region has lagged behind, 
stagnated, or even regressed. With the 
largest proportion of autocracies, it is 
one of the few world regions that 
remains an outlier to the third wave of 
democratization. On the economic 
front, it remains mired in primary 
commodity dependence while many of 
its comparators have diversified their 
export structures. And, despite 
numerous efforts to promote it, regional 
trade remains hopelessly inadequate, 
hovering around 9–10 per cent of total 
trade for the last four decades.   
The region’s failure in these three 
overlapping domains reveals the 
paradox of Arab underdevelopment, 
and deserves an explanation that 
incorporates the economic, political, 
and geopolitical aspects of 
development. Consider its failed 
attempts at economic diversification. 
Every resource-rich country in the 
region has made tall promises to 
diversify its economy away from 
excessive dependence on oil and gas. 
Yet, if anything, the region’s reliance on 
hydrocarbons has increased over time. 
What explains this gap between 
intentions and outcomes?  
A political challenge 
To understand this, one must first 
acknowledge that the core challenge of 
economic diversification is not technical 
but political. Clearly, the challenge of 
diversification is deeper than simply 
learning the right lessons from 
successful experiences in Norway, 
Malaysia, or Botswana. After all, if the 
recipes for diversification are so widely 
known, why have Arab countries not 
seriously pursued them?  
To diversify their economies, resource-
rich countries need to develop the non-
oil sector, which entails, among other 
things, producing a greater number and 
variety of goods—including those at the 
higher end of the value chain that 
involve more complex forms of 
production. The problem is that the 
effects of doing so are rarely politically 
neutral. Political scientists have long 
recognized that structural change in the 
economy is usually accompanied by 
new forms of political contestation. New 
sources of income breed new 
constituencies, since economic power 
can easily translate into political power.  
For this one needs to look no further 
than Turkey, whose recent political 
transition is undergirded by 
fundamental economic changes. The 
appeal of Turkey’s Justice and 
Development Party is based, not just 
on its populist narrative, but also on the 
material interests of a constituency 
empowered by Turkey’s vibrant 
economy. In the Arab milieu, where the 
overriding concern of rulers is to 
separate the economy from polity, 
economic diversification carries 
genuine political risks. With a long 
legacy of centralized rule, dating back 
to the Mamluk era, Arab regimes rest 
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on two pillars: patronage and control. 
Such a political order runs counter to 
the logic of a dynamic economy that 
requires cultivation of dense economic 
linkages among various parts of the 
supply chain. There is a clear danger 
that such vibrant economic links can 
serve as the basis for horizontal 
cooperation.   
In this context, it is hardly surprising 
that resource-rich Arab economies 
have failed to rise to the challenge of 
diversification. These economies are 
doubly deprived in this regard, suffering 
from the burdens of both history and oil. 
Whatever weak constituency of private 
production was inherited by these 
countries was further weakened after 
the discovery of oil. Even where rulers 
were more dependent on merchants 
prior to the discovery of oil—such as 
Kuwait—oil tied down the merchant 
class in state contracts and other forms 
of patronage. While the private sector 
has shown greater dynamism in Gulf 
countries, it still remains structurally 
dependent on the state.  
Diversification is further hindered by 
macroeconomic challenges that oil-rich 
economies face by virtue of their 
exposure to commodity price cycles. 
Pro-cyclical fiscal policy, a universal 
feature of resource-rich Arab 
economies, means that oil cycles are 
accompanied by budgetary cycles that 
make planning for long-term investment 
more difficult. Counter-cyclical fiscal 
policies, which require that countries 
spend less in periods of higher oil 
prices, are politically difficult to 
implement. The underlying political 
settlement in these countries gives rise 
to extensive and sticky distributive 
claims in the form of salaries, 
subsidies, and defence spending.  
Oil-rich economies also find it difficult to 
build a productive regime for 
competitive diversification since the 
dominance of the oil sector is likely to 
lead to exchange rate appreciation, 
which prices their non-oil exports out of 
global markets. The overvalued 
exchange is also favoured by the non-
tradeable sector, which is strong and 
pervasive throughout the region. 
Historically, economic exchange in the 
Middle East has been managed by 
importers and distributors who depend 
on simple arbitrage opportunities and 
prefer a fixed and overvalued exchange 
rate.  
These political roadblocks to 
diversification are difficult to bypass in 
the midst of multiple development 
traps. The region’s resource-rich 
economies have few institutional shock-
absorbers to mitigate the effect of 
global price shocks. The same factors 
that are needed to cope with oil price 
volatility are also needed for 
diversification. Diversification is not 
impossible in these economies, but 
attempts at it are selective, and often 
take forms that are politically more 
acceptable to local elites. In the United 
Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Oman and 
parts of North Africa, liberalization of 
the financial sector has provided such a 
politically safe avenue for 
diversification. It has offered lucrative 
brokerage opportunities for state elites 
who, through carefully brokered 
partnerships with foreign banks, have 
derived additional rents.  
Two additional factors make financial 
liberalization a politically palatable form 
of diversification. First, the bulk of 
private-sector credit extended by the 
financial sector is earmarked for real 
estate. Second, land is principally 
owned by the state. This means that 
even when the financial sector 
increases its lending to the private 
sector it is unlikely to give rise to 
independent forms of accumulation that 
might threaten the political order.  
The political challenges of 
diversification are by no means limited 
to the region’s oil-exporting nations. 
Even resource-scarce countries face 
similar constraints at varying intensities. 
Consider Morocco and Tunisia, the two 
countries that have had some success 
in developing the private sector. 
Although export structures in both 
countries are less concentrated than in 
other Middle Eastern and North African 
(MENA) countries, exports have 
expanded mostly along the intensive 
rather than extensive margin—relying 
mostly on existing export relationships 
rather than establishing new products 
and trading partners. Additionally, in 
Tunisia, policy has traditionally 
segmented the offshore sector, which is 
mainly export-oriented, from the 
onshore sector, oriented towards 
domestic markets. Economic activity 
also remains confined to a closed circle 
that protects its privilege by virtue of its 
proximity to state elites. Such 
systematic undermining of market 
competition serves a larger political 
purpose, since it provides rents needed 
to solidify elite coalitions in countries 
where oil rents are either absent or 
scarce. But while these market-
generated rents support the prevailing 
authoritarian order, the resulting crony 
capitalism undermines productive 
capacity. It discourages genuine 
economic diversification, which requires 
a level playing field with low barriers to 
entry and mobility.  
This pattern of economic control is 
shared by other states in the region, 
including Lebanon, where monopoly 
concessions have long been used as a 
principal means of distributing privilege. 
When pressed for reform, MENA 
countries have often responded by 
pursuing trade liberalization selectively 
in ways that protect elite interests. In 
Egypt, for example, while average 
tariffs have fallen since the mid-1990s, 
they have been applied more broadly, 
and sectors dominated by elites with 
military or political connections have 
continued to benefit from relatively high 
tariff protection. Similar patterns occur 
in non-tariff barriers (which are more 
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discretionary and non-transparent than 
tariff barriers), for example in Tunisia.   
In summary, Middle Eastern countries’ 
difficulties in diversifying their 
economies probably have more to do 
with politics than with weaknesses in 
technical planning or implementation.  
Successful diversification: 
Botswana, Malaysia, and Iran 
This primacy of politics is not exclusive 
to the Middle East, but is also relevant 
for understanding successful 
diversification experiences around the 
globe. Often, it is not good policy alone 
that explains successful diversification. 
An enabling political framework 
remains a common denominator in all 
such experiments. Botswana’s 
experience underscores the role of 
stable political coalitions and favourable 
initial and external conditions. At 
independence, Botswana inherited 
multiple constituencies with divergent 
economic interests, political competition 
and stable coalitions, and a favourable 
external environment. Botswana’s 
membership in the South African 
Customs Union encouraged sensible 
macroeconomic reform. All these 
factors helped protect the interests of 
nonresource sectors.    
In Malaysia at independence, the 
Chinese community controlled the 
Malaysian private sector and 
counterbalanced any tendency for the 
natural resource sector to grow at the 
expense of the private sector. In the 
political domain, the consociational 
agreement between the ethnic Malay 
and Chinese communities fostered a 
system of power sharing that protected 
the economic interests of Chinese 
businessmen, to whom bad 
macroeconomic policy—especially an 
overvalued exchange rate—was 
politically unacceptable and would have 
been both bad policy and bad politics. 
The regional trade circuit also created 
positive spill-overs that supported 
private-sector development.  
Closer to home, the Iranian experience 
provides similar lessons. Iran has a far 
more diversified economy than its oil-
rich Arab neighbours. And, despite the 
failure of state industrialization in 
1970s, its economic landscape appears 
less barren than that of many of its 
regional comparators. While the 
country’s differential economic structure 
might be explained by a complex array 
of factors, it is difficult to understand the 
Iranian experience without considering 
the role diverse economic interests 
have historically played in shaping the 
domestic political economy. Iran’s 
bazaar economy is famed for its 
political and economic resilience. Apart 
from inheriting a strong productive 
constituency, the country’s geopolitical 
isolation since the late 1970s has left 
few options for its elites other than to 
look beyond oil. Recent evidence 
shows that Iranian exports were, for the 
most part, resilient to international 
sanctions (Haider, 2017). Not only was 
Iran able to deflect its exports away 
from the sanctions regime, but it also 
managed to diversify its trading 
partners. It has also broached, even if 
briefly, the politically sensitive reform of 
fuel subsidies. External pressures and 
the changing domestic political 
economy have thus both pushed Iran 
towards exploring alternative economic 
options.     
Prerequisites for successful 
diversification 
Clearly, each case is different and must 
be analysed on its own merit. But 
politics provides a common thread 
through these accounts. And this is 
where MENA countries are especially 
challenged: Most did not inherit strong 
and diverse economic constituencies 
that could have gained a political voice 
after independence and 
counterbalanced the dominance of oil. 
Regional conflict and instability have 
also impeded diversification. The 
Middle East thus lacked all three 
factors that facilitated economic 
diversification in other countries: strong 
political coalitions, diverse economic 
constituencies, and positive 
neighbourhood effects.  
Given this challenging legacy, any real 
hope for diversification will depend on 
three factors: concessions from political 
elites that make room for a robust 
private sector, regional economic 
cooperation, and geopolitical choices, 
including by influential actors from 
outside the region, that do not sacrifice 
long-term stability and development for 
the sake of short-term strategic 
advantage. 
Strengthening the non-elite private 
sector 
Successful diversification requires a 
new political arrangement under which 
elites concede greater space to the 
private sector.  
Given the primacy of the political, the 
debate on diversification must begin 
with a discussion of elite incentives and 
political concessions. What 
concessions are needed from the ruling 
elite, and what will persuade them to 
surrender their control of the economy 
and the associated rents? Perhaps they 
need to be compensated for the loss of 
rents from a levelling of the economic 
playing field. After all, new growth 
strategies in emerging markets are built 
on a happy (even if fragile) coexistence 
of economics and politics.  
The Chinese example illustrates how 
economic reform can be aligned with 
the interests of political elites. Beyond 
that oft-cited example, Africa’s recent 
success stories confirm the importance 
of elite incentives. Ethiopia’s recent 
economic transformation has made it 
one of the world’s 10 fastest-growing 
economies. Central to this has been the 
role of public investment in 
infrastructure and public enterprises, 
and the changing political orientation of 
state elites. The ruling party set up its 
own enterprises supported by 
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specialized endowments geared 
towards promoting investment in 
underdeveloped regions. Although this 
model of party capitalism poses serious 
questions about market competition, it 
shows how elites tend to favour an 
expansion of the economic pie when 
they are among its lead beneficiaries. 
This is a key point of North, Wallis, and 
Weingast’s (2009) treatise Violence 
and Social Order. Change often begins 
with small outcomes and processes 
that are compatible with elite 
incentives. But what begins as a 
privilege for insiders can ultimately 
become a universal right.  
The idea is not to identify a single ideal 
growth experience that will fit all Arab 
contexts. Rather, it is to emphasize that 
whatever growth strategy the Middle 
East embarks on should accommodate 
political incentives. Elites have rarely 
surrendered economic control unless it 
became essential for their survival. The 
so-called Arab Spring was a recent 
knock on the doors of power. 
Unfortunately, it did not result in 
genuine economic concessions. The 
only concessions offered were 
financial: cheap loans, salary hikes, 
and bonuses. But such temporary 
appeasement without changing the 
underlying rules of the game is unlikely 
to work for long. The rules remain 
rigged in favour of business elites in 
and around the royal circle. Across 
much of North Africa, crony capitalism 
is rearing its head again, and insider 
deals continue to thrive. Economic 
diversification will be difficult if not 
impossible to realize, without a new 
political compact that anticipates a 
future beyond oil and conflict. At the 
very minimum, the region needs a new 
discourse on economic reform that 
mobilizes public support for two or 
three fundamental concessions that 
elites must offer for long-term economic 
revival.  
 
Strengthening regional cooperation 
In the Middle East, questions of 
national and regional development are 
closely interwoven. While national 
initiatives can kick-start economic 
revival, it will be difficult to sustain 
without access to regional markets. 
Few countries have effectively 
diversified without the expanded 
markets and deeper trade reforms that 
regional trade liberalization affords. 
Turkey’s recent economic success is 
built on strategic cultivation of regional 
trade linkages. In Asia and Latin 
America, regional market connections 
offer an additional avenue for 
industrialization through entry into 
global supply chains, which tend to 
conglomerate spatially. Arab countries 
are clearly disadvantaged in this 
regard. A coordinated regional effort is 
needed to foster trade 
complementarities, establish regional 
public infrastructure, and relax trade 
barriers. Given the repeated failures of 
past attempts at regional economic 
cooperation and the adverse security 
climate, this seems like a pipe dream. 
No matter how impractical, however, it 
will be difficult to fulfil any new vision for 
Arab development without it. In 
political-economic terms, the rationale 
for this is even stronger, since it is only 
through a regionally integrated 
merchant class that a stable 
constituency for economic and political 
reform will emerge. If the broader 
economic challenges faced by the Arab 
states are common, they also deserve 
a common response. Even if a 
cooperative solution does not serve the 
narrow factional interests of political 
elites, Arab civil society must lend its 
weight to the regional project.   
Refocusing the geopolitical 
discourse 
In a region with a history of conflict and 
violence, it is difficult to conceive 
economic diversification in isolation 
from geopolitics. Before the recent 
upsurge in violence, countries in the 
region had begun to witness falling 
trade costs and growing regional trade. 
These limited gains have been washed 
away again by violence. Foreign 
military interventions seeking regime 
change have eroded state capacity, 
demolished public infrastructure, and 
ripped apart the social fabric of Arab 
societies. The region has been set back 
by decades.      
If conflict retards development, a 
genuine economic renaissance in the 
Arab world will also have geopolitical 
repercussions. Foreign powers have a 
deep economic, political, and military 
footprint in the region. An economically 
independent Middle East can challenge 
the established patterns of external 
hegemony and undermine the 
prolonged legacy of divide and rule. In 
this milieu, structural economic change 
also requires a geopolitical concession 
from regional and global powers that 
have high stakes and influence in the 
Middle East. As the recent refugee 
crisis has shown, the spillovers from 
regional conflict are difficult to contain 
within Arab borders. This is an 
opportune moment to talk about 
concessions. A peaceful and 
prosperous social order is now of direct 
interest for the global community, 
especially Europe.   
Foreign powers face a deep trade-off 
between narrow short-term strategic 
interests and long-term development. 
The human and economic cost of this 
trade-off is rising by the day, yet an 
effective global response has been 
lacking. Since the start of the Arab 
Spring, economic development has 
been conspicuous by its absence in 
western policy discourse. There has 
been no grand vision for regional 
development on the part of multilateral 
institutions or Western governments. 
Initiatives such as the Deauville 
Partnership and the Arab Partnership 
Fund were miniscule in both size and 
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significance, and simply substituted talk 
for action. On the other hand, there has 
been a major escalation in the sale of 
military hardware to Arab states. Rather 
than using their ‘convening authority’ to 
organize regional funding for a major 
development initiative, Western powers 
have sold billions of dollars worth of 
arms to the GCC states since 2011.     
Conclusion 
Economic diversification in the Middle 
East, far from being a purely 
technocratic challenge, carries deep 
power implications, involving three 
interlocking spheres: domestic, regional 
and geopolitical. By increasing the 
number and variety of products, 
diversification not only increases the 
complexity of economic exchange but 
also risks generating independent 
constituencies with political-economic 
effects on both the domestic and 
geopolitical power structures. This calls 
for a more holistic understanding of the 




ARAB OIL EXPORTERS IN 
THE CONTEXT OF PEAK 
OIL AND THE ENERGY 
TRANSITION 
Bassam Fattouh & 
 Anupama Sen 
Economic diversification has taken on a 
renewed sense of urgency in Arab oil-
exporting countries. This is largely due 
to a paradigm shift around the future 
prospects of global oil demand and 
whether the oil industry will continue to 
generate sufficient rents to sustain oil 
exporters’ economies and their 
extensive welfare systems. There is a 
growing consensus that oil demand 
growth is likely to slow over time and 
eventually plateau or decline as 
efficiency improvements, technological 
advances, policy measures to curb 
climate change and air pollution, and 
changing social preferences lead to 
substitution away from oil in its 
traditional sectors (such as 
transportation) which have historically 
driven oil demand growth. The concept 
of peak oil demand has now become 
more accepted, with many scholars, 
company executives, and policymakers 
predicting an imminent peak, as early 
as within the next decade.  
Increased uncertainty about the 
prospects of global oil demand is 
already changing the behaviour of oil 
market players, including oil-exporting 
countries, which are intensifying their 
efforts to diversify their economies and 
sources of income. Indeed, economic 
diversification has been a key 
developmental goal for the Arab oil-
exporting countries for decades, as 
evidenced in their national development 
plans. Achieving this objective is seen 
as essential for their economic security 
and sustainability. Some Arab oil 
exporters have made progress over the 
last few decades in diversifying their 
economic base and their sources of 
income; but despite these efforts, most 
indicators of economic complexity, 
diversity, and export quality continue to 
be lower in Arab oil-exporting 
economies than in many emerging 
market economies, including 
commodity exporters in other regions. 
The renewed sense of urgency over 
diversification constitutes a break with 
the past—when the concern was 
mainly over the macroeconomic 
consequences of heavy dependence 
on a single export commodity with a 
highly volatile price—to the present 
concern about the possibility that as 
demand slows, global oil markets 
become increasingly competitive, and 
oil industry margins decline, Arab oil 
exporters will no longer be able to rely 
on oil export revenues for their 
economic prosperity.  
Against this backdrop, this article 
addresses the following questions: How 
soon can we expect peak oil demand to 
occur; or put another way, how fast is 
the current energy transition occurring? 
What are the links between 
diversification efforts by key oil 
exporters and the global energy 
transition? What role should the 
hydrocarbon sector play during the 
energy transition? How does the 
emergence of renewables as a 
competitive energy source impact 
economic diversification strategies in 
oil-exporting countries?  And it offers 
the following responses: 
 The speed of the energy 
transition is highly uncertain. 
And because is heavily driven 
by government policies, it will 
not be uniform across regions, 
making it difficult to draw firm 
conclusions on a global scale.  
 The diversification strategy 
adopted by oil-exporting 
countries will be conditioned by 
the speed of the energy 
transition, during which the oil 
sector will continue to play a key 
role in these economies, 
including in their diversification 
efforts.  
 Thus, oil producers will need to 
be far more strategic in 
developing their energy sector, 
including renewables, 
strengthening forward and 
backward linkages to help 
diversify their economies.  
 There is interdependence 
between the success of 
diversification efforts by oil 
exporters and the global energy 
transition. While the transition is 
already shaping political and 
economic outcomes in Arab oil-
exporting countries, the success 
(or failure) and the speed at 
which they transition to more 
diversified and more resilient 
economies will also shape the 
global energy transition.   
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Peak oil demand and the energy 
transition 
Analysts from various organizations 
offer a wide range of projections of the 
point at which global oil demand is 
likely to peak, from the mid-2020s to 
later than 2040. Some of these – 
including the International Energy 
Agency (IEA), US Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) and BP Energy 
Outlook, are depicted in Figure 1. 
Three main points can be made based 
on this range: 
1. Uncertainty is high. Peak demand 
forecasts are highly dependent 
upon their underlying 
assumptions. Slight changes in 
assumptions can push the peak 
demand backward or forward by 
several years.  
2. There could be multiple peaks, 
due to a ‘rebound effect’—a peak 
in oil demand could cause prices 
to fall, triggering higher demand 
from consumers, leading to one or 
more additional peaks.  
3. Oil will continue to be an 
important part of the energy mix 
for the foreseeable future due to 
its incumbent advantages and its 
domination of existing 
infrastructure. None of the peak 
oil demand forecasts in Figure 1 
display any sharp discontinuity. 
While there is unlikely to be a sharp 
discontinuity in oil use, it is also 
uncertain how closely the current 
transition will match the speed of past 
energy transitions, which historical data 
show have been slow. Some authors 
argue that past transitions (e.g. wood to 
coal and coal to gas), which took 
decades, occurred in an age of scarcity 
and were driven mainly by the need for 
substitution, while the current transition 
(to low-carbon energy sources) is 
occurring in an age of abundance and 
is largely problem-driven. It involves 
adjusting the selection environment by 
means of policies, regulations, and 
incentives (Fattouh, Poudineh, and 
West, 2018). Also, since the current 
transition is heavily driven by national-
level policies, its speed could differ 
across regions as well as sectors, 
making it difficult to draw firm 
conclusions on a global scale.  
Thus, oil-exporting countries should 
adapt to the energy transition, which is 
already underway, but its speed is 
highly uncertain. In their strategic 
thinking, they should take into account 
the consolidation of three key trends.  
First, government oil substitution 
policies imply that oil demand is 
unlikely to increase strongly over the 
next two decades, although the time at 
which oil demand growth will slow and 
turn negative is still highly uncertain. 
Some countries in OECD Europe have, 
for instance, announced bans on 
internal combustion engine vehicles by 
2040 as part of their carbon reduction 
targets, which are among the world’s 
most ambitious, while in non-OECD 
Asia, China and India have both 
announced ambitions to scale up 
electric vehicles in their fleets, with 
China aiming to integrate them into its 
overall industrial strategy.  
Second, even in the event of peak 
demand, without investment in the oil 
sector, the decline in supply will be 
faster than the decline in demand. 
Figure 1 includes a series, which 
depicts the path of oil production to 
2040 assuming no new investments 
and a 3 per cent decline rate, resulting 
in a large and widening supply-demand 
gap. As low-cost producers, Arab oil 
exporters will likely need to fill this gap 
by investing in their oil sector, while 
facing competing demands on their 
revenues to fund their social welfare 
measures. 
Projections of world oil demand (million barrels/day) through 2040 
 
Source: Adapted from Dale, S., and Fattouh, B. (2018). Peak Oil Demand and Long Run Oil Prices, OIES Energy Insight 25, Oxford Institute 
for Energy Studies. 
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Third, renewables are at an inflection 
point, and are now globally competitive 
on a plant-level basis (excluding 
intermittency costs). While there are 
many uncertainties related to the 
energy transition, there is almost a 
consensus among forecasters that the 
share of renewables in the energy mix 
will rise, and especially that the recent 
cost deflation has been nothing short of 
revolutionary. Around 5 years ago, US 
wind costs were $0.11/kWh (kilowatt 
hour) and solar costs were $0.17/kWh, 
on a fully loaded basis, including the 
capital costs of construction (Fattouh et 
al, 2018). Costs have fallen 
exponentially since then. In 2019,  the 
International Renewable Energy 
Agency (IRENA) estimated that solar 
PV costs in the GCC had decline to 
less than  $0.3/kWh, leaving behind 
natural gas, LNG, coal, oil and nuclear. 
In Saudi Arabia and Oman, wind has 
emerged as another cost-effective 
option. The four bids submitted for the 
400 MW Dumat Al Jandal wind project 
were reported to be between 2.13 US 
cents/kWh and 3.39 US cents/kWh.  
The strategic role of the oil sector in 
the energy transition 
As low-cost producers with some of the 
largest reserve bases, Arab oil 
exporters are expected to fill the 
supply–demand gap. Therefore, even 
when oil demand growth slows, oil will 
continue to play a role in these 
economies for the foreseeable future. 
As leaders develop new visions to 
transform their countries, the energy 
sector will be under increasing pressure 
to show that it can contribute to 
diversification, not only by generating 
rents that could be used to create new 
industries, but also by extending the 
value chain and creating new industries 
by fostering backward and forward 
linkages. 
Therefore, the oil sector will continue to 
dominate the economy, but needs to 
play a more active role in the 
diversification process. By extending 
the value chain, producers can create 
new industries whose products’ prices 
are not highly correlated with oil 
prices—for instance, more complex 
petrochemical products and finished 
products manufactured in industrial 
parks that attract private-sector and 
foreign direct investment. To illustrate, 
the Saudi Arabian Oil Company and 
Dow Chemical established a joint 
venture in 2011, with an investment of 
$20 billion, which incorporates 26 
integrated large-scale manufacturing 
plants with over 3 million metric tonnes 
of capacity per annum. It has 
introduced many new products to Saudi 
Arabia (e.g. the first isocyanates and 
polyurethane plants), enabling many 
manufacturers of intermediate products 
that previously either did not exist or 
only existed through imports of raw 
materials, potentially opening up a 
range of new downstream 
opportunities.  
Adding more stages to the oil value 
chain also generates different types of 
jobs, including in the service sector, 
such as trading, marketing/sales, 
procurement, and logistics as well as 
supporting services such as 
accounting, finance, and human 
resource management. In such a 
context, local-content requirements that 
give priority to hiring nationals, 
contracting domestic companies, and 
procuring locally produced goods and 
services will also be important. 
Also, regardless of the speed of the 
energy transition, governments should 
pursue measures to optimize the use of 
the resource base. These include 
energy-efficiency measures, 
rationalizing domestic energy 
consumption, reforming energy prices, 
reforming the power sector, and 
diversifying the energy mix. Such 
measures are complementary to an 
overall economic diversification 
strategy, which entails structural 
changes and fiscal reforms.  
Finally, Arab countries should not miss 
out on the renewables revolution. They 
have great potential for renewable 
energies. High irradiation and wind 
potential, combined with fewer 
limitations on land for construction of 
wind and solar farms in locations that 
are close to the regions’ main energy 
markets, create an opportunity for 
these countries to serve rising 
domestic energy demand and free 
hydrocarbons for exports, and to 
harmonize with the changing global 
energy landscape.   
However, as argued by Fattouh et al 
(2018), given the uncertainty about the 
Projected share of renewables in total primary energy demand 
 
Source: Authors; Based on data from the IEA, EIA and BP. 
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speed of transition, Arab oil exporters 
need to adopt a strategy that is likely to 
be successful under a wide set of future 
market conditions, by gradually 
extending their energy model to 
integrate renewables rather than 
completely shifting from hydrocarbons 
to renewables. After all, renewables do 
not generate the high returns that the 
hydrocarbon sector does, and cannot 
alone meet the real needs of these 
economies, such as generating enough 
government revenues, creating enough 
jobs, and supporting an extensive 
welfare system.  
The role of oil policy and producer 
cooperation 
Faced with the possibility that oil 
demand may fall, some suggest that it 
is rational for Gulf Cooperation Council 
countries to monetize their reserves as 
quickly as possible and squeeze out 
high-cost producers to gain market 
share—just as with any other 
competitive market. However, this 
argument ignores the significant 
challenges that a shift to a competitive 
market poses for major oil-producing 
countries. If most low-cost producers 
adopt a similar strategy in the face of 
slowing demand growth, this will trigger 
a massive fall in oil prices and 
revenues, derailing the entire economic 
diversification agenda. The heavy 
reliance on oil revenues limits how 
quickly oil exporters can adapt to a 
more competitive world where prices 
converge to the marginal cost of 
physical production. There is also the 
question of whether low-cost producers 
can sharply increase their production 
capacity, especially in an environment 
of low oil prices. This is a major 
undertaking, which requires huge 
investments and would face 
overwhelming challenges, especially in 
countries with unstable political and 
economic conditions.  
Thus, even as we shift to more 
competitive markets, oil policy and 
management of relations between 
producers will continue to matter. 
Rather than simply pursuing a policy of 
noncooperation and competition 
between low- and high-cost producers, 
it is most likely that producers will 
continue to cooperate and restrain their 
output in an attempt to increase 
revenues. This is despite the fact that 
the challenges in producers’ pursuing a 
cooperative approach are immense 
especially in a more competitive oil 
market.  
Economic diversification and the 
global energy transition 
The global energy transition is already 
shaping political and economic 
outcomes in the Arab oil-exporting 
countries—but those countries’ 
transition to more diversified and 
resilient economies will also shape the 
global energy transition. In other words, 
this is a two-way street. If the transition 
in Arab countries does not go smoothly 
and they fail in their diversification 
efforts, this could result in lower 
investment in the oil sector, output 
disruptions, and more volatile oil prices. 
Also, in the absence of diversification, 
oil exporters will continue to push for 
higher oil prices. These have the effect 
of speeding up the global energy 
transition. In contrast, if these countries 
succeed in their diversification 
objectives, not only will they increase 
the resilience of their economies, but 
this will allow them to pursue a more 
flexible and proactive oil policy and 
adopt long-term strategies that could 
influence the speed of global energy 









COUNTRIES IN THE 
MIDDLE EAST AND 
AFRICA MUST FOCUS ON 
HOW TO TRANSFORM 
THEIR ECONOMIES 
Rabah Arezki 
Many oil- and gas-rich countries—
including those in the Middle East and 
North Africa, such as Algeria and Saudi 
Arabia—have either announced or put 
in place policies to reduce their 
dependence on oil by diversifying their 
economies. The collapse in oil prices, 
which started in 2014 and is expected 
to be protracted, has put diversification 
at the forefront of the policy debate. 
Although many fossil fuel exporters 
understand the need to diversify, few 
have successfully done so. Historically, 
diversification away from oil extraction 
has been difficult for oil-rich nations—in 
large part because the state’s top-down 
approach has not given managers and 
other economic agents the confidence 
or incentive to embrace new ideas, 
innovate, and take risks. For example, 
the incentive structures of state-owned 
oil companies in many countries around 
the world, including in the Middle East 
and North Africa, have not consistently 
encouraged managers and employees 
to achieve their full potential and adapt 
to new technology rapidly affecting their 
industry. Many state-owned companies 
embark on missions outside their core 
activities and competencies, innovate 
little, and struggle to keep talented 
employees. What’s worse, several 
state-owned oil companies around the 
world have a heavy burden of debt, 
even though they sit on large oil 
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Shift in focus 
If countries were to shift their focus 
from the end goal, diversification, to 
how to get there—that is, to the 
transformation process—they might 
find it easier to diversify. The effort 
involves steps to shift away from the 
dominant oil and gas sector. A focus on 
transformation involves an approach to 
that dominant sector that can spill over 
to, and even help foster, sectors 
outside hydrocarbons. That is, by 
embracing transformation, countries will 
focus on getting incentives right for 
managers and other economic agents 
and turn technology and innovation in 
energy markets, now seen as disruptive 
enemies, into friends. Countries that 
take this approach are less likely to 
stumble or resist change. 
Technological changes in energy 
markets can help the sustainability of 
economies that depend on oil 
revenues. More agile economic 
systems with appropriate corporate 
governance structures—structures that 
empower managers and employees—
can more easily take advantage of new 
technology to mitigate risks associated 
with potential disruptions in energy 
markets, and can even create 
opportunities. For example, publicly 
listed companies have tended to fare 
better than state-owned (or even 
privately owned) companies. Because 
these companies are accountable to 
shareholders, they are more likely to 
adapt to new circumstances and stay 
ahead. 
At the country level, the lack of 
government accountability combined 
with state ownership of the oil sector 
has exposed countries to considerable 
risk. The sector is largely resistant to 
changes in energy-producing and 
energy-using technologies that can 
dramatically affect energy markets. 
One example, on the energy-producing 
side, is the advent of the combination of 
hydraulic fracturing—often called 
fracking—and horizontal drilling. This 
technique made production of oil from 
shale much simpler, which changed the 
dynamic of the oil market. Shale oil 
output can be turned on and off much 
more quickly and cheaply than that of 
conventional oil drilling; this will 
eventually lead to shorter and more 
limited oil-price cycles as output gears 
up when prices rise and slows when 
they fall. The rapid increase in the 
production of shale oil—to 5 million 
barrels a day in a global market of 94 
million barrels a day—also arguably 
contributed to the oil supply glut that led 
to the collapse in oil prices. 
Another example involves changes in 
energy-using technology. As use of 
hybrid and electric cars grows, the 
transportation sector will rely 
increasingly on the electricity sector 
and vice versa, and the role of oil 
products will diminish. That’s bad news 
for oil, whose main use has been for 
transportation—through products such 
as gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel. 
Technological change will also spur 
competition for oil from other sources of 
energy—such as natural gas and 
eventually renewables such as solar 
and wind. Technological change is, of 
course, related to the level of energy 
prices or more generally to the need to 
innovate—for example, when the 
security of the energy supply is at 
stake, as it was during the oil crisis of 
the 1970s. 
The so-called peak-oil hypothesis, 
developed in the mid-1950s, posited 
that global oil production, limited by 
geological reality and the ability to 
extract oil, would top out around 2020. 
For years, the hypothesis seemed on 
target. But as production was supposed 
to be nearing its peak, the shale 
revolution began. In many respects, 
this revolution, and the surge in supply 
it triggered, can be viewed as a 
response of oil supply to high prices in 
the 2000s, driven by China’s economic 
expansion and ensuing greater market 
for oil. It was a direct challenge to the 
overly pessimistic peak-oil view that 
geological factors would limit supply. 
It is unclear, however, to what extent 
the lower prices ushered in by the shale 
revolution will delay the transition away 
from oil use in the transportation sector. 
There is, in fact, evidence that firms in 
the auto industry tend to innovate more 
so-called clean technologies when they 
face higher fuel prices. 
Stranded assets 
Understanding the role of technological 
change in energy markets is important, 
because such change does much to 
determine the fate of oil and of the 
countries and companies that depend 
on it. 
Transition to lower-carbon or carbon-
free energy (such as renewables), a 
major goal of the effort to contain global 
warming, can hurt oil-rich countries. 
Reduced demand for carbon-rich fuels 
such as oil will make it uneconomical 
for these countries to tap their 
reserves—turning those reserves into 
so-called stranded assets. 
The historic 2015 Paris Accord to limit 
the rise in global temperature to less 
than 2 degrees Celsius accentuates the 
transition away from fossil fuels 
fostered by changes in energy-
producing and energy-using 
technologies (such as renewables and 
electric and hybrid cars). There is 
evidence that a third of oil, half of gas, 
and 80 percent of coal reserves will be 
kept in the ground forever if the goals of 
the accord are reached. Among those 
severely affected would be the Middle 
Eastern oil-producing nations. About 
260 billion barrels of oil in the Middle 
East cannot be burned if the world is to 
reach its goal of limiting global 
warming. In addition to the oil, 
equipment and other capital used to 
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explore and exploit those reserves 
could also become stranded. 
And the amount of potentially stranded 
assets is growing. Recent giant 
discoveries of oil and gas (in Egypt, 
Israel, and Lebanon) are expanding the 
list of countries whose oil and gas 
assets may never make it out of the 
ground. With so many countries 
exposed to the risk of stranded assets, 
it is a priority for governments and 
businesses to diversify to help adapt to 
and mitigate this risk. 
Reducing carbon 
In any quest to diversify, the move 
toward reducing the carbon component 
in energy will be beneficial because it 
gives countries great opportunities to 
harness the potential for relatively 
untapped renewable resources. The 
Middle East and North Africa are not 
only endowed with vast oil reserves, 
they also have large and largely 
untapped renewable resources. Indeed, 
every six hours the sun delivers to the 
world’s deserts more energy than the 
planet consumes in a year, according 
to DESERTEC—an initiative whose 
vision of a global renewable energy 
plan involves harnessing sustainable 
power from areas with abundant 
renewable sources of energy. Studies 
by the German Aerospace Center 
demonstrated that the desert sun could 
easily supply enough power to meet 
rising demand in the Middle East and 
North Africa while also helping to power 
Europe. 
Solar power and other renewable 
energy assets give countries in the 
Middle East and North Africa the 
opportunity to offset the risk of stranded 
oil and gas assets. Solar radiation is 
indeed highest in that region—along 
with parts of Asia and the United 
States—according to the US National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration. 
These non-oil and -gas resources can 
help address the rapidly growing 
electricity demand of an expanding 
population in the Middle East and North 
Africa. But to harness the power of 
renewables, the region needs improved 
and expanded infrastructure, a better-
educated population, a 
strong state, and appropriate incentives 
for economic managers and 
entrepreneurs to adopt existing frontier 
technology. Several countries have 
already embarked on ambitious 
projects to increase their renewables 
sector. The United Arab Emirates, for 
example, wants 24 per cent of its 
primary energy consumption to come 
from renewable sources by 2021. 
Morocco has unveiled the first phase of 
a massive solar power plant in the 
Sahara Desert that is expected to have 
a combined capacity of two gigawatts 
by 2020, making it the single largest 
solar power production facility in the 
world. 
An urgent need 
The decline in oil and gas prices may 
make transformation imperative. The 
adage that ‘necessity is the mother of 
invention’ seems to have a particular 
resonance for oil-rich countries in the 
Middle East and North Africa, which 
have been shaken by the decline in oil 
prices and recognize that they must 
develop economies resilient to the 
changes in energy markets. Dubai, for 
example, facing the depletion of its oil 
reserves, transformed itself into a 
global trade hub. Countries and 
businesses that rely on these markets, 
and the revenue they generate, must 
formulate policies to address risks and 
embrace opportunities presented by 
transformation. 
Institutional factors—such as corporate 
governance, legal systems, and 
contestable markets (those in which 
there are no barriers to entry and 
exit)—and patronage spending in state-
owned companies affect attitudes 
toward innovation and openness to new 
ideas and, therefore, the process of 
transformation in oil-rich countries. For 
example, large public-sector 
employment financed by oil revenue 
has stifled the impetus for innovation. 
Economic policies that are not geared 
toward changing attitudes are unlikely 
to deliver the needed transformation for 
oil-rich countries. 
Saudi Arabia—the region’s, and 
perhaps the world’s, most important oil 
producer—seems aware of the need to 
augment the long-time source of its 
riches with non-oil income. As part of its 
ambitious plan to transform its 
economy, the country announced a 
public offering of 5 percent of the state-
owned oil company, Aramco. That 
appears to be a step toward emulating 
publicly owned Western energy 
companies, such as Exxon—which 
once concentrated on oil, but 
broadened their focus to become 
energy companies, balancing their oil 
assets with other forms of energy. 
The focus on the end goal of 
diversification has too long kept 
countries in the Middle East and North 
Africa from getting the process right. 
Transformative policies should move 
away from top-down approaches that 
pick which sectors to develop. Instead, 
they must develop an environment that 
promotes market contestability and 
changes the incentives of managers 
and tech-savvy young entrepreneurs 
and helps them, their firms, and 
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THE ROLE OF THE 




This article is based on the 2018 
International Energy Agency (IEA) 
publication Outlook for Producer 
Economies and draws from a variety of 
other IEA analyses, including the World 
Energy Outlook.  The views expressed in 
the article do not necessarily reflect the 
views or policy of the IEA Secretariat or 
of individual IEA member countries. 
The fall in oil prices since 2014 has 
taken a heavy toll on producers across 
the Middle East, with net incomes from 
oil and gas in the region falling 
45 per cent on average in 2016–2017 
from their high of $755 billion in 2010–
2015. The consequent fiscal strain and 
slowdown in economic growth has 
refocused the minds of policymakers on 
the imperative of reducing reliance on 
hydrocarbon revenues by pursuing 
structural economic change.  
Recognition of the need for economic 
diversification is not new; it was 
identified as a strategic necessity in 
development plans across the region 
as early as 1970. But success has 
been limited, partly because the 
urgency with which reform was pursued 
has tended to follow the oil price cycle, 
diminishing when prices rose.  
Future uncertainty in the energy 
markets means that, now more than 
ever, this pattern needs to be broken. 
On the supply side, the shale revolution 
in the United States has changed the 
calculus across energy markets. By 
2025, projections in the IEA’s (2018) 
World Energy Outlook suggest, the US 
could account for one in every five 
barrels of oil produced globally and 
one-quarter of the world’s natural gas 
production, and the nature of the short-
cycle investments associated with this 
production increases the potential price 
volatility in the short and medium term. 
On the demand side, improved 
efficiency and (to a lesser degree) the 
move towards electrification of 
automobiles are making a dent in oil 
demand in the transportation sector, 
which currently accounts for over half of 
all oil consumption. Increasing public 
perception of the challenges of climate 
change and the growing policy push 
towards energy transitions add to the 
uncertainty around future oil demand, 
providing further incentive for producer 
economies to enact changes now that 
will increase their resilience in the 
future.  
Not all producers share the same 
pressures and challenges. But for 
countries with young, fast-growing 
populations, like Nigeria, Iraq, and 
Saudi Arabia, the current economic 
model, which channels oil and gas 
revenues to public-sector jobs and 
government-led consumption, will be 
increasingly difficult to maintain, even if 
oil prices trend higher. In Iraq, for 
example, where around one-third of all 
jobs are with the government, 
population growth alone means that, 
without a change to the existing pattern 
of job creation, the public-sector wage 
bill would reach around $70 billion in 
2030, equivalent to 40 per cent of the 
anticipated net oil and gas income that 
year.  
If oil prices trend lower because of 
increased supply, decreased demand, 
or a mixture of the two, the impact on 
producer economies would be even 
starker: Across the Middle East, per 
capita income would be 50 per cent 
lower by 2040 than in a scenario where 
demand keeps growing and prices 
remain robust. The cumulative lost 
income from oil and gas to 2040 would 
reach $6.5 trillion (equivalent to almost 
three years of the region’s current total 
gross national product). 
Phasing out subsidized use of 
energy to improve its efficiency 
According to estimates by the IEA, 
fossil-fuel consumption subsidies 
totalled around $105 billion across the 
Middle East in 2017. Artificially cheap 
energy encourages wasteful 
consumption. Primary energy demand 
in the Middle East has grown at 4.4 
per cent per year since 2000, a rate 
that is more than double the world 
average. Among other things, this has 
meant that two in every five new barrels 
of oil production have been consumed 
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domestically during this time. 
Economies across the region are now 
among the most energy-intensive in the 
world—the United Arab Emirates, the 
least intensive in the region, requires 
10  per cent more energy to generate a 
dollar of economic output than the 
world average.  
Beyond the fiscal burden and the 
impact on consumption, subsidies also 
distort broader investment incentives 
across the energy sector. Low natural 
gas prices, for example, have reduced 
the incentive for private companies to 
invest in new exploration and 
production projects in parts of the 
Middle East.  
Besides accommodating the fact that 
low-cost energy is deeply embedded in 
the social contract in many producer 
economies, successful reform must 
also reconcile the need to reform prices 
with the imperative of sustaining or 
even enhancing industrial 
competitiveness. Across the Middle 
East, even without subsidies, most oil 
and gas producers would still have a 
comparative advantage in energy, 
since a low production cost base can 
provide a stable low domestic price. 
The implications of pricing reform for 
energy consumers can be mitigated 
substantially if reform is paired with 
enhanced energy efficiency measures. 
Raising fuel and electricity prices 
reduces the payback period for 
products with higher efficiency, and 
helps raise public awareness of the 
links between efficiency and the cost of 
the energy they consume; but a push is 
typically required on the supply side to 
ensure that more efficient products are 
available on the market.  
 
Ensuring adequate investment for a 
dynamic upstream sector 
The ability to maintain oil and gas 
revenues at reasonable levels provides 
an important element of stability for the 
economy as a whole, especially when 
market conditions are tough. In this 
regard, though it may sound counter-
intuitive in the narrative on economic 
diversification, it remains crucial for 
producers to attract investment and 
maintain or improve the productivity of 
their upstream sectors. Occupying the 
bottom end of the oil supply cost curve, 
Middle East producers could remain 
integral producers even in a Paris-
compliant energy landscape where oil 
demand peaks imminently and falls to 
around 70 million b/d by 2040. Some 
producers, led by Saudi Arabia and the 
United Arab Emirates, have already 
also shown that through intensified 
efforts to eliminate gas flaring and 
methane leakage, they are also 
extremely competitive on the basis of 
greenhouse gas emissions intensity, a 
factor that could differentiate suppliers 
of oil in the future. 
Supporting the development of 
cleaner and more efficient energy 
technologies  
Many producers have world-leading 
expertise in energy technologies; in 
addition to their potential in renewables, 
they are also well positioned to develop 
new approaches that reduce or 
minimize the lifecycle emissions of oil 
and gas. The argument becomes 
particularly compelling when synergies 
are found between industries. This is 
already happening to some extent, for 
example, in the United Arab Emirates, 
where over 40 million standard cubic 
feet per day of carbon dioxide are being 
captured at the Al Reyadah steel plant 
and piped to be used in enhanced oil 
recovery. This has the added benefit of 
freeing up much-needed natural gas 
that would otherwise be used for the 
same purpose. Oman is pioneering the 
use of large concentrating solar 
projects for enhanced oil recovery. 
There are large-scale opportunities to 
use solar energy to meet the Middle 
East’s increasing demand for clean 
water through desalination. This is a 
particularly crucial area, with the 
production of desalinated seawater in 
the region projected to increase almost 
14-fold by 2040. The shift from thermal 
processes towards electricity-fed 
reverse osmosis has the dual benefits 
of reducing hydrocarbons combustion 
for water while also providing an outlet 
for excess renewable power at certain 
times in the day (thereby reducing the 
problem of curtailment). It should not be 
assumed that the comparative 
advantage in energy of today’s major 
producers will diminish in the energy 
transition. 
Conclusion 
Although the risks are not evenly 
distributed across producers, 
demographic pressures and 
uncertainties on both the supply and 
demand sides mean that the imperative 
is growing for countries that rely on oil 
and gas revenues to reorient their 
economies. The transformation process 
will no doubt be complex and 
challenging, but the way it unfolds will 
have profound implications for the 
producer economies themselves, and 
the global energy system and energy 
security more broadly. This is because 
the prospects for stability in oil markets 
are increasingly linked with those for 
the reform agenda in producer 
economies. Venezuela provided a 
cautionary example of how 
developments in one producer 
economy can have serious implications 
for global balances. Price cycles are 
likely to continue to be a feature of 
commodity markets, and may even 
become more frequent given the 
increased prominence of short-cycle 
shale investments in the global supply 
picture. Periods of higher prices can 
provide relief but also bring with them a 
considerable risk, particularly if they 
ease the pressures for change at the 
same time as they increase the 
incentives for large consumers to 
accelerate the policy momentum 
behind alternatives to oil and gas. This 
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risk means that successful 
transformation of producer economies, 
underpinned by a strong energy sector, 
is of fundamental importance to actors 
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economies remain highly dependent on 
the hydrocarbon sector in terms of the 
composition of GDP and as a source of 
government revenue and export base. 
The GCC countries that are currently 
most resilient and best able to cope 
with the lower oil price environment are 
those with large hydrocarbon reserves 
relative to their populations 
(hydrocarbon rich per capita). These 
countries are underpinned by strong 
fiscal fundamentals – low debt and high 
foreign exchange reserves—that 
support their economic sustainability 
despite heavy dependence on the 
hydrocarbon sector. High foreign 
exchange reserves (absolute and per 
capita) also provide an additional 
source of government revenue through 
investment income, which can be used 
during times of lower oil prices. This 
does not mean that these economies 
should not look to diversify. Rather, it 
highlights that their fiscal strength 
results in less pressure on the economy 
during times of low prices and reform. 
Thus, fiscal sustainability at this stage 
is mostly unrelated to the degree of 
economic diversification. Fiscal 
diversification has largely been weak 
across the region, with hydrocarbon 
revenue remaining the main source of 
income. That some countries have a 
relatively higher share of non-oil 
revenue in total revenue could merely 
reflect their weaker hydrocarbon 
endowment rather than a diversified 
revenue base (especially taxes) and 
lower subsidy levels. Fiscal 
diversification is just one aspect of 
overall economic diversification.  
A broadening of the economic base will 
also be conducive to raising non-oil 
revenues (alongside the introduction of 
taxes and government fees), though 
times of fiscal austerity can act as a 
headwind to government objectives of 
developing non-oil sectors. The 
underlying fiscal sustainability of GCC 
economies is especially important given 
that the region has had limited success 
in widening the economic base 
(composition of GDP) much beyond 
pre-2014 levels.  
Variations in hydrocarbon 
endowments per capita 
A key factor in fiscal sustainability is the 
size of total hydrocarbon reserves per 
capita (as distinct from the size of the 
reserves themselves or hydrocarbon 
revenue as a percentage of total 
revenue). On this basis, the GCC 
countries can be broadly divided into 
two categories:  
 Hydrocarbon-richer per capita: 
These countries have large 
hydrocarbon reserves relative to 
their populations. They include 
Kuwait, Qatar, and the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE), led by 
Abu Dhabi. 
 Hydrocarbon-poorer per 
capita—These countries have 
relatively smaller hydrocarbon 
reserves relative to their 
populations. They include 
Bahrain, Oman and Saudi 
Arabia. Within this group, Oman 
and Bahrain are in relatively 
weaker positions.  
These are calculated on the basis of 
national populations (i.e. they do not 
include expatriates). 
The per-capita hydrocarbon ratio is 
particularly important in the GCC given 
the social contract between the state 
and citizens. Hydrocarbon revenue falls 
to the government and is then 
distributed and mobilized for the well-
being of the population and country. 
This has provided a framework that 
supports citizens from cradle to grave 
in various ways, including free 
education and healthcare, highly 
subsidized utility prices, land, and 
cheap financing for housing 
construction. This support varies across 
the region; differences in the pace of 
reforms since 2015 contribute to this 
variation. The public sector has also 
been a key employer of nationals, and 
there has been a limited tax base. (We 
calculate hydrocarbon endowment 
based on the number of nationals, as 
this is population that the government 
supports under the social contract. The 
expatriate population tends to adjust to 
economic cycles and requirements.) 
This social contract is changing as oil 
prices fall and domestic populations 
increase. Some subsidies have been 
reduced and some fees and taxes 
introduced since 2015. At the same 
time, strong population growth means 
that the younger generation of GCC 
nationals may not fully be able to rely 
on the state for employment. Despite 
these adjustments, however, the social 
contract remains largely in place.  
 
   
31 
JUNE 2019: ISSUE 118 – ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION IN THE MENA 
OXFORD ENERGY FORUM 
The nature of the economies and 
impact of the social contract has 
resulted in hydrocarbon richer countries 
generally having to spend less of their 
hydrocarbon income to support their 
populations and have built up larger 
fiscal surpluses and foreign exchange 
reserves during periods of higher oil 
prices—and for the most part, smaller 
deficits and lesser fiscal adjustments 
after the collapse of the oil price at the 
end of 2014. 
Hydrocarbon endowment reflected 
in fiscal and economic indicators 
Hydrocarbon endowments are reflected 
in a number of fiscal and economic 
indicators, as discussed below. 
 Budget break-even oil price: 
This is the required oil price for 
a fiscal position to be balanced. 
For most GCC countries, it has 
fallen since the peak in 2014 as 
governments reduced spending 
and introduced fiscal reforms. 
The hydrocarbon-richer per 
capita countries have a lower 
budget break-even oil price and 
a lower external break-even oil 
price (the oil price needed for 
the current account to be 
balanced). This again reflects 
that less of the hydrocarbon 
income is spent on the national 
population and more is saved.  
 Debt-to-GDP ratio: The 
hydrocarbon poorer per capita 
countries generally have higher 
government debt levels relative 
to GDP. The larger fiscal deficits 
in Bahrain, Oman, and Saudi 
Arabia have resulted in greater 
funding requirements and a 
more rapid increase in 
government debt, which in turn 
results in more government 
spending on debt service. 
Economic research consultancy 
Capital Economics recently 
estimated that Bahrain’s interest 
payments could reach as much 
as 15–20 per cent of total 
spending by 2020 (Capital 
Economics, 2018). However, for 
most GCC countries, interest 
payments still account for a 
small share of overall spending.  
 Foreign exchange reserves: 
The hydrocarbon-richer per 
capita countries have built up 
greater foreign exchange 
reserves—reflecting their larger 
fiscal surpluses during times of 
higher oil prices and lower 
pressure to draw down these 
reserves to cover fiscal deficits. 
Income from these reserves, 
often invested by their sovereign 
wealth funds, provides an 
additional source of income 
(investment) and in a way is a 
form of diversification and can 
be utilised for counter-cyclical 
support during times of lower oil 
prices.  
 Sovereign ratings: The 
hydrocarbon-richer per capita 
countries have substantially 
higher sovereign ratings, 
underpinned by large foreign 
exchange reserves and low debt 
levels. Despite the sharp 
Hydrocarbon endowment per capita (barrels) 
 
Source: BP (hydrocarbon data); regional statistical agencies (population data); authors’ calculations and methodology. 
 
Hydrocarbon endowment per capita reflected in current account and fiscal balance (% of GDP in 2017) 
  
Sources: Regional statistical agencies; ADCB estimates . 
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correction in the oil price, Abu 
Dhabi and Kuwait have not seen 
any ratings downgrades by the 
three main ratings agencies 
since 2014; their ratings remain 
among the strongest globally. 
On the other hand, Bahrain, 
Oman, and Saudi Arabia have 
seen multiple downgrades over 
the same period. The ratings are 
reflected in the cost of borrowing 
and the risk premium, with 
hydrocarbon-poorer per capita 
countries more susceptible to 
changes in sentiment, including 
globally, and dependent on 
capital inflows. 
 GDP per capita and 
unemployment: Reflecting the 
fact that fewer resources in 
relative terms are available to 
support their populations, the 
hydrocarbon-poorer per capita 
countries also tend to have 
lower GDP per capita and 
spending power. Moreover, 
unemployment levels for 
nationals tend to be higher, 
though regional data on this 
front are weak. More 
government resources have to 
be spent relative to hydrocarbon 
income to support employment 
opportunities for the national 
population. The hydrocarbon-
richer per capita countries tend 
to have a larger share of 
expatriates in their populations 
given their smaller populations 
relative to economy size. 
There are naturally variations within the 
GCC based on government policy and 
effectiveness. During times of high oil 
prices (2005–2008), Kuwait saw 
substantially larger fiscal surpluses as a 
percentage of GDP, as the government 
made relatively little progress in its 
investment plans, partly due to the 
difficult relationship between the 
government and parliament. 
Meanwhile, in Qatar, government debt 
was higher in the late 1990s, reaching 
about 74.4 per cent of GDP in 1999, 
largely due to borrowing to develop the 
gas industry. However, the rise in gas 
income resulted in a sharp reduction in 
government debt to 8.9 per cent of 
GDP in 2007, and foreign exchange 
reserves rose. Overall, GCC countries 
used strong oil revenues in 2002–2014 
to reduce debt levels and build up 
foreign exchange reserves. Thus, they 
entered the lower oil price cycle in a 
better fiscal position than in previous 
cycles.  
Fiscal reform momentum 
Since late 2014, the pace of fiscal 
reform in the GCC has gathered 
momentum. This is especially important 
given the large youth population and 
fast national population growth as well 
as medium- to long-term structural 
challenges to the oil price, including 
from new technology (shale, renewable 
energy sources).  
Fiscal reforms have been much more 
extensive than in previous oil price 
downturns, extending into areas that 
were previously seen as too sensitive. 
For example, subsidies have been 
reduced, unlike in the 1980s and 1990s 
when the main fiscal adjustment was 
through the retrenchment of spending. 
A significant development for the GCC 
was the introduction of VAT in Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE on 1 January 
2018. This was a vital initial step in 
developing tax revenue in the region, 
which has a weak tax base. However, 
the overall pace of fiscal reform 
moderated markedly from 2017, which 
partly reflects reform fatigue and the 
difficulty of sustaining a multi-year 
reform programme. The weakening in 
economic momentum as a result of 
fiscal adjustments limited the ability of 
the economy to absorb new measures. 
A critical factor supporting the more 
gradual pace of fiscal adjustment from 
2017 was a rise in the oil price, 
especially from the second half of the 
year. In Saudi Arabia, a public-sector 
handout package for Saudi citizens was 
announced in January 2018 to cushion 
the impact of VAT and subsidy reforms. 
In the UAE, both Abu Dhabi and Dubai 
announced packages to support 
economic activity in mid-2018, including 
measures aimed at reducing short-term 
pressure on corporations and 
individuals and initiatives to improve the 
business environment and encourage 
domestic and international investment.  
Greatest adjustment by country  
The pace of reform has varied across 
the GCC between 2014 and 2018. The 
UAE and, to a lesser degree, Saudi 
Arabia have been the most proactive in 
introducing fiscal reforms—one 
hydrocarbon-richer per capita and one 
hydrocarbon-poorer per capita country. 
This reflects that other economic, 
social, and political factors contribute to 
the ability of regional governments to 
carry out fiscal reforms. However, we 
believe that hydrocarbon endowment 
does play a strong role, including its 
effect on the variations in GDP per 
capita amongst the national population 
across the region and countries’ ability 
to absorb fiscal adjustments, especially 
on a cumulative basis.  
The UAE has frontloaded much of the 
fiscal adjustment and cutback in 
spending. The pace of subsidy reform 
in Abu Dhabi and the broadening and 
raising of government fees occurred at 
a steady and staggered pace since 
early 2015 and 2017. However, in 
percentage terms, the rise in energy 
prices in the UAE was less than in 
some other GCC countries, because 
subsidies were lower and prices were 
higher to start with.  
In Saudi Arabia, the pace of reform has 
been patchier despite announcing a 
very ambitious fiscal reform programme 
in 2016 aiming for a balanced budget 
by 2020 (this target was later extended 
to 2023). There have been two main 
phases of subsidy reforms – i) end-
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2015 and January 2016 
and ii) January 2018. The 
simultaneous price 
increases in a number of 
areas, rather than a more 
staggered approach, 
greatly increased the 
impact on the population in 
certain periods. However, 
the impact of the second 
round of subsidy reforms 
on Saudi citizens and the 
introduction of VAT was 
dampened shortly after, 
with the introduction of an allowance 
package for public sector employees. 
Moreover, the reduction in public sector 
benefits in Saudi Arabia was short-lived 
and was reversed.  
The other four GCC countries have 
seen a more moderate pace of fiscal 
reform. There have been no major 
reforms in Qatar since 2017; following 
the regional dispute, the government’s 
focus has been on stabilizing and 
supporting the economy. In Kuwait, 
there has been substantial populist 
opposition to fiscal reform, led by the 
National Assembly. This is the most 
independent legislature in the GCC and 
a central stumbling block for the 
government to make progress with its 
fiscal reforms. For Bahrain, wider GCC 
support remains vital for the investment 
programme given the limited fiscal 
reforms. 
The UAE, with its high hydrocarbon 
endowment per capita and greater 
pace of fiscal reform, has one of the 
strongest fiscal position among GCC 
countries. Moreover, it benefits from the 
more diversified nature of Dubai’s 
economy (which, however, was not 
immune to the fall in the oil price given 
the softening in regional demand). The 
UAE’s consolidated fiscal position is 
expected to see a surplus in 2018, 
supported by the reforms and the 
expected higher oil price average. 
Kuwait will also likely realize a fiscal 
surplus in 2018, with Qatar seeing a 
small and contained deficit. The 
hydrocarbon-poorer per capita 
countries are expected to see a 
relatively larger deficit relative to GDP, 
albeit narrowing from 2017 levels. 
However, the pace of fiscal reform in 
Bahrain is expected to increase 
beginning 2019 linked to a $10 billion 
GCC support package (from Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia, and the UAE), which was 
announced in October 2018. The 
support will be spread over five years 
and will be linked to Bahrain’s Fiscal 
Balance Program, which aims to 
balance the budget by 2022. Bahrain’s 
fiscal adjustment plan includes a 
5 per cent VAT (introduced on 1 
January 2019), reduction in subsidies, 
and pullback in expenditure.  
Other factors have been also important 
for the pace of fiscal reform and the 
ability of governments to enact reforms. 
However, there is still some indication 
that hydrocarbon endowments are a 
factor, especially in the ability to lower 
government spending. The 
hydrocarbon-richer per capita countries 
have generally been able to cut 
government spending by more than the 
hydrocarbon-poorer per capita ones. In 
the hydrocarbon-poorer per capita 
countries, wages and salaries tend to 
make up a larger total share of 
spending, whilst debt servicing costs 
have also been increasing with rising 
debt levels. This makes it harder to 
reduce spending on a multiyear basis. 
Moreover, with higher GDP per capita 
in the hydrocarbon-richer per capita 
countries, their populations can more 
easily absorb fiscal reforms, though 
this, too, is affected by other factors. 
The larger proportions of expatriates in 
the populations of the hydrocarbon-
richer per capita countries also support 
greater fiscal reforms. A number of 
GCC countries have introduced greater 
price adjustments for expatriates than 
for nationals. On the other hand, the 
nationals of the relatively hydrocarbon 
poorer per capita countries are more 
impacted by the subsidy reforms given 
the largely lower average GDP per 
capita, resulting in some cases in 
greater pushback. Moreover, the need 
for fiscal reform tends to be greater in 
these countries.  
Looking ahead, two factors are likely to 
be central to boosting fiscal 
sustainability: deepening of the tax 
base, and lowering the share of wages 
in government spending. For some 
countries, further subsidy reforms are 
required. A number of factors will be 
important for developing the tax base, 
including reducing the role of the public 
sector, improving the business climate, 
and developing a framework for 
supporting private-sector growth. The 
development of the private sector is 
also important for creating job 
opportunities for the youth. 
 
Fiscal and economic indicators: Budget Breakdown Oil Price ($/bbl) 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Hydrocarbon-poorer per capita 
Bahrain 76 81 99 112 116 119 116 118 107 103 
Oman 65 66 71 81 83 96 103 96 89 84 
Saudi Arabia 57 65 67 78 79 92 106 95 96 78 
Hydrocarbon-richer per capita 
UAE 44 66 70 74 77 76 83 65 60 65 
Qatar 29 27 33 38 43 50 54 50 53 57 
Kuwait 34 29 45 43 49 52 56 49 47 51 
 Source: IIF (2018).  “Hydrocarbon Exporters Breakeven Oil Prices have declined”, IIF Research Note, 
The Institute of International Finance, 1 February. 
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PRICING POLICIES AND 




After the oil price plummeted in the 
summer of 2014 and remained low 
throughout the next years (the OPEC 
Reference Basket only moderately 
recovered to an average of $52 in 
2017), the fuel-producing countries of 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
started implementing energy pricing 
reforms. For many years, pricing 
reforms had been planned and 
envisioned but, due to the 
quintessential role of low energy prices 
in the domestic political economies of 
Gulf countries, never really 
implemented. This inaction resembled 
the lack of progress on diversifying 
economies away from oil to other 
productive sectors, and on changing 
the domestic social contract from one 
that is reliant on public employment and 
universal pricing policies to one with 
private employment, market-based 
pricing structures, and targeted social 
safety nets. 
GCC countries have now made 
considerable progress in implementing 
both fuel and electricity pricing reforms, 
thereby achieving some form of fiscal 
consolidation and reducing the massive 
deficits that were rampant across the 
region after the oil price collapse. This 
has unquestionably reduced the 
unsustainable fiscal stress that GCC 
countries were and are experiencing, 
mostly as a result of the public wage bill 
and secondarily as a result of price 
subsidies. Pricing reform may not yet 
be a norm, but it is certainly a trend.  
Pricing reform strategies and growth 
While all GCC countries reformed 
energy prices, they did so in 
remarkably different ways. The United 
Arab Emirates (UAE), Oman, and Qatar 
were able to implement a periodic 
adjustment system that linked national 
prices to international and regional 
prices. Kuwait tried to do the same but 
was unsuccessful; instead, like Saudi 
Arabia and Bahrain, they relied on one-
off price increases. Unlike Kuwait, 
however, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain 
were able to implement more than one 
ad hoc price adjustment.  
Even though energy price reform has 
had different popular receptions in 
different countries, it seems to be one 
policy that authorities recognize is 
crucial for adjustment to falling oil 
revenues, and it has persisted in all 
GCC countries.  Overall pre-tax energy 
(gasoline, diesel, and electricity) 
subsidies fell from $116 billion in 2014 
to $47 billion in 2016 based on a price-
gap model (IMF, 2017).  
In an environment of low oil prices 
coupled with end-use energy price 
reforms, overall growth prospects in the 
medium term have been subdued, 
though non-oil growth has been 
improving in some countries 
recognizing the need for accelerated 
economic diversification. The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF, 
2017) has estimated that the reforms 
proposed by GCC governments could 
lead to an increase of 1.7 to 
6.6 per cent in their non-oil GDP by 
2020, based on each country’s reform 
path, and an additional 1.5 to 3.0 
percentage points of non-oil GDP 
would be generated with the 
introduction of VAT as proposed by 
different countries and contained in the 
ratified GCC VAT agreement. 
Gradual fuel price reforms 
The UAE, Oman, and Qatar have been 
able to switch from ad hoc to formula-
based fuel pricing methods. The UAE 
was the first GCC country to seriously 
reform its fuel prices. In August 2015, 
transport fuel prices were liberalized 
and linked to international market 
prices using price formulae. As a result, 
the price of gasoline increased by 
25 per cent and diesel prices 
decreased by 29 per cent (IMF, 2015). 
Since then, international market prices 
have gradually risen, and UAE prices 
have followed this trend. Fuel prices 
have been liberalized for all actors, 
including industry and commerce. 
Like many other countries, Oman first 
started raising energy prices for 
commerce and industry, before moving 
to residential consumers. It reformed 
fuel prices in the wake of Saudi reforms 
in January 2016 (Fattouh, Moerenhout, 
and Sen, 2016). At the same time, it 
introduced a new pricing formula that 
links Omani prices to prices on the 
international market and in the UAE. 
Since then, Oman has stuck to the 
formula and increased energy prices in 
keeping with international market price 
trends (Moerenhout, 2018). When 
reforming fuel prices, Oman also 
experienced opposition. In response, it 
twice installed a price cap and twice 
broke it. The government abolished the 
latest cap after introducing the National 
Subsidy Scheme, which provides fuel 
at a subsidized rate to less wealthy 
families.  
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Like Oman, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar also revised gasoline prices in 
early 2016. In a very early move, Qatar 
had already reformed diesel prices in 
2014 (by about 50 per cent for local 
companies but 75 per cent for joint 
ventures) (Walker and Kovessy, 2016). 
In May of the same year, the Qatari 
government announced plans to 
liberalize fuel prices and adjust them in 
keeping with international market price 
trends, regional price trends, and 
production costs—a move similar to the 
one taken by Oman and UAE. This plan 
was implemented as of June 2016, 
after which there were monthly 
revisions to the fuel price. 
Ad hoc fuel price reforms 
Saudi Arabia implemented significant 
energy pricing reforms in two stages in 
January 2016 and January 2018. In 
January 2016, the government 
reformed prices predominantly in 
reaction to the fiscal crisis resulting 
from the oil price drop. The Saudi 
government has targeted a full energy 
and water subsidy phase-out by 2020 
under its Vision 2030 plan (IMF, 2016). 
While the first stage of reforms was 
successful without introducing 
compensation measures or public 
information campaigns, the second 
stage was only implemented after the 
launch of Citizen’s Account, a cash 
transfer scheme (APICORP 2018). The 
2018 reforms were implemented after 
delays linked to several factors: an 
increasing oil price, the roll out of the 
cash transfer scheme, and a decrease 
in the annual growth rate from 3.5 to 
1.7 per cent. The Saudi government 
was cautious not to slow down 
industrial output. In its latest budget, it 
pushed back the target date for 
removing subsidies to 2025. 
Like Oman, Bahrain took its first step 
towards energy pricing reforms by 
increasing natural gas tariffs for 
industrial users in March 2015. An 
earlier attempt to reform electricity 
prices for residential 
users had failed due to 
opposition from 
members of parliament. 
Again, like Oman, it 
followed in the footsteps 
of Saudi Arabia in 
January 2016 and 
reformed fuel prices. It 
raised gasoline prices 
and planned for annual 
diesel price increases of 
$0.05/litre. (Gasoline 
prices were not reformed 
annually, while diesel 
prices were.) Following 
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain 
implemented a second 
round of ad hoc gasoline price 
increases in January 2018. 
The Kuwaiti government increased 
diesel prices by 200 per cent in January 
2015 but immediately had to scale this 
back to 100 per cent after 
parliamentary and other protests. Large 
(e.g. industrial) users continued to 
receive diesel at a lower price. In 
September 2016, the government 
implemented a gasoline price increase 
of about 70 per cent on average and 
combined this with a plan to revise 
prices in keeping with international 
price movements. After heavy protests 
Transport fuel prices (US$/litre, June-July 2018) 
 
Note: Gasoline 90/91/95/97 refer to the gasoline’s octane rating; world average is based on country averages 
 
Price changes (%) Summer 2014 until after reforms (June–July 2018) 
 
Note: Gasoline 90/91/95/97 refer to the gasoline’s octane rating;  
world average is based on country averages 
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and a legal challenge, the government 
was able to maintain its one-time 
gasoline price increase but dropped the 
plan to adjust prices periodically 
(Moerenhout, 2018). It is not planning 
any further price increases at this time. 
Fuel pricing reforms in comparison 
and their effect on demand 
In comparison with prices in other 
countries in the region, such as Jordan, 
and with average world prices, GCC 
country nationals are still able to buy 
fuel at some of the lowest rates 
worldwide. The UAE, Oman, and Qatar 
have higher prices than other GCC 
countries, even though Saudi Arabia 
and Bahrain have also invested heavily 
in cutting gasoline consumption. 
It appears fashionable to conclude that 
countries in the Gulf still have a long 
way to go in terms of fuel pricing 
reform. Experiences in fuel price 
changes across the world indeed show 
that changes may be reversed in the 
wake of popular protest or changing 
international oil prices. This is of course 
no different in the case of GCC 
countries. That said, progress has been 
remarkable and has yielded substantial 
results so far, especially in terms of 
fiscal consolidation and lowering 
demand. 
Average annual gasoline and diesel 
demand growth was around 
6.2 per cent and 4 per cent, 
respectively, in 2010–2015 but slowed 
to 0.4 per cent and −6 per cent in 2016. 
It is, however, difficult to attribute this 
slowdown to pricing reforms, as 
economic output also declined over the 
last few years (APICORP, 2017, 3). In 
Saudi Arabia, gasoline demand levelled 
out even before the January 2018 
reforms and diesel demand had already 
fallen 10 per cent. The latter can be 
attributed to the reduction in economic 
activity and the sourcing of more gas 
for power generation. In Oman, 
gasoline and diesel consumption fell by 
respectively 6.2 per cent and 
7.2 per cent from 2015 to 2016. 
Unsurprisingly, given the relatively 
modest fuel price increases, the UAE 
has seen less demand reaction in 
recent years. On the contrary, fuel 
demand actually increased in 2016. 
A trend, but not yet a norm 
There has been remarkable progress 
on fuel pricing reform in the GCC on 
two fronts. First, three countries were 
able to implement formula-based fuel 
price adjustments and have so far stuck 
to revising fuel prices upward. 
Especially in Qatar, this has led to 
strong price increases over two years. 
Second, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain 
have proven that one-off reforms can 
be followed up again, especially with 
the introduction of mitigation measures. 
Of all GCC countries, Saudi Arabia has 
increased gasoline prices by far the 
most. Even if they had the lowest prices 
among GCC countries, the fact that 
GDP per capita is lower in Saudi 
Arabia, and a rentier mentality 
potentially higher, makes such 
adjustments all the more surprising.  
Fuel pricing reform may not yet be a 
norm in the GCC. While one could pose 
the question whether it should be, given 
GCC countries’ comparative advantage 
in extracting and producing oil, it is 
difficult to deny that pre-reform prices 
were at an unsustainable level. They 
fostered skyrocketing demand growth, 
allocated resources inefficiently, and 
caused governments to forego 
significant revenue. It is encouraging 
that fuel price increases appear to be a 
trend. This has led to meaningful fiscal 
consolidation, adjusted some of the 
inefficient allocations and demand, and 
pushed countries to think more 
seriously about economic and social 
sustainability in their developmental 
visions. Most importantly, many GCC 
countries continued to adjust fuel prices 
even after the oil price started to 
recover. This shows a willingness, 
more than at any moment in the past 
decade, to discuss the opportunity cost 
of domestic pricing schemes. 
(The author would like to thank the Swiss 





JOB CREATION IN THE 
ARABIAN GULF: A VALUE 
CHAIN PERSPECTIVE 
Martin Hvidt 
This article seeks to answer two 
interlinked questions: What kind of jobs 
should Arabian Gulf societies aim to 
create in order to secure long-term 
growth? And how can these states 
encourage their citizens to work in the 
private sector? The article uses the 
concept of value chains to provide 
insight into the types of jobs that are 
likely to be most beneficial to Gulf 
countries’ development efforts, and the 
knowledge content of these jobs. It 
does not address Gulf countries’ 
participation in global value chains.  
Value chains have most commonly 
been studied with the purpose of 
identifying opportunities for increased 
profitability for a given company, either 
by making each part of the chain more 
efficient, or by adding or deleting parts 
of the chain. The addition of parts to 
value chains holds significant 
implications for diversification. In the oil 
value chain, for example, moving from 
the production of oil into other activities, 
for example refining, diversifies the 
product (e.g. from crude oil into 
gasoline, naphtha, jet fuel, and 
kerosene).  
The value chain perspective also holds 
significant implications for job content 
because different activities within a 
value chain require different skills and 
knowledge. Job creation and content 
are especially relevant for the Gulf 
states, for two reasons. First, these 
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states face a significant challenge 
related to job creation, due partly to the 
distributive economic model pursued 
since oil income first began to flow, and 
not least to the very high population 
growth rates. Over the next 15 years, 
more than 500,000 increasingly well-
educated nationals will enter the 
working age in the six Gulf countries, 
and increasing numbers of these will 
actively seek employment (Hvidt, 2018, 
17). Second, so far, the public sector in 
the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
countries has provided jobs for nearly 
every national who wished to get at 
jobs. However, according to 
development plans and visions 
published in the region, this policy is 
expected to become increasingly 
unsustainable because rapid population 
growth will make the cost prohibitive, 
and all countries in the region now 
assign the responsibility for further job 
creation to the private sector. 
Diversification. What is it and why is 
it of interest to research in the 
Arabian Gulf countries? 
‘Diversification’ is defined in a variety of 
ways depending on the context. In 
political economy, it ‘normally refers to 
exports, and specifically to policies 
aiming to reduce the dependence on 
a limited number of export 
commodities that may be subject to 
price and volume fluctuations or 
secular declines’ (Routledge, 2001, 
360). Within political economy, 
diversification can take place either 
horizontally (by seeking new 
opportunities within the same sector—
e.g. mining, energy, or agriculture) or 
vertically (by adding more stages of 
processing of domestic or imported 
inputs). Vertical diversification 
encourages forward and backward 
linkages in the economy, as the 
output of one activity becomes the 
input of another, thus expanding the 
value-added produced locally. 
Risk is the underlying issue in this 
definition. Fluctuations in prices and 
demand are basic components of the 
world economy, and diversification is 
one of the options open to societies, 
firms, and individual investors to protect 
themselves from these fluctuations. 
The underlying logic of diversification is 
that ‘instability for any group of 
products tends to be significantly lower 
than for any of its constituents, 
indicating that price and volume 
stability gains are attainable from 
diversification’ (Routledge, 2001, 360).  
As stated by Qatar’s General 
Secretariat for Development Planning, 
‘A more diversified economy is 
inherently more stable, more capable of 
creating jobs and opportunities for the 
next generation and less vulnerable to 
the boom and bust cycles of oil and 
natural gas prices’ (GSDP, 2011, 10).  
Diversification in the Arabian Gulf 
context 
The distributive state model applied in 
all Gulf states remains highly 
dependent on the income from 
hydrocarbons. This model is state-led 
and state-driven, emphasizes wealth 
distribution, makes extensive use of 
migrant labour, and, of most 
importance in this context, is 
characterized by a significant 
underdevelopment of productive 
assets, since oil seems to crowd out 
other economic activities, which leads 
to undiversified economies. This model 
worked well when oil incomes were 
high and populations small. Over the 
last decades, however, the model can 
be said to have failed to support further 
development of the GCC states in two 
important respects.  
First, while it has provided significant 
incomes since the export of oil and gas 
first started, it has failed to generate a 
stable economy with predictable 
income for the population, due to highly 
fluctuating oil prices and lack of 
diversification. This has created an 
environment in which it is difficult to 
foster a dynamic private sector.  
Second, it has failed to create sufficient 
job opportunities to accommodate the 
many new entrants to the job market. 
The 2014 oil price collapse—which by 
one stroke halved the yearly income 
from oil, and which led to substantial ad 
hoc measures to cut public spending 
Porter's value chain 
 
Source: Porter, M. (1998). Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior 
Performance, New York: The Free Press, 37. 
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for services (for example hospitals), 
subsidies, and development projects—
is a stark reminder that the countries 
have not yet succeeded in diversifying 
their economies and creating 
alternative sources of income. Vision 
2030, launched in Saudi Arabia in 2017 
(SACEDA, 2017) is an expression of 
the urgency of the diversification drive.  
Economic diversification is, however, 
not a new strategy among the GCC 
states. It has been on the political and 
economic agenda since oil and gas 
became the main (and almost sole) 
source of income in these countries 
some half a century ago. Notable 
projects, such as aluminium smelting in 
Bahrain, the industrial cities of Yanbu 
and Jubail in Saudi Arabia, and the 
ports in Dubai were established in the 
1970s with the specific aim of 
diversifying these economies by 
investing oil money in productive 
assets. Besides these, investments in 
education and health services has been 
ongoing. Lately development of a 
manufacturing industry to satisfy 
domestic needs (e.g. for poultry and 
dairy products and for construction 
materials, furniture and household 
items) have been ongoing and most 
recently there has been the 
development of activities such as 
tourism, financial series, aviation etc.all 
with the purpose of diversifying the 
economies (Hvidt, 2013).  
Value chains 
The concept of value chains was 
introduced by Michael E. Porter in 
1985. In 1998, he further developed the 
concept as a tool to analyse the 
sources of a firm’s competitive 
advantages. He defined a value chain 
as a collection of activities that are 
performed within a firm to design, 
produce, market, deliver, and support 
its products (Porter, 1998, 36).  
The value chain displays total value, 
and consists of value activities (the 
physically and technologically distinct 
activities a firm performs) and profits. 
For companies that produce goods, the 
value chain starts with the raw 
materials that go into the product, and 
consists of everything added before the 
product is sold to consumers. Porter 
divided a business’s activities into two 
main categories, primary and 
secondary, where the secondary 
activities are seen to support or serve 
the primary activities. 
Building on this insight, but with a less 
rigorous division between primary and 
secondary activities, the Smiley Model 
of value chains was proposed by Stan 
Shih, the founder of Acer Inc. in 1992 
(see Ye et al. 2015, 2).  
In the electronics value chain, the 
Smiley curve has attained a more 
pronounced U-shape over the last four 
decades. This indicates that the gap 
between the value added produced by 
manufacturing activities and that 
produced by innovation and marketing 
activities is growing. If this is a general 
trend, it provides even further 
incentives for the Gulf states to 
emphasize job creation in the services 
part of the value chain. 
Value chains and job creation in the 
Gulf  
The labour markets of the GCC 
countries have a dual nature: Nationals, 
as a part of the social contract, 
primarily seek employment in the public 
The smiley-model 
 
Source: The Shifting Geography of Global Value Chains: Implications for Developing Countries and Trade Policy. Geneva, Switzerland: World 
Economic Forum, p.21 
The Smiley Model describes the magnitude of value-added at various stages in the value chain. The insight derived from this model is that 
production activities (manufacturing and assembly) yield the least value added (most likely due to the standardization of those processes, and 
thus exposure to high levels of competition), while the secondary activities—such as design, research and development, innovation, logistics, 
and marketing) yield high levels of value added. A classic illustration of this relationship is that the manufacturing cost of a jacket, that is the 
cost of all inputs (such as labour, materials, shell fabric, lining, buttons, and hangtag) only make up 9 per cent of the price of the final product; 
the secondary services and profit make up the remaining 91 per cent (Low, 2016, 13)   
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sector, which is better paid and offers 
more job security and shorter working 
hours than the private sector 
(McKinsey, 2015). Private-sector 
employment is also more competitive 
and meritocratic and takes place in a 
mixed-gender environment, which 
might present a cultural challenge to 
segments of the national population 
(Ulrichsen, 2018, 12ff). The key 
reasons for this are that the private 
sector consists overwhelmingly of low-
skilled jobs and state policies permit the 
sourcing of cheap migrant labour. As 
such, private sector employment is less 
attractive to nationals.  
A recent World Bank report argued that 
to make private-sector jobs more 
attractive, salaries must be increased, 
and that this should be done through 
reforms that increase the productivity of 
the private sector by shifting economic 
activity to ‘higher value-added sectors, 
more technology-intensive production, 
diversified and more sophisticated 
exports, and technology-driven foreign 
direct investment’  (World Bank, 2017, 
vii). An International Monetary Fund 
report documented that productivity 
gains in the GCC countries have 
contributed relatively little to growth 
since 1970. Rather, growth has been 
attributable to ‘hiring more hands’, not 
to capital or total factor productivity 
(IMF, 2017, 26)  
The inclusion of more nationals in the 
private sector is a contentious subject, 
which relates not only to the salaries 
paid but also to the motivation, 
willingness, and ability of nationals to 
take private-sector jobs (World Bank, 
2017, vii).  
Regarding educational qualifications, 
will nationals be able to compete with 
imported skilled workers? A review of 
the available indicators of educational 
achievement in the GCC countries 
highlights structural problems within 
and around the educational system that 
lower the quality of teaching, minimize 
research outputs, and lessen the 
usefulness to society of the education 
provided. In this respect, it is 
questionable how well the current 
system prepares graduates to play an 
active role in a future knowledge 
economy (Hvidt, 2015). At the 
international level, a link has been 
found between high incomes from 
natural resources and lower political 
emphasis on education (Gylfason 
2001).  
A second issue relates to the likely 
success of the political initiatives to 
make private-sector employment 
attractive to nationals. In all Gulf states, 
there are policies, with names such as 
Emiratization, Omanization, and 
Saudization, that aim to pressure or 
encourage nationals to take jobs in the 
private sector. One such initiative is the 
drive to localize production. For 
example, Saudi Arabia aims to localize 
50 per cent of defence spending and 75 
per cent of the oil and gas industry, 
meaning that all inputs should come 
from local sources and that a very high 
percentage of the higher-skilled jobs 
within these sectors should be taken by 
Saudi nationals (SACEDA, 2017).  
Other measures to localize labour 
include quotas for employing nationals 
within various categories of private-
sector firms (e.g. the Saudi Nitaqat 
system) and restriction of certain job 
functions to nationals only. For 
example, in January 2018, the Saudi 
government announced it would add to 
its growing list of Saudi-only jobs by 
including the sale of watches, eyewear, 
medical equipment and devices, 
electrical and electronic appliances, 
auto parts, building materials, carpets, 
cars and motorcycles, home and office 
furniture, children’s clothing and men’s 
accessories, home kitchenware, and 
confectionery (Young, 2018, 17). Such 
policies are implemented cross the six 
countries, but primarily in the three 
countries with the highest 
unemployment figures for nationals: 
Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Bahrain. 
Besides the obvious point, that it is 
positive for the national economy if jobs 
are filled by nationals rather than 
migrant workers, who usually transfer a 
substantial part of their wages out of 
the country, employment localization 
efforts should be seen as a long-term 
strategy of ‘upskilling’ national labour 
forces to undertake high-end jobs in the 
private sector.  
Conclusion 
Instead of viewing diversification in a 
narrow sense, as economists often do, 
Smiley curve for the electronics value chain, 1970s and 2000s 
 
Source: de Backer, K. (2013). “Interconnected economies: benefitting from global 
value chains – the Czech Republic”, Presentation given at Conference of Economic 
Counselors, Prague, 25 June 2013, Slide 16. 
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measuring it by the percentage of 
exports from non-oil sectors, the value 
chain perspective as applied in this 
article focuses on the type of jobs that 
diversification policies are attempting to 
create and the knowledge content of 
those jobs. 
This leads to the understanding that it 
is not important whether a new 
economic activity is within or outside 
the oil sector, but whether the jobs 
created by the activity are in a low- or 
high-value-added segment of the 
supply chain.  
High-value-added jobs have, as this 
article has demonstrated, a much larger 
potential to generate income and thus 
to attract workers from the national 
labour force. They also have a much 
larger development potential, in that 
jobs with high skill levels and 
knowledge content increase a country 
or a firm’s ability to quickly adjust to 
new and changing demands in a rapidly 
changing world. As pointed out by 
Bremmer (2018), not only are the 
profits larger in technology-driven 
sectors, but in the next decade the 
world will experience an even higher 
rate of technological change than in the 
previous decades. Artificial intelligence, 
robotics, and machine learning have 
now reached a stage where they can 
be applied profitably across sectors. 
This will transform the job market, 
placing an even higher premium on the 
jobs that develop, interact with, and 
control digital processes. The Smiley 
Curve is likely to attain an even more 
pronounced U-shape, thus leaving 
countries and sectors that do not 
pursue technological upskilling behind. 
As a recent study pointed out (UNIDO 
and WEF, 2014), today, the 
competitiveness of nations has less to 
do with decreasing costs (e.g. of 
production or transactions) and more to 





IS THERE A FEASIBLE 
SOFT LANDING FOR 
SAUDI ARABIA'S 
ECONOMY?   
Ishac Diwan 
With a rising population, and oil prices 
expected to fall over time as interest in 
climate change increases, the rentier 
mode of development followed by 
Saudi Arabia is clearly unsustainable. 
On this most analysts agree. But once 
this model collapses, what could 
replace it? Here, pundits are deeply 
divided: some believe that the 
inadequacies of the model will 
necessarily lead, sooner or later, to a 
doomsday scenario of instability and 
pauperization; others advocate a move 
from the current mono-sector economy 
to a modern and diversified knowledge-
based economy, OECD-style. 
This confusion in the economic 
discourse about the kingdom has its 
source in the unusual structure of its 
labour market. The steep dualism 
between expatriates and national 
workers is unique among large 
countries. The main problem with the 
current economic system is that under 
it, nationals are simply not employable 
in large numbers in the private sector. 
And the main challenge to building a 
better future is to find ways to employ 
them productively. 
Doing so would greatly boost growth 
and may be the only source of growth 
that is currently readily available. It 
would also save on the foreign 
exchange now being remitted by 
expatriates abroad, reducing the need 
to produce tradables besides oil. While 
the current labour arrangements create 
a heavy disincentive to nationals joining 
the labour force, huge gains could be 
made if they were instead encouraged 
to do so, because Saudi nationals are 
both grossly underemployed and 
increasingly well educated, thus 
increasing the opportunity cost of low 
participation. Currently, only 40 per 
cent of working-age nationals 
participate in the labour force (but only 
35 per cent work as the rest are 
unemployed). This compares to labour 
participation rates of about 60 per cent 
in the OECD. Low Saudi participation 
rates are largely due to very low 
participation by women (19 per cent), 
but men’s participation (55 per cent) is 
not high by international standards 
either.  
To give a sense of the potential gains if 
national labour was employed more 
effectively, a simple projection model 
suggests that with participation rates 
growing from 40 per cent to 60 per cent 
of the working-age population, and 
unemployment dropping to its natural 
rate, non-oil national income would 
more than double if the additional 
workers join the non-oil sector at 
current productivity levels. 
Improvements in labour productivity 
would add to this growth rate further. 
Altogether, it can be estimated that this 
addition to national wealth is 
comparable in magnitude to the 
kingdom’s current oil wealth (Diwan, 
2018). 
To create the conditions needed for the 
full employment of Saudi nationals, the 
current growth model needs to be 
deeply reformed. This model rests on 
two pillars: businesses’ free hand to 
import labour from abroad, and a 
guarantee for citizens of public-sector 
jobs and lifelong support. With its 
current population of 23 million, and oil 
revenues of only $6,000 per capita, 
Saudi Arabia has clearly outgrown the 
current arrangement. The government 
is no longer hiring all Saudis who are 
willing to work. Already, unemployment 
is officially at 11.6 per cent overall, 32.8 
per cent for women, and 29.4 for youth, 
and rising. Oil rents are not sufficient to 
finance anything close to current 
consumption levels for the population, 
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and this can only get worse over time in 
the absence of a new source of growth.  
If the current system of incentives does 
not change, and the economy 
continues on autopilot, dwindling oil 
revenues will provide less income to 
nationals. The oil shock of 2014, 
coming on the heels of a post–Arab 
Spring fiscal expansion, caused a large 
deficit in the government budget. But 
the problem is not just fiscal 
sustainability. The kingdom can borrow 
abroad and sell assets to theoretically 
finance at least 10 years of deficits at 
the current level before going bankrupt, 
which allows it to kick the can down the 
road for a while, as typical of regimes 
built on oil (Karl, 1997). But if cheap 
labour continues to be freely imported 
in the meanwhile, Saudi reservation 
wages will only fall slowly over time, 
and Saudis will continue to shun 
working in the private sector until they 
become much poorer. In such an 
‘Algerianization’ scenario, the kingdom 
would turn into an increasingly 
impoverished welfare state, with rising 
unemployment (or low labour force 
participation) and rising income 
inequality; business owners would 
continue to enrich themselves by 
importing cheap expatriate labour, 
while the rest of the population would 
gradually become poorer. Governance, 
which has relied largely on the co-
optation of citizens, would have to 
become more repressive, as has 
happened in the countries of the region 
with smaller oil endowments and larger 
populations such as Iraq or Algeria 
(Cammet et al., 2019). 
While an important risk is that the 
government may just delay 
consideration of serious reforms, an 
even greater risk is that its existing 
fiscal space may enable it to buy into a 
costly pie-in-the-sky project. One overly 
optimistic scenario recommends that 
Saudi Arabia become a sort of Dubai 
on steroids, with Saudi youth managing 
a large population of migrant workers in 
a super-competitive economy driven by 
private initiative and serving as a bridge 
between East and West. Vision 2030, 
which embodies these aspirations, has 
been equally celebrated and criticized. 
This scenario is unrealistic in its 
assumptions about how much can 
change quickly. A more realistic 
projection, given the country’s starting 
point, is that it would take several 
generations to extricate itself from 
dependence on oil through 
diversification. 
While the more pessimistic scenario is 
the more likely of the two, both fail to 
present a reasonable vision for the 
country's next 20 years, when oil 
revenues are likely to remain sizable 
but not sufficient to sustain the current 
model of development. Saudi Arabia 
can no doubt do better than commit 
economic suicide. Unlike other oil 
countries, it has invested heavily in 
assets and skills, and its business and 
political elites have too much ‘skin in 
the game’ to sit back and allow a 
catastrophe to unfold in slow motion.  
It must be evident to many Saudis that 
it is high time for the productive 
structure (if not the polity) to adapt to 
the new realities. The country’s human 
and real assets have changed 
profoundly in the past 50 years. While 
importing labour to build the country 
made sense in the past, there are now 
large cohorts of educated Saudis 
graduating and aspiring to productive 
employment. The situation is thus 
profoundly different, and it requires 
profoundly different economic 
incentives. The massive import of 
foreign labour was a response to an 
exceptional situation, unseen in these 
proportions in any other country at any 
other time. This period has now to 
come to an end.  
To employ its youth gainfully, Saudi 
Arabia now needs to become a ‘normal’ 
oil economy—like, for example, 
Norway—that exports mostly if not only 
oil, but that derives national income 
from the work of its own population, 
primarily in the service sector. In this 
model, Saudi workers would replace 
expatriates, largely in service jobs. The 
economy would remain dominated by 
oil; a large share of the Saudi labour 
force (say half) would remain employed 
in government; and many public-sector 
firms would continue to play an 
important economic role, employing 
specialized Saudi workers in the oil, 
health, academic, telecom, and finance 
industries.  
But the new jobs would largely be in 
high-productivity occupations in the 
service sector. Except in a few areas of 
comparative advantage, not many firms 
would produce globally competitive 
tradables; those that do so now would 
be unlikely to survive given that 
unskilled wages would rise, capital 
would come at a higher cost, subsidies 
would be cut, and taxes would be 
introduced. At best, a few tradable 
sectors could thrive, such as religious 
tourism and sectors with close linkages 
with petroleum.  
At the end of this transition, millions of 
expatriates would have returned to their 
home countries, having provided a vital 
contribution to the task of building up a 
modern country at record speed. The 
Saudi economy would become smaller, 
but it would employ a large share of its 
own population productively—it may 
have a lower GDP, but it would have a 
larger national income. Oil would 
remain central, but it would have a 
much larger multiplier effect in terms of 
the domestic employment of nationals.  
The main economic challenge of the 
transition to a normal economy is to 
create productive jobs for nationals. It is 
easy enough to create high-paying 
jobs—in the public sector, including the 
security forces, or by replacing 
migrants in labour-intensive private-
sector occupations. But the first option 
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(creating new public-sector jobs) would 
expand fiscal deficits unsustainably. 
The second option (replacing expatriate 
workers with nationals) can deliver high 
wages in the nontradable service sector 
if the total number of migrant workers is 
reduced sharply. But unless 
productivity rises too, this would be 
reflected in higher nontradable prices, 
eroding standards of living.  
The good news is that the education 
level among young Saudis has risen, 
which makes it possible for them to 
occupy jobs at relatively high 
productivity levels. The bad news, 
however, is that existing incentives 
have pushed firms in the private sector 
to create jobs that require either very 
low skills (especially in services) or very 
high skills (especially in the energy 
sector). The challenge of creating jobs 
that are attractive for Saudis, who have 
mostly mid-level skills, is to create 
incentives for structural change in the 
production methods used by private 
firms. Ideally, a new cohort of small and 
medium-size enterprises (SMEs) 
should emerge that pay sufficient 
wages to attract Saudi workers, by 
investing in more capital- and skill-
intensive production methods, and by 
training their workers to improve their 
productivity.  
There are two types of economic 
challenges to such a scenario (and a 
multitude of political-economic ones). 
First, there is a large reform agenda 
needed to create a more dynamic 
private sector. To encourage innovation 
and growth, there is a well-known need 
to substantially improve the business 
climate and to increase access to 
credit. The labour market would have to 
become much tighter, with constraints 
placed on the total number of migrants 
in the country — and not just firm-level 
quotas that are poorly applied, as is the 
case now. To help SMEs quickly adjust 
to the new input price structure, more 
targeted industrial policies would be 
needed. The key challenge would be 
supporting the transformation of whole 
sectors—reforming the construction 
industry so that it can move from its 
current labour-intensive techniques to 
more capital- and skill-intensive 
methods, or helping to create new 
SMEs that cater to a world where 
housework is three to four times more 
expensive, by creating substitute 
services in the transport, cleaning, 
child-care, and food sectors. These 
new SMEs would have to change the 
current labour-intensive way of doing 
business. Their rise would need to go 
hand in hand with the (creative) 
destruction of the old inefficient firms, 
so that the new firms can increase their 
market shares. In the absence of 
supporting policies, there is a risk of 
migrant jobs disappearing but being 
replaced with only a limited number of 
jobs for nationals, as has been 
observed in the Saudization policies 
followed so far (Hertog, 2014; Peck, 
2017). 
Second, at the macro level, the 
required new investments would 
generate large new financing needs. To 
create about 1 million jobs every five 
years would require investment of $0.5 
to 1 trillion over 10 years. These funds 
would have to come from the national 
banking and financial sectors, foreign 
direct investment, or public funds. At 
the macro level, this would create a 
trade-off with the speed of adjustment. 
Large amounts of public financing of 
deficits would crowd out funds needed 
to finance private-sector investment. 
Given that the private investment 
required for a successful structural 
reform strategy is large, there is also a 
global finance trade-off. It would not be 
possible to wait 10 years to adjust, 
while at the same time creating 
1 million good new jobs. Slowing 
adjustment too much would constrain 
how much can be invested to upgrade 
jobs and productivity. 
Underlying these economic 
complexities are a multitude of political-
economic challenges to the 
establishment of a ‘normal’ Saudi 
economy. The economic elites would 
want to keep their privileged access to 
cheap foreign workers. They would 
claim that most Saudis’ education and 
attitude are not favourable to their 
employment. National workers will 
resist a reduction in their reservation 
wage, claiming that it is the 
responsibility of the state to protect 
their consumption level. But in the end, 
all citizens know that the current model 
is not sustainable, and a smart set of 
reforms could manage to build a 
cooperative national strategy aimed at 
the creation of an efficient enough 
private service economy. The 
perception that the costs of reform are 
fairly shared by all groups will be 
essential. To build support for reforms, 
it does make sense for the state to try 
to smooth out the initial consumption 
drop by only lowering the fiscal deficit 
gradually, at the speed at which the 
private sector picks up steam in 
creating jobs for nationals.  
The deeper question is whether the 
Saudi elite and society can coalesce 
around a reasonable vision for the 
future of their economy, avoid the risks 
entailed by excessive optimism, and 
muster the courage to support the 
needed reforms before it is too late.  
 
IN THE SPOTLIGHT: 




The Saudi government’s plans to 
launch an initial public offering (IPO) of 
5 per cent of its national oil company, 
Saudi Aramco, have pushed the 
previously discreet oil giant into the 
international spotlight. But its plans for 
a public listing are not the only way in 
   
43 
JUNE 2019: ISSUE 118 – ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION IN THE MENA 
OXFORD ENERGY FORUM 
which the company has become more 
visible: It also has been taking on 
increasing non-oil domestic 
development tasks, has acquired 
growing international investments, and 
is set to indirectly raise significant debt 
for the Saudi government. Aramco is 
set to play a more prominent role not 
only in international hydrocarbons and 
downstream business, but also on 
international financial markets—even if, 
as recent signs suggest, its IPO might 
not happen. 
Saudi Aramco’s prominent national role 
reflects its capabilities and gives it 
considerable political capital. It also 
comes with significant noncommercial 
obligations, however, which often are 
not of its own making. So while the 
kingdom’s ambitious industrial 
diversification agenda provides Aramco 
an opportunity to shine, it also pushes 
the firm into a more complex political 
environment and requires it to operate 
in theatres that it is less familiar with. 
This research note reviews Aramco’s 
political history and position in the 
Saudi system and discusses its 
growing role outside the upstream 
sector, including in industrialization. 
This is followed by a discussion of 
political changes under the new Saudi 
leadership that have, among other 
things, led to the IPO plans and a large 
industrial restructuring plan under 
which Aramco is planning the debt-
financed acquisition of a majority stake 
in national petrochemicals giant SABIC 
(Saudi Basic Industries Corporation). 
Saudi Aramco’s position in the 
Saudi system 
Saudi Aramco has been a critical agent 
for the social, economic, and 
infrastructural development of Saudi 
Arabia. Its managerial capacities are 
unrivalled in the kingdom and the Gulf 
region, and its range of tasks and 
ambitions has recently expanded into a 
number of new policy sectors. This 
presents opportunities but also risks for 
Aramco, which has started to operate 
far outside of its traditional turf of 
running the upstream oil and gas sector 
in the kingdom, and is now involved in 
activities that are more political and 
more closely scrutinized by the Saudi 
public. 
Saudi Aramco has not only been in 
charge of the assets that generate 
more than 85 per cent of Saudi exports 
and more than 80 per cent of recurrent 
government revenue. Since its creation 
as an American concessionaire in the 
1930s, it has also helped build 
important parts of the local private 
sector through its contracting efforts 
and local business development 
programme. It has played an important 
part in building Saudi infrastructure, 
especially in the strategic Eastern 
Province, and in training an advanced 
industrial and managerial workforce. 
Many former Aramcons have used their 
experience with the company to join the 
ranks of Saudi entrepreneurs, and in 
recent years, senior government 
technocrats too have increasingly been 
recruited from Aramco’s ranks. 
Different from other national oil 
companies, Aramco was taken over 
from its original US owners in the 
1970s in a comparatively smooth 
fashion. It has retained its American 
corporate culture although it has been 
100 per cent government-owned since 
1980 and is run mostly by Saudis. It is 
now generally ranked as the most 
efficient national oil company among all 
OPEC countries—making it, in the eyes 
of Crown Prince Mohammad bin 
Salman, an attractive target for an IPO. 
Saudi Aramco has historically retained 
a rather high level of operational 
autonomy since becoming state-owned. 
It has also retained considerable 
cultural autonomy and remains an 
enclave in whose compounds genders 
are allowed to mix and where women 
were allowed to drive long before the 
recent decree giving this right to all 
Saudi women. While the company 
discloses little information—a stance it 
has arguably developed as a self-
defence mechanism—it is generally 
seen as the most efficient part of the 
Saudi public sector. Senior royals have 
been instrumental in protecting it from 
predation or meddling by either the 
national bureaucracy or the wider ruling 
family. 
Saudi Aramco remains the preferred 
employer of a large share of young and 
ambitious Saudi graduates; its 
managers and engineers are held in 
high esteem in the international 
petroleum business. From about the 
1970s on, however, it lost some of its 
pre-eminence in national development. 
While in the 1950s and 1960s it built 
national infrastructure and provided 
electricity services and education, the 
rest of the state apparatus grew rapidly 
with the post-1973 oil boom and could 
take on new public service tasks, taking 
some pressure off Aramco. 
This trend has reversed in recent years: 
While the Saudi state has continued to 
grow, policy challenges have grown 
even faster, and Aramco once again is 
at the forefront of social and economic 
development outside the hydrocarbons 
sector. This is partially an outcome of 
higher oil income and increased 
demands on the part of government 
and the royal leadership, but also 
driven by a more assertive vision of the 
company’s role developed under 
Khaled Al-Faleh, chief executive officer 
from 2009 to May 2016, and minister of 
energy since then. 
The list of new projects, sectors and 
tasks has grown exponentially during 
the last decade however. Aramco has 
decided to expand strongly into 
petrochemicals through world-scale 
joint ventures with Sumitomo and Dow. 
According to Al-Faleh, planned 
investment amounts to $60 billion, and 
the ambition is to be among the top 
three petrochemicals companies 
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worldwide. Aramco has also stepped 
up its refinery-building programme and 
aims to become the world’s largest 
refiner with a total capacity of 8–10 
million barrels per day. It has invested 
in a range of downstream joint ventures 
overseas, with a primary focus on Asia. 
It has also started to invest in 
renewables technology—on a much 
smaller scale, but with potentially 
strategic long-term impact given the 
kingdom’s ambitious renewable energy 
plans. It has become much more active 
in pushing its contractors into producing 
industrial inputs for its large operations 
locally through its In-Kingdom Total 
Value Added programme.  
Aramco is also trying to redefine its role 
in its upstream core business. While it 
generally has been a capable 
consumer of international technology, it 
now wants to become a technology 
leader; it has invested heavily in 
research and development capacity, 
building partnerships with international 
universities and research centres in 
Houston (Texas), Massachusetts, and 
Saudi Arabia. Its new technology 
venture capital arm, Saudi Aramco 
Energy Ventures, has identified 
Norwegian partners with which it will 
invest up to $120 million a year in 
European start-up companies. The 
company also set up its own 
commodity trading arm in January 
2012, and is building a $5.2 billion 
shipyard through a joint venture with 
foreign partners. 
Of potentially greater importance for the 
kingdom’s future, the company is also 
becoming increasingly involved in 
industrial development outside of 
hydrocarbons and heavy industry. The 
government has asked it to be the lead 
agent in developing Jizan Economic 
City, a struggling project in Saudi 
Arabia’s underdeveloped south built 
around a refinery for which no private 
investors were found. While the Jizan 
project might have been imposed on 
the company (and requires 
commercially questionable shipping of 
crude around the Arabian Peninsula), 
Aramco also proactively pushes for the 
development of downstream 
manufacturing through industrial parks 
attached to its large petrochemicals 
projects with Dow and Sumitomo. 
Together with the Ministry of Energy, it 
also attempts to push national 
industrialists—who rely on Aramco’s 
cheap gas and oil products as 
feedstock—away from basic 
petrochemicals and energy-intensive 
manufacturing of basic building 
materials towards higher value-added 
production. 
The company has also stepped up its 
support for Saudi small and medium 
enterprises and entrepreneurs through 
a variety of training and financing 
initiatives. While its own workforce 
remains comparatively slim—65,000 
employees in 2016, a fairly small 
number by the standards of large 
OPEC producers—its role in training 
has become huge. It invests 
considerably in internal staff 
development, with more than 3,000 
industrial workers in training in 2012 
and more than 1,000 Aramcons 
studying on scholarships in the United 
States. 
The need to accommodate these new 
graduates appears to be a core 
concern for policymakers and drives 
some of the activism pushing Aramco 
into new business fields. The training 
programs also reflect a renewed 
commitment to shaping the kingdom’s 
young managerial elites, which had 
been somewhat thinned out in the 
austere 1980s and 1990s when 
resources for overseas scholarships 
dwindled.  
Outside of employee training, the 
company has launched a ‘youth 
enrichment’ programme in cooperation 
with various local organizations under 
which 2 million Saudis are supposed to 
be trained by 2020. The late King 
Abdullah also tasked Aramco with 
setting up the King Abdullah University 
of Science and Technology from 2009 
on, a selective graduate institute with 
an endowment of $10 billion (which 
initially was outside the control of the 
Ministry of Higher Education). 
Finally, Aramco is trying to grow its 
broader policy research capacity: In 
2008, it was put in charge of the King 
Abdullah Petroleum Studies and 
Research Center, a national energy 
think tank. At the same time, it has 
been building an internal economic and 
energy research department to assist in 
defining its national development role.  
Saudi Aramco is the most capable 
organization in the kingdom. On an 
individual basis, for many of the 
development tasks it has taken on (or 
been charged with), it is indeed a good 
choice. The question is whether the 
breadth of these combined tasks might 
become overwhelming, dilute the 
managerial focus of the company, and 
lead to a ‘mission creep’ of ever-
expanding follow-up tasks.  
The answer to this is not obvious, but it 
is a question to keep in mind when 
watching the company over the coming 
years. When Aramco was tasked with 
the building of a stadium and sports city 
in Jeddah in 2009—with other 
government agencies apparently 
perceived as not up to the task—some 
observers already wondered whether it 
was being turned into a surrogate 
government. Probably for the first time 
in the company’s history, opinion 
pieces in the local press commented on 
Aramco’s tasks and, in some cases, 
questioned its performance. 
Adding complexity: IPO and SABIC 
acquisition plans 
Adding a further layer to Aramco’s 
strategic and governance challenges, 
Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman 
in 2016 instructed the firm to prepare its 
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own 5 per cent IPO. It is not the only 
instance in which he has exerted more 
immediate control over the corporate 
strategy of a firm used to an arm’s-
length relationship with government. 
Aramco has historically been isolated 
from royal politics: Different from some 
other Gulf monarchies, no royals hold 
any senior positions in the firm. Minister 
of Energy Khaled Al-Faleh, himself a 
former Aramco man, is also a 
commoner, as were his all 
predecessors. While princes have been 
deputies in the Ministry of Energy, their 
portfolios have been clearly delimited 
and they tend not to get directly 
involved in company affairs. Before 
Mohammad bin Salman’s emergence 
as key economic policymaker in 2015, 
most policy research and strategic 
proposals emerged from within Aramco 
to be merely ratified by a Supreme 
Petroleum Council chaired by the king. 
The Ministry of Energy itself relies 
heavily on Aramco for research and 
remains a comparatively slim institution 
with limited autonomous capacity. 
Mohammad bin Salman has disrupted 
this status quo on several levels: In 
early 2016, the Supreme Petroleum 
Council was disbanded and replaced 
by a Supreme Council for Aramco 
under the prince’s chairmanship—
indicating a more direct involvement in 
the firm’s strategy and, given that 
Aramco also has a conventional 
corporate board with independent 
directors, creating an unusual two-tier 
board structure. 
Around the same time, the crown 
prince publicly mused about the option 
to IPO parts of the firm in an Economist 
interview. At first, many observers in 
the energy world did not take this 
statement seriously, but since then IPO 
plans have firmed up and been made 
official. Used to full operational 
autonomy and secrecy, most Aramco 
executives have been unhappy about 
the IPO idea, but had little wherewithal 
to directly confront the leadership over 
it. 
The IPO can be seen as a quasi-fiscal 
operation: The government hopes for a 
valuation of $2 trillion, so that a 
5 per cent IPO would yield liquid 
revenue of $100 billion. Such money is 
needed for the various investment 
schemes of the Public Investment Fund 
(PIF), the crown prince’s preferred 
vehicle for both overseas acquisitions 
and local diversification projects. The 
PIF, run by Yasir Al-Rumayyan, has 
significant but mostly illiquid assets. It 
has made large commitments to invest 
in Softbank and Blackstone funds 
internationally, and to build various 
large-scale tourism and entertainment 
projects as well as the robot-run city 
Neom in the kingdom. Directly financing 
the projects out of government funds 
would inflate deficits at a time when the 
kingdom is keen to convince foreign 
investors that it can balance its budget 
by 2023. 
The IPO plan has run into difficulties, 
and some observers doubt that it will 
ever happen.   
In the course of preparation for the IPO, 
the Supreme Council for Aramco—
incompatible with modern corporate 
governance—was disbanded again and 
replaced by a cabinet-level Higher 
Committee for Hydrocarbons in 2018. 
Yet concerns about potential political 
intervention in the firm remained. 
Further roadblocks to the IPO include 
the potential legal liabilities that come 
with a Western listing, the difficulty of 
separating Aramco’s core business and 
accounts from the various non-core 
activities undertaken at the 
government’s behest, and the struggle 
to get close to the $2 trillion valuation. 
The Aramco technocracy has used all 
of these issues to convince the 
leadership of the difficulties of the 
proposed IPO. Recent reports that the 
IPO is off the table were not publicly 
denied for several months until the 
crown prince indicated in October 2018 
that the target date was now late 2020 
or early 2021. 
 
Yet the PIF is capital-hungry, and 
despite elevated oil prices the kingdom 
remains under tight fiscal constraints: 
The International Monetary Fund 
estimated the fiscal break-even oil price 
for 2018 at $83.4 per barrel. Official 
deficit reduction targets are at odds 
with large project spending plans. At 
the same time, the kingdom has been 
under strong pressure from the Trump 
administration to keep a lid on oil prices 
in the wake of the renewed Iran 
sanctions. 
Advisors around the crown prince have 
therefore devised a new idea to raise 
funds outside the government balance 
sheet—and once again through 
Aramco. In July, it became known that 
the firm was preparing the acquisition 
of a majority stake in petrochemicals 
producer SABIC, the kingdom’s second 
largest firm, which is currently 
70 per cent PIF-owned. The purchase, 
which could set Aramco back $50–70 
billion, is expected to be mostly debt-
financed through a large international 
bond and bank loans. If the bond 
issuance happens, it is likely to be one 
of the largest in the history of emerging 
markets. 
The transaction would not affect the 
government’s own fiscal figures, yet 
would enable public spending through 
the PIF, which would receive huge 
liquid funds from Aramco. Aramco 
technocrats again do not appear to be 
happy about the plan, but are likely to 
go along: It is a less fundamental 
intervention than the IPO and 
potentially, in practice, a substitute for 
it. It is easier to pull off from a technical 
perspective, not least as Aramco has 
already undertaken significant private 
international borrowing and issued a 
domestic Islamic bond last year, at only 
a slight premium to sovereign debt and 
with minimal disclosure. 
In the long run, quasi-sovereign 
borrowing through Aramco is likely to 
crowd out sovereign bonds issued by 
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the central government. In the short 
run, given Saudi Arabia’s modest debt 
level (below 20 per cent of GDP), the 
market will be large enough to absorb 
both Aramco debt and moderate 
government borrowing. Aramco will 
need to disclose more financials for the 
bond issuance than it has ever done 
before, yet given the company’s cash 
flow and operational track record, 
investors are likely to demand less 
transparency than they would if they 
were obtaining equity in the firm. 
Outlook 
Aramco now has important and visible 
stakes in industrial diversification, 
domestic energy reform, national 
employment and entrepreneurship, and 
secondary, vocational and higher 
education. It has become a political 
player, but it is not run by politicians: 
Most of its senior management below 
the topmost level are primarily 
engineers, instinctively careful and 
probably lacking the appetite to get 
involved in more controversial policy 
fields, or the experience to defend the 
company’s interests publicly. Aramco 
will in the end fall in with the wishes of 
the political leadership—while tweaking 
their implementation to protect the firm. 
Even in its core mission, Saudi Aramco 
will have an ever tougher task. The 
window of acceptable oil prices is 
becoming ever narrower. It is 
constrained from the bottom by 
increasing spending needs: Although 
the fiscal break-even is somewhat 
lower than it was two years ago, it is 
likely to remain around $80 per barrel 
due to planned spending growth. It is 
constrained from the top by the need to 
placate the United States as well as 
concerns about reactivating shale 
investment and triggering demand 
destruction through high prices. The 
danger of an ever narrower price 
window has become real: According to 
Wood Mackenzie, the break-even price 
for US shale producers was $52 in 
2017. This was expected to drop to $44 
in 2018. At the same time, demand 
destruction becomes a threat at oil 
prices exceeding $80.      
The Saudi economy remains deeply oil-
dependent and hence dependent on 
Aramco. The company’s debt 
operations will provide some temporary 
fiscal space for government, but 
Aramco will remain in the spotlight and 
under pressure from various sides. 
Saudi Aramco remains by far the best 
national oil company in OPEC. Yet it 
faces new risks of domestic overstretch 
and new complexities of governance 
through the IPO and SABIC acquisition 
plans. The company has an 
unparalleled track record on building 
and managing large physical 
infrastructure. It remains to be seen 
how astute its engineers are in 
navigating the treacherous waters of 
industrial policy that it has been 
involved in more recently. It is too 
important an asset not to be used for 
diversification, but it will come under 
closer local and international scrutiny 
as a result. One of Aramco’s core 
strengths has always been to be 
perceived as separate from politics in 
Riyadh (and indeed, parts of its 
management are blissfully unaware of 
the goings-on among Riyadh-based 
elites). This stance will be harder to 
maintain as Aramco takes on more 
government tasks and becomes more 
visible through large-scale industrial 
and debt transactions. 
 
CLIMATE STRATEGY IN 




The threat that climate action poses to 
hydrocarbon rents is bringing about two 
policy shifts in producer countries. First, 
national leaders are finally getting 
serious about diversifying economies 
into non-oil enterprises, despite 
comparatively lacklustre prospects for 
profitability and rents. Second, 
policymakers are simultaneously 
protecting and enhancing the 
competitiveness of state-owned oil 
industries.  
The two strategies appear compatible. 
Diversification has been among the 
perennial recommendations of 
multilateral institutions. The urgency is 
heightened by climate policy and the 
possibility of long-term reduction in oil 
rents’ contribution to the state’s fiscal 
revenue. Diversification may be 
unattractive to a low-cost oil producer, 
but it is more attractive than standing 
by as the economic mainstay of the 
state is whittled away. The second 
strategy—the subject of this article—
has policymakers taking steps to 
protect the flow of oil and gas rents 
from climate action, by seeking ways to 
preserve market share for oil in general 
and by creating preferences for national 
supplies of crude oil as differentiated 
from grades produced by other 
countries. 
In the past, low-cost oil producers like 
Saudi Arabia responded to international 
climate negotiations in ways that 
ranged from noncommittal to 
obstructionist. Recently, Saudi Arabia 
has adopted a more nuanced and 
sophisticated climate strategy, driven in 
part by national oil company Saudi 
Aramco, which has played a leading 
role in the kingdom’s approach to 
climate change. Several Aramco 
employees are on the Saudi climate 
negotiating team, which is under the 
control of the Ministry of Energy, 
Industry, and Mineral Resources. One 
member is an acknowledged author of 
the 2018 Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change report. Deep 
involvement in global climate policy 
may have helped Aramco design a 
strategy that could preserve its role, 
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and that of crude oil, in a future global 
economy beset by restrictions on fossil 
fuels. 
Some of the strategies that Saudi 
Arabia has developed alter the nature 
of its future participation in the oil 
business. From simply supplying crude 
oil, the kingdom is increasing its 
involvement in refined oil and gas 
products, as well as in import markets 
and oil-consuming technology. Three of 
these strategies are discussed below. 
Strategy no. 1: ‘dig in’—reduce the 
vulnerability of the oil sector to 
climate action 
Saudi Arabia finds itself on the front 
lines of climate change in several ways: 
as a major fossil fuel consumer and 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emitter, as the 
world’s largest commercial source of 
GHGs (Saudi Aramco’s oil and gas 
production is behind roughly 
4.3 per cent of current global GHG 
emissions—Mayer and Rajavuori, 
2016), and as an early victim of climate 
damage through extreme temperatures. 
However, to national oil company 
executives, the default concern about 
climate change tends to be the indirect 
threat posed to oil demand and exports, 
rather than the direct threat to 
habitability of the national territory. As a 
result, national policymakers have been 
‘digging in’ in various ways to protect 
their economies against the aims of 
GHG accords such as the 2015 Paris 
Agreement.  
Petrochemicals and noncombustion 
uses for crudes 
Conversion of unburned crude oil and 
natural gas into chemical products may 
be Saudi Aramco’s most promising 
climate hedge. Chemicals represent a 
growing ‘climate-proof’ use for 
hydrocarbons, through which oil and 
gas feedstocks are converted into 
precursor resins and polymers that 
form the basis for finished products 
ranging from plastic auto components 
to foam cushions, paint, and even 
toothpaste. As in the manufacture of 
lubricants, the carbon from oil and gas 
is sequestered in the finished product—
rather than released upon combustion, 
as is the case with gasoline and other 
fuels. 
Saudi-based companies have made 
major investments in petrochemical 
plants, including the $20 billion Sadara 
joint venture with Dow Chemical, the 
largest single-phase chemical plant 
ever built. Demand for plastic goods is 
closely correlated with GDP growth, 
with large markets emerging in 
developing countries where populations 
are moving into the middle class. 
Differentiating among crude oil 
grades by carbon intensity  
Saudi Arabia also seeks to leverage a 
competitive advantage of its crudes: 
their low upstream carbon intensity. 
Carbon intensity of crude oil varies 
substantially from country to country, 
and Saudi Arabia is among the very 
lowest emitters of CO2 per unit of oil 
extracted, about 3.5 g of CO2 
equivalent per megajoule (MJ) of oil 
produced, according to a paper in 
Science (Masnadi et al., 2018a). In the 
highest emitters, Algeria and 
Venezuela, upstream emissions 
average more than 20 g CO2/MJ. Low 
upstream emissions in Saudi Arabia 
are due to the low levels of energy 
expended in lifting crude oil from the 
reservoir to the surface, and in 
processing and transporting it. 
Minimized associated gas flaring in 
Saudi Arabia and some of its 
neighbours, such as the United Arab 
Emirates, Qatar, and Kuwait, also 
contributes.  
Other neighbours, such as Iran and 
Iraq, flare gas at high rates, which 
increases the carbon footprint of their 
crudes. Gas wasted during the US 
shale boom has turned the United 
States into another flaring front runner, 
raising the average carbon intensity of 
US oil to 12 g CO2/MJ, above the 
global average of 10.3.  
Given such a timely advantage, Saudi 
Aramco has begun highlighting the low 
carbon intensity of its crude oil. In the 
future, the company could use its 
environmental edge as a marketing 
strategy. Low carbon intensity could 
even translate into a price advantage in 
countries that levy carbon taxes, if 
carbon taxes were designed to 
differentiate among crude grades by 
carbon intensity. More typically, carbon 
taxes apply an average value to oil 
products irrespective of origin.  




GHG intensity  
(g CO2 eq/megajoule) 
Upstream GHG tax per barrel Total GHG tax a Oil price @ $70/barrel 
@ $25/tonne @ $50/tonne @ $25/tonne @ $50/tonne + $25 tax + $50 tax 
Saudi average 3.5 $0.54 $1.07 $11.64 $23.28 $81.64 $93.28 
Venezuelan 
Orinoco 
31.9 $4.88 $9.76 $15.98 $31.97 $85.98 $101.97 
a This includes upstream CO2 emissions as well as those from transport, refining, and final combustion. Venezuelan heavy crude oil typically 
sells at a discount to more valuable lighter grades, a distinction that is not captured in this analysis. 
Source: Baker Institute using CO2 intensities from Masnadi et al. (2018b). 
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As the table above shows, Saudi 
medium crude priced at $70/barrel with 
a $25/ton carbon tax would cost $81.64 
per barrel. A barrel of Venezuelan 
Orinoco crude would be priced at 
$85.98, a $4.34 premium. At a $50 
carbon tax, the effect would be 
magnified: the Saudi barrel would be 
nearly $9 cheaper.  
Backing internal combustion 
engines over electric vehicles 
The kingdom has also made strategic 
investments to improve engine 
efficiency so that gasoline engines 
remain cost-competitive with electric 
vehicles, which rely on power 
generation feedstocks that rarely 
include oil. In August 2018, Saudi 
Aramco announced it would cooperate 
with Japanese auto manufacturer 
Mazda to develop more efficient 
combustion engines and gasoline that 
would reduce GHG emissions from the 
transport sector. These developments 
would improve petroleum’s 
competitiveness versus alternative 
fuels and technologies.  
‘Locking in’ market share through 
refining 
Saudi Aramco has also created foreign 
joint ventures in refineries configured 
for Saudi crude oil, all but assuring the 
kingdom a share of the market in 
countries where it has invested. 
Aramco has bought stakes in refineries 
in China, South Korea, Japan, 
Malaysia, India, and the United States. 
Similarly, the Kuwait Petroleum Co. has 
purchased a stake in a refinery in 
Vietnam configured around Kuwaiti 
crude. These investments in vertical 
integration enable preferential access 
to crudes from states with ownership 
stakes.  
Strategy no. 2: ‘join in’ climate 
action 
As international resolve has coalesced 
around the desirability of GHG 
mitigation, Saudi Arabia has, at times, 
shifted its public stance from 
obstruction to open support for climate 
action. Energy minister Khalid Al-Falih 
has supported the Paris accord as 
‘balanced and fair’, saying in a 2017 
ministry press release that the kingdom 
was ‘determined to see it implemented’. 
The Paris Agreement also provides 
useful political cover for unpopular—
albeit environmentally beneficial—
actions like Saudi Arabia’s reforms of 
energy subsidies in 2016 and 2018. 
These reforms have economically 
rational goals of reducing government 
spending on energy provision and 
decreasing the ‘cannibalism’ of 
exportable energy commodities, while 
allowing renewables to compete more 
readily with fossil generation. Subsidy 
retractions serve double duty as 
environmental policy, since they also 
reduce growth in the kingdom’s GHG 
emissions.  
Internationally, Saudi Arabia promotes 
a different ‘join in’ strategy, featuring 
efforts that protect the interests of oil-
exporting states in ways that do not 
harm demand for fossil fuels. 
Supported strategies include the 
following: 
 Carbon capture and storage—
This actually increases fossil 
fuel input for the same energy 
output, because capturing and 
compressing CO2 requires 
combustion of additional fuel.  
 Flaring reductions—Saudi 
Arabia seeks to persuade other 
countries to reduce upstream 
emissions so as to reduce 
pressure to curtail final 
consumption. 
 Focus on GHGs other than 
CO2—Saudi officials want more 
attention paid to GHGs such as 
methane and nitrous oxides, 
which, although a smaller 
portion of overall emissions, 
have much higher heat-trapping 
properties than CO2. 
The Saudi international climate 
negotiation brief also argues that fossil 
fuels should be retained in a future 
energy mix due to their synergies with 
renewables. The kingdom sees CO2 
emissions as a harmful side effect that 
can be mitigated with technological 
solutions. In 2014, Saudi Aramco joined 
the Oil and Gas Climate Initiative, a 
group of 11 major oil companies each 
pledging $100 million for research into 
low-emissions fossil fuel technology.   
In the coming years, the kingdom and 
Saudi Aramco appear likely to highlight 
these efforts, as well as the low carbon 
intensity of its crude, lack of flaring and 
fugitive methane, and investments in 
high-efficiency engines to claim 
credentials as an environmentally 
responsible supplier of necessary fossil 
fuels.  
Strategy no. 3: ‘throw in’ and accept 
climate damage 
Saudi Aramco and other fossil fuel 
producers, scholars, and sympathetic 
elites have been promoting a relaxed 
path toward decarbonization that 
amounts to a concession (‘throwing in 
the towel’) that 2°C emissions limits are 
too costly and disruptive. The 
‘pragmatic’ climate strategy, as outlined 
by Gross and Matsuo (2017), argues 
that trade-offs are needed between 
mitigation costs and allowances for 
losses, even if the result means that 
average warming reaches 3°C and 
brings increased climate damage. 
Proponents argue that damage costs 
would be more than offset by 
reductions in spending on mitigation, 
and by reduced economic losses 
among producer governments.  
However, the coalition’s estimates of 
mitigation costs are based on modelling 
carbon taxes required to bring about 
sufficient reductions in demand. A very 
brief comparison of actual climate 
damage costs and hypothetical lost 
revenue highlights potential 
weaknesses in the assumptions used.  
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In 2017, the United States alone 
experienced a record $306 billion in 
damages from weather and climate 
disasters. That amount is almost five 
times the 2017 revenues of Saudi 
Aramco (roughly $65 billion) and more 
than 70 per cent of OPEC’s 2016 oil 
export revenues. If anthropogenic 
climate factors were responsible for 20 
per cent of the damage—due to 
intensified drought-induced wildfires 
and flooding from extreme rainfall—
paying for that portion alone would 
require Saudi Aramco’s entire 2017 
revenues. Of course, 20 per cent may 
be too large an estimate of the 
anthropogenic role, but the damages 
tallied are also incomplete and do not 
account for heat-related mortality, 
decreased crop yield, increased 
electricity demand, and other factors 
such as negative feedback loops from 
shrinking snow and ice cover, or 
methane releases from thawing 
permafrost. 
In summary, the ‘throw in’ strategy 
revolves around speculation that 
improved technology will emerge in the 
future and reduce GHG emissions 
without terminating the fossil fuel 
industry. Given that such technologies 
have yet to be demonstrated or 
deployed, the strategy may be 
described as a nuanced update of 
Saudi Arabia’s prior obstructionist 
approach.  
The Saudi advantage 
Saudi Arabia has developed a 
sophisticated climate strategy that 
leverages its significant advantages as 
a low-cost oil producer with substantial 
market and investment power. The 
kingdom has staked out an early 
advantage in noncombustion uses for 
oil and gas, and has made investments 
that should place it in a strong future 
position as a relevant supplier. 
However, it is worth noting that the 
strategies outlined range from activities 
that would bring a decrease in 
emissions—at least at the margins—to 
those that would increase or prolong 
them. To the extent that these tactics 
assist in the marketing of fuels that 
continue to be combusted in unabated 
fashion, they prolong damage to the 
Earth’s climate, geography, inhabitants, 
and their property, despite providing 
short-run economic benefits, 
particularly in developing countries. 
 




Norway has experienced substantial 
success in managing its oil and gas 
wealth. It has converted a large part of 
its reserves to financial assets, with a 
sovereign wealth fund equivalent to 2.5 
times its GDP. This is a unique 
accomplishment. The closest historical 
parallel is Britain, which before World 
War I had external assets amounting to 
twice its GDP (Picketty, 2014) – but 
that wealth was mainly owned by 
private individuals, while Norway’s fund 
is a way to take care of the collective 
savings of the Norwegian people . 
The Norwegian Oil Fund (formally 
known as the Government Pension 
Fund Global (GPFG)), which has strict 
limits on annual withdrawals, has 
helped Norway avoid turning into a 
rentier state. The country has 
maintained a diversified economic 
structure even though its important oil- 
and gas-related supply industry has 
made it industrially more dependent on 
the hydrocarbon sector. 
The Oil Fund as an instrument of 
diversification 
The Oil Fund serves as a savings fund 
to prepare Norway for future pension 
commitments. But it also prepares the 
country for a new low-carbon energy 
system. Energy markets are likely to 
change fundamentally during the 
coming decades. The world is moving 
towards low-carbon energy; the great 
uncertainty is how quickly this energy 
transition will occur. This will put 
existing oil and gas producers, 
including Norway, under much more 
pressure as their main source of 
income is likely to diminish over time. It 
is in Norway’s interest to transfer as 
much wealth as possible from oil in the 
ground to other forms of capital before 
these assets risk becoming worthless. 
The Oil Fund is instrumental in this 
transfer (even though this was not its 
original purpose).  
The Oil Fund also operates as a 
stabilization fund to even out 
fluctuations in oil revenues by 
separating the earning and spending of 
those revenues. A “spending cap” limits 
the amount of money which yearly can 
be transferred from the Fund to the 
budget to 3 percent of the value of the 
fund. This figure is an average over the 
business cycle. It is set about one per 
cent below the historic real rate of 
return of the Oil Fund. This has led to 
greater macroeconomic stability, 
greater ability to live with market risk, 
and less vulnerability to the potential 
negative effects of oil income on 
economic diversification. The Oil Fund 
stands out as the most important 
diversification policy of the Norwegian 
oil age.  
The oil revenue mechanism 
The Oil Fund was created in 1990 and 
became operational in 1996, more than 
20 years after production started on the 
Norwegian continental shelf. At the 
start, it was considered a fiscal 
instrument to smooth volatile income 
streams. It was much later that it 
became an intergenerational savings 
fund. 
Norway channels all its state revenues 
from oil and gas into the Oil Fund. This 
is different from almost all other oil- and 
gas-producing states. There are, 
however, some hybrid solutions. 
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Russia, for example, puts aside all 
‘excess’ income (unspecified) into its 
National Wealth Fund, while feeding 
the rest into the budget (IEA, 2018). 
Direct Norwegian government 
participation in the industry through the 
State’s Direct Financial Investment (a 
portfolio of the Norwegian 
government’s directly owned 
exploration and production licensees) 
along with an extraordinary tax rate for 
oil companies, currently at 78 per cent, 
ensure that most of the resource rents 
flow into government coffers. 
All the government’s income from the 
sector—consisting of taxes, cash flow 
from the State’s Direct Financial 
Investment, and dividends from the 
state’s equity share of Equinor 
(formerly Statoil)—is injected into the 
Oil Fund. All the Fund’s capital is 
invested abroad. The 3 per cent 
spending cap guides the annual 
transfers from the fund to the fiscal 
budget. 
Today, equities make up 66 per cent of 
the Fund’s assets; 31 per cent is in 
bonds, and 3 per cent in unlisted 
property. The greater part of the 
portfolio is held in OECD countries. 
Norway, a nation of 5.3 million 
inhabitants, today owns 1.4 per cent of 
all global equity (2.4 per cent of all 
European equity). The average real 
rate of return net of administrative costs 
from 1996 to 2017 was 4 per cent, 0.25 
per cent higher than a chosen 
reference index. The fund has helped 
to set a global ‘gold standard’ for 
transparency and governance of 
sovereign wealth funds (SWFI, 2018) 
Sustainability principles 
The Fund also adheres to broad and 
accepted sustainability principles. Its 
emphasis is on intergenerational 
principles, environmental issues, and 
ethical behaviour. This is in line with the 
first Brundtland Report, which defined 
sustainability as ‘development that 
meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future 
generations’ (WCED, 1987, 43). 
Another definition of economic 
sustainability states that a country’s 
national wealth per capita should 
remain intact over time (NOU, 2005). 
This means that as a country extracts a 
non-renewable commodity like oil, the 
consumed capital should be substituted 
by other forms of capital. This is exactly 
what the Oil Fund does.  
The Fund’s ethical   standards prohibit 
investments that break fundamental 
ethical norms, manufacture certain 
types of weapons, base their 
operations on coal or produce tobacco. 
The Fund expects the companies in the 
portfolio to address a number of global 
challenges that largely coincide with 
UN Sustainable Development Goals 
ranging from climate change and water 
management to anti-corruption and tax 
transparency. 
In March 2019 the Norwegian 
government proposed to divest 134 
upstream oil and gas companies from 
the Oil Fund. This represents less than 
one percent of the value of the portfolio 
because the majors integrated 
companies were not among the chosen 
companies.  The government said the 
proposal was meant to decrease the 
Fund’s aggregate oil price risk and was 
not related to climate change. Others 
have seen the divestment as a 
important symbolic “first move” that 
recognizes the financial risk associated 
with climate change and that may set a 
precedent for other global funds.  
(For a more detailed description of the 
Oil Fund, see www.nbim.no) 
A 67 per cent savings rate 
The government has, since the creation 
of the Oil Fund, saved 67 percent of its 
net cash flow from the petroleum 
sector. The figure below shows the 
relationship between government oil 
revenues (net cash flow) and how 
much of these have been spent 
(Statistics Norway, 2018). The 
savings rate increases to 82 
per cent if the cumulative return 
from investments in the fund is 
added to government oil 
revenue.  
The result of the savings is that 
the Oil Fund has become the 
world’s largest sovereign wealth 
fund. Its value by the end of 
2018 ($1 trillion) corresponds to 
approximately to 2.5 times the 
Norwegian GDP or around 
$190,000 per Norwegian citizen. 
Petroleum revenues and government spending as a percentage of GDP 
 
Source: Olsen (2018) 
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There are several reasons for this high 
savings rate. From the beginning of 
Norway’s oil era in the early 1970s, 
there has been a national consensus 
that Norway should not become a 
‘rentier economy’ (Parliamentary 
Report, 1973). Norwegians have been 
particularly concerned about not  
succumbing to the ‘Dutch disease’— 
which refers to the negative effects of 
oil and gas income that have often 
crowded out traditional industry though 
the wage mechanism (Corden and 
Neary, 1982).  
To prevent such an outcome, 
policymakers initially set a physical 
production limit (90 million tons of oil 
equivalent per year). Later, the Oil 
Fund with its 3 per cent spending cap 
became the primary prevention 
mechanism. A fund like this is easy to 
establish but extremely difficult to 
manage over time. Its success is 
largely due to its high quality of 
governance, effective institutions, and 
political legitimacy in Norwegian 
society. 
Timing is another important reason for 
the high savings ratio. A great part of 
the Norwegian oil rent was collected 
during the ‘commodity super cycle’ in 
the first decade of the 21st century, 
when China’s demand for raw materials 
drove commodity prices to new highs. 
The sudden surge in income was so 
overwhelming that it would have been 
virtually impossible to consume it all. 
Economic theory indicates that there is 
a lag to learn to consume as income 
increases.  
Transformation of capital from oil in 
the ground to financial assets  
Even more impressive than building a 
world-class institution and the world’s 
largest sovereign wealth fund is the 
way Norway has managed to transform 
one form of wealth (oil in the ground) to 
another (financial wealth). This 
transformation is the ultimate example 
of diversification by a resource-rich 
country. 
In 2006, financial 
wealth in the Oil 
Fund made up a 
little less than 50 
per cent of the 
value of remaining 
oil and gas 
reserves. By2017, 
financial wealth 
had reached 200 





about the value of 
the remaining oil 
and gas reserves, especially given the 
rapid changes expected in global 
energy markets. But the rate of 
transformation has clearly increased 
during this period.  There is no doubt 
about the direction of the change. 
Both dependent on and independent 
of the oil price 
Following the dramatic fall in the oil 
price in 2014, Norway avoided a 
recession by pursuing a counter-
cyclical economic policy financed by 
the existing assets in the Oil Fund.  The 
Norwegian government did not need to 
balance its budget by cutting 
expenditure and investments because 
oil income dropped. The reason being 
that government spending in Norway is 
largely independent of the current oil 
price.  
The build-up of the Oil Fund and the 3 
per cent spending rule ensures that oil 
and gas related spending only depends 
on past savings (the value of the fund), 
and not on current oil and gas prices. 
The short run fiscal break-even oil price 
(the price that is necessary for 
balancing the Norwegian budget) is 
therefore technically zero.  
Again, Norway’s position differs from 
the majority of petroleum producing 
states. The International Monetary 
Fund estimated that in 2017, 11 Middle 
Eastern and Central Asian oil 
producers had an average fiscal break-
even price of around $70/barrel (IMF, 
2018).  As prices fell in 2014 a number 
of these countries dramatically cut their 
budgets. 
But should the oil price remain at zero 
in the long run, Norway would of course 
have less income available to spend for 
future generations. In such a case the 
Fund would only grow due to financial 
return from the existing assets. This is, 
however, not a trivial observation. 
Cumulative financial returns in the Oil 
Fund during the period 2014-17 were 
higher than net income from oil and 
gas. 
The Norwegian government and 
society should therefore be just as 
concerned about the state of the world 
economy, which defines the value of 
the Oil Fund, as about current oil and 
gas prices.  
Industrial oil dependence  
Norway has built a large industrial 
sector that supply goods and services 
to the oil industry. This sector is 
internationally competitive, 
technologically sophisticated and highly 
profitable. Thirty-five per cent of its 
production is exported and Norway is 
world leader in areas like underwater 
production systems.  
When oil prices crashed in 2014 the 
main negative effects were felt by the 
Transformation from natural to financial wealth 
 (billions of Norwegian kroner)  
 
Source:  Matsen (2018) 
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supply industry. Yearly investments in 
this sector (19 per cent of all Norwegian 
investments) fell by 34 per cent while 
15,000 jobs were shed. The damage 
was especially felt regionally on the 
Western Coast.   
This was a very painful process and 
showed that Norway, despite its macro-
economic resilience, has paid some 
heavy costs for being industrially 
dependent on the oil and gas sector.  
There are three take-aways from this 
experience: 
 Building a supply industry sector 
has not been at the expense of 
maintaining a diversified 
economic structure. Norway is 
today the world’s largest fish 
exporter while maintaining its role 
as a major producer and exporter 
of hydropower.    
 Norwegian industry showed itself 
to be more flexible and robust 
than expected in moving to new 
activities after 2014. Equinor used 
its offshore skills to start an 
intensive investment program of 
floating offshore wind turbines.  
The fish farming industry is 
developing scale solutions partly 
inspired by technology developed 
by the petroleum sector.  
 The government’s flexible 
exchange rate policy has 
significantly helped the national 
diversification process 
How sustainable is the Oil Fund? 
What is taken as a given by one 
generation can fundamentally change 
by the next. The United Kingdom lost 
its net foreign asset position during 
1914–1950 as a result of three factors: 
the collapse of the foreign portfolio; two 
world wars, and lower domestic savings 
that led to a draw-down of foreign 
assets (Picketty, 2014, 155). 
A combination of exogenous and 
endogenous factors can change 
Norway’s position.  
 What will happen if Norway 
simultaneously experiences an 
erosion of the value of Fund 
capital, a faster than expected 
increase in state expenses, and 
falling return on investments?   
 This is not a wholly speculative 
scenario. Government 
expenditure has grown 
dramatically. In 2005, transfers 
from the Oil Fund constituted 5 
per cent of government income, 
while in 2018 this figure was 18 
per cent. While expenditure 
continued to stay inside the 
spending cap, the size of the 
fund has increased so much that 
the size of the transfer can 
threaten the very success of 
diversification.   
 A dramatic international 
economic collapse with equity 
prices in free fall would shrink 
the value of the Fund. The Bank 
of Norway has tested scenarios 
under which value could decline 
by up to 40 per cent. But it is 
highly unlikely that there will be 
a prolonged recession, and the 
value of the fund is very likely to 
eventually recover. It may be 
necessary to draw down the 
Fund’s capital in case of natural 
disasters or military conflict, like 
the United Kingdom did in the 
two world wars. 
 Populism is on the rise 
everywhere. Political forces may 
start to ask why they do not get 
more out of the Fund to support 
present consumption. There 
have already been serious 
discussions about whether 
Norway saves too much and 
consumption could be higher 
(Gagnon, 2018). Is there an 
optimum size for the Oil Fund? 
 No studies have been 
undertaken to compare the 
Fund’s performance with that of 
peers like the Singapore 
Investment Corporation. Will 
there be a reaction the Fund is 
perceived to have 
underperformed? 
Norway can to some extent plan to 
meet these exogenous and 
endogenous dangers. It can influence 
the growth in state expenditure and 
how much is withdrawn annually from 
the Oil Fund. But it will have very little 
influence on factors like global 
recessions or external conflicts. 
Can GCC countries learn from 
Norway’s experience?  
Norway is not a model that other 
countries can blindly copy. Political, 
social, and legal contexts differ 
dramatically between countries. Most 
importantly, Norway has not been 
under intense pressure, like many other 
oil-producing states have, to satisfy 
demands for basic services like health, 
education, and basic infrastructure. 
That said, some of Norway’s 
experiences are worth considering. The 
Norwegian sovereign wealth fund and 
its 3 per cent spending cap have 
contributed to macroeconomic stability 
and helped the country avoid the ‘Dutch 
disease’.  Flexible exchange rate 
policies have helped this diversification 
and strong and competent institutions 
and good governance have been 
essential to its success. Norway has 
also managed to build a world-class oil 
and gas supply industry while 
maintaining a diversified economy. 
But in the end it is about politics. The 
Oil Fund has enjoyed a high degree of 
legitimacy in the population. If that 
continues, Norway will be in a strong 
position to confront both external and 
internal challenges. But if, for whatever 
reasons, the political legitimacy of the 
Fund should weaken, Norway’s 
situation could quickly change.  
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